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Reconstructing Celibacy: Sexual Renunciation in the First Three Centuries of the 
Early Church 
 
Abstract 
 
 This thesis explores the philosophical and theological motivations for early 
Christian celibacy prior to the appearance of monasticism. This thesis will challenge 
recent scholarly positions that portray early Christian celibacy only in light of the 
emergence of monasticism in the fourth century, and which argue that celibacy as an 
ascetic practice was motivated primarily by resistance to the dominant social structures of 
antiquity. The practice of celibacy was a significant movement in the early church well 
before the appearance of monasticism or the development of Christianity as the dominant 
social force in the empire, and although early Christian sexual austerity was similar to the 
sexual ethics of Greco-Roman philosophical constructs, early Christian sexual ethics had 
developed in relation to uniquely Christian theological and cosmological views. 
Moreover, a segment of the early Christian community idealized celibacy as an 
expression of the transformation of human nature amidst a community that continued to 
remain sexually austere in general. 
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Foreword 
 The complexity that confronts anyone studying early Christian celibacy is 
daunting, to say the least.  The primary documents and secondary studies concerning 
celibacy in the early church confront one with a myriad of historical, textual, cultural and 
methodological questions, all set within a modern field of study that lacks unity with 
regard to a theoretical approach to the study of religion in general.  In addition, the 
practice of sexual renunciation, as contrary to basic human biological and social 
behaviour, stands as a puzzling but seemingly widespread aspect of religion, which only 
adds to the complexity of the issues surrounding its practice.  This thesis is an attempt to 
sort through the jungle of ancient and modern texts dealing with celibacy in the early 
Christian church. 
 In particular, this thesis will attempt to answer the simple question of why early 
Christianity engaged in celibacy as an ideal practice.  This necessarily means that how the 
practice developed as a historical reality must be examined, as well as what sorts of 
things motivated early Christians to practice sexual renunciation as a spiritual discipline.  
Contrary to recent scholarship, this thesis will take a methodological position that 
emphasizes the importance of theological and cosmological speculation as the central 
motivator behind celibacy, and will attempt to demonstrate that academic explorations of 
asceticism in the past twenty years have not only failed to account for the entire historical 
situation in regard to early Christian celibacy, but have also left a portion of historical 
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 data on celibacy largely unexplored. The methods of post-modern criticism, at least in the 
study of early Christianity, have redefined celibacy and asceticism as a kind of social 
resistance within a given society, and assumed that the role of asceticism is primarily a 
social one.  This a priori assumption about the nature of asceticism has led to recent 
misinterpretations of historical data, as well as causing a large portion of historical data to 
be overlooked, oversimplified or simply dismissed. 
 This thesis, then, will ultimately argue that early Christian idealization of celibacy 
had its roots in the late first and early second century as an amalgamation of Christian 
theology with Greco-Roman concepts of human anthropology.1  The rises of institutional 
monasticism, and the ascendancy of rhetorical support for celibacy in the fourth century 
church, reflect the complicity of the Greco-Roman culture with the Christianisation of the 
empire. In addition, it will be argued that monasticism was not so much the initial ascetic 
impulse of early Christianity as it was the employment and transformation of an already 
well established ascetic form with much earlier roots.  It will be argued, therefore, that 
religious concerns motivate celibacy, which in turn creates social ramifications as the 
natural by-product of a new belief system.  Modern scholarly treatments, then, have 
placed the cart before the horse, so to speak.  The attempt to define asceticism and 
celibacy primarily as social discourses does not represent the historical reality of celibacy 
in the early church and results in the misrepresentation of the nature of early Christian 
celibacy, treating it as an ahistorical and areligious counter-cultural force. 
                                                          
1 Here it must be noted that the term “anthropology” will be used in a very narrowly defined sense for this 
thesis. Anthropology, in this sense will be used to refer the concepts and constructs specifically pertaining 
to the ancient understanding of human nature and the relationships between the physical, spiritual and 
ethical elements of human beings. In that regard, the term “anthropology” will not be used in any way that 
one might expect to find in the modern academic field of anthropology.  
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  In order to proceed logically through this argument, this thesis will have four 
progressive discussions.  In the first chapter, the recent historical conclusions and 
methodological perspectives on asceticism and celibacy will be discussed, with an aim to 
demonstrating the scholarly shift towards describing celibacy as a social discourse, and to 
show how these discussions do not take into account the full range of historical data.  The 
second chapter will be a re-examination of the primary sources on early Christian 
asceticism in order to gain a full perspective of the historical data on the subject.  Third, a 
chapter will be dedicated to comprehending the Greco-Roman philosophical standards on 
sexuality so that a proper comparison can be made to determine what changes early 
Christian theology brought about in order to produce such an idealization of celibacy.  
Finally, a fourth chapter will focus on the early Christian texts of the first through third 
centuries in order to examine the nature of theological and philosophical motivations for 
celibacy.  In particular, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate how the early Christian 
conception of human anthropology in regard to Christ, the Holy Spirit, sin, salvation and 
the telos of human existence, produced the belief that human nature could be transformed 
through the practice of asceticism.  
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 Chapter One - A Survey of Scholarship on Asceticism and Celibacy 
I. Early Scholarship on Asceticism 
 Presentation of the history and motivations behind celibacy, and asceticism in 
general, naturally has a history of its own.  Prior to the Reformation, Enlightenment and 
rise of scientific theory, the western and eastern churches had their own version of the 
history of asceticism that was rooted in their confessional commitment to celibacy’s 
superiority. Faith in the histories found in the writings of the church and desert fathers 
was firm, and their presentation of asceticism tended to be a linear progression reflecting 
the growth of Christianity as the superior culture of the empire and the rise of virginity as 
a reflection of God’s victory over “pagan” immorality.  For centuries, asceticism and 
celibacy represented the culmination of God’s work of salvation that transformed the 
Roman empire into this City of God, and ascetics across Europe, well into the middle 
ages, understood their own activities to be continuous with a tradition rooted in the 
glorious days of the heroic Anthony and Pachomius.  It was thought that Anthony and 
Pachomius were the pioneers of the ascetic process that brought temporal human 
existence even closer to the eternal through the disciplines of desert and monastery. Their 
appearance was nothing short of a miraculous movement of God designed to inaugurate 
his kingdom on earth.2  
 This confessional and idealistic view of the early church and the development of 
asceticism was, of course, challenged in the centuries following the Protestant 
Reformation and the rise of Enlightenment and scientific thinking.  On the one hand, an 
                                                          
2 Even in the present, one can find this view still put forward as modern Christian monastics wrestle with 
their vocation. See for example, T. Merton’s The Silent Life (New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1957) or 
J.M. Talbot’s Hermitage - A Place of Prayer and Spiritual Renewal: Its Heritage and Challenge for the 
Future (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1989). 
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 internal dialogue continued about asceticism within the Christian church, only it was now 
reworked in the light of Protestant and Roman Catholic doctrine.  Catholics continued to 
defend the history of asceticism and its monastic institutions, particularly in light of their 
perceived sacramental value.  Naturally, Protestants often rejected the role of asceticism 
in salvation or spiritual life. For example, concerning monasticism Martin Luther wrote, 
“Here let us lay our rock and foundation, our first principle of faith, namely, the words of 
Paul in Romans 14, ‘Everything that is not of faith is sin.’ From this we infer that 
monastic vows, if not of faith are sins. Moreover, if these vows are life long, compulsory 
and not optional, they are not of faith.”3 On the other hand, Enlightenment thought that 
challenged the historical claims of the Christian church simply viewed asceticism as an 
aberration that demonstrated the irrational nature of religion.  By the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, works appeared portraying asceticism as a pathological perversion 
of sexual and social impulses.4  One can hardly forget, for example, the numerous 
scathing comments by Gibbon condemning asceticism and celibacy as among the many 
species of tyranny and superstition that so tragically regressed the civilization of Rome.5 
 By the twentieth century, after a series of new textual discoveries as well as a 
methodological shift that leaned towards social scientific theory, scholarly perception of 
asceticism had gained a bit more balance and sought to explain asceticism as a historical 
phenomenon that was intricately linked to the social situations of the Roman Empire.  A 
more historical-critical approach to early Christian texts highlighted and adjusted to the 
                                                          
3 Martin Luther, On Monastic Vows, II. See Luther’s Works, American Edition, Vol. 44, J. Atkinson & H.T. 
Lehmann eds. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 243-400. 
4 R. Valantasis & V.L. Wimbush, “Introduction” in Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush & R. Valantasis, eds. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. xxi. 
5 For example, Gibbon opens his chapter on the rise of monasticism: “…the Ascetics, who obeyed and 
abused the rigid precepts of the Gospel, were inspired by the savage enthusiasm which represents man as a 
criminal.” See The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Dent, 1962), XXXVII.1.  
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 rhetorical nature of the texts.  As a result, scholars focused on the real practices of 
ascetics gleaned from the texts, and attempted to locate the real experiences of ascetics 
and how they were related to Greco-Roman culture.  Moving away from the 
Romanticized confessional approaches, scholars consequently came to understand 
asceticism as a complex set of practices that interacted with many levels of both the 
church and society. 
II. Twentieth Century Scholarship on Asceticism 
 In the twentieth century, the origins of Christian asceticism and sexual 
renunciation have been linked primarily to the emergence of monasticism in the early 
fourth century. Surveys of the history of asceticism generally acknowledge that an 
undeveloped and limited ascetic practice existed in isolated areas of Christianity prior to 
ca. 300 CE, at which time there seems to have been an explosion in the practice and 
extent of asceticism and celibacy across early Christianity as a whole.6 That is, beginning 
in the early 300s, substantial numbers of Christians suddenly abandoned their normal 
cultural positions to pursue a life in singular pursuit of a spiritual existence. Leaving 
behind family, wealth and social status, these individuals would move to the desert to live 
an ascetic life rooted in celibacy, fasting and a variety of spiritual disciplines. Some lived 
in isolation as hermits, while others banded together to form communities, and both 
“forms” of ascetic lifestyle had their heroic founders in the persons of Anthony and 
Pachomius. The movement of people from towns, cities and villages to the desert was so 
great that it prompted Athanasius in his Life of Anthony to comment that the ascetics had 
                                                          
6 J. Goehring calls it the “Big Bang Theory” of monasticism. See his “The Origins of Monasticism” in 
Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism, eds. H.W. Attridge and G. Hata (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1992), pp. 235-55. 
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 “made the desert a city.”7 The values and ethos of the monastic life became ideals of 
Christian spirituality, and the monastics of the desert were held to be superior examples 
of the truly Christian life. 
As scholars of the twentieth century understood it, the broad picture of an 
ascetic/monastic life was one of anachoresis, askesis and enkrateia. 8 Anachoresis, or 
“withdrawal”, represented the movement from the city to the desert, while askesis, that is, 
the “discipline” rooted in celibacy, fasting, poverty and a variety of spiritual practices, 
provided the path to enkrateia, or “self-mastery.”  Anachoresis first removed the 
individual from the temptation of sexuality, family, wealth and power, and askesis then 
allowed individuals to overcome their own nature through rigorous hard work. The 
stories of Anthony and Pachomius, as well as the numerous anecdotes of the desert 
fathers found in the Apothegmata Patrum, all depicted the ascetic life as one of wrestling 
with self and demons, avoiding sexual desire, engaging in hard labour, enduring hunger, 
reading scripture and battling temptation. When ascetics had attained a level of discipline 
to be successful in their askesis, they had achieved enkrateia, the self-mastery that would 
ultimately aid in the transformation of their soul into a sanctified being.  
 The heart of the monastic and ascetic explosion was the practice of celibacy, and 
sexual renunciation was expected of both male and female monastics. In the accounts of 
both the lives of Pachomius and Anthony, the struggle against sexual desire looms large, 
and as heroic examples of the monastic life, they embraced celibacy as the core of the 
                                                          
7 Life of Anthony, 14:865. 
8 Kalistos Ware, “The Way of the Ascetics: Negative or Positive?” in Asceticism, Wimbush, V.L. & 
Valantasis, R. eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-15. 
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 monastic life.9 Not only was sexual activity presented as a struggle with the “demon of 
fornication”, it was also portrayed in terms of an antithesis between the desert and the 
world. Celibacy was the first movement of askesis toward personal sanctification and the 
pivotal move to separate oneself from the world (anachoresis), which was the location of 
everything opposed to God. Indeed, only a few decades after the emergence of 
Pachomius and Anthony, Gregory of Nyssa can confidently say that sexual activity is the 
first link in a “chain” of vice that will lead to the soul’s descent into sin, while celibacy is 
the “science”10 of assimilating one’s nature with the divine.11 Simply put, one could not 
be a monastic without being celibate as well.  
  Moreover, scholars argued that in the years following the conversion of 
Constantine and the emergence of a “Christian” empire, the early church in general 
embraced asceticism and monasticism as an ideal expression of human sanctification and 
spiritual practice. In particular, the ideal of “virginity” became the marker of the superior 
Christian. We find in the religious literature of the fourth century a number of works 
devoted entirely to the subject of virginity12 and encouraging the pursuit of celibacy as a 
higher spiritual path. Consequently, many men and women took vows of celibacy to 
preserve their uncorrupted state from their youth, while many others took vows in their 
adulthood, often leaving spouses and children behind to pursue life in the desert.13 So 
                                                          
9 P. Brown, Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 214-18. 
10 Gregory writes “In other sciences men have devised certain practical methods for cultivating the 
particular subject; and so, I take it, virginity is the practical method in the science of the Divine life, 
furnishing men with the power of assimilating themselves with spiritual natures.” On Virginity, ch. 4. 
11 Gegory of Nyssa, On Virginity, ch. 4-5. 
12 For example, Methodius Symposium, Gregory of Nyssa On Virginity, Basil of Ancyra On the 
Preservation of Virginity, Augustine On Marriage and Concupiscence, John Crystostom On Virginity, 
Jerome Letter 130: To Demetrias. 
13 For example, the sayings of Apa Paphnutios in the Apothegmata Patrum (Paphnutios 4) tell the story of a 
young man who, after marrying and finding it difficult to care for his wife, simply abandons his wife at the 
invitation of a desert monk. 
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 supreme was the ideal of virginity that in order to avoid temptation the monks and nuns, 
either as hermits or in communities, separated themselves from the opposite gender or 
sought to come into contact with the opposing sex as little as possible, and never if 
able.14 There even existed cases of married couples living in celibacy once they had filled
their obligations to produce children. For some, such as Jerome, the ideal of virginity wa
so firmly entrenched that they rejected marriage itself as a viable option.
 
s 
15 
                                                          
 In addition, the fourth century Christian literature on virginity provides a variety 
of theological justifications for the practice of celibacy. In these works, celibacy is linked 
with numerous theological concepts, including the following: celibates (especially 
women) are seen as the full expression of being the bride of Christ; sexual activity is 
linked to the sin of the Fall and virginity to the primordial state of perfection; celibacy is 
equated with the effort and faith previously exhibited by martyrdom; celibacy represents 
a sanctified state of incorruption; celibacy is an imitation of Jesus and his mother Mary; 
celibacy represents a resurrected self that has died to sin; celibacy represents a more 
intense intimacy with God, and so on.16 In sum, the elevated status of sexual renunciation 
had resulted in its connection with some of the most significant and powerful spiritual 
concepts of Christian theology, and those who practiced celibacy were held in high regard 
by the early Christian communities.  
14 For example, when asked if he should like to move closer to a village by a disciple, Apa Siseos simply 
says “Where there is no woman, that is where we should go.” Apothegmata Patrum, Siseos 3. 
15 It is important to note that Jerome is perhaps the most “conservative” of orthodox thinkers in terms of 
sexuality. But, although he felt marriage was inferior to celibacy, he never crossed the line that the Gnostics 
did in rejecting marriage and creation as sinful.  
16 Whether these justifications are simply rationalizing the practice of celibacy or a genuine set of beliefs 
about it will be addressed more fully in the next chapters. A good survey of this kind of material can also be 
found in Peter Brown’s classic treatment of sexual renunciation in the early church, The Body and Society: 
Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
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  Finally, the lofty position of virginity in the church was incorporated into the 
ecclesiastical and social structures if the early church. First, although celibacy as a 
requirement for clergy was only to become required by canon law in the early medieval 
period,17 the expectation that clergy would benefit from celibacy was widely held during 
the fourth century (and beyond).  For example, although isolated incidents, the Councils 
of Nicea and Elvira not only had corrective canons for clergy who were living as 
celibates, but also included proposals to legislate that clergy should be required to be 
unmarried.18 In addition, even though celibacy did not become a requirement, clergy that 
wished to marry often required the permission of their bishop19 and certainly faced 
pressures to remain sexually inactive once they did marry, or at least after they had 
produced children.20 Regardless, it is clear from the writings of the fourth century that 
celibacy provided the clergy with the virtue, sanctity and spiritual power to properly 
execute their office.  
                                                          
17 It is certainly clear that despite efforts to enforce clerical celibacy, it was adopted haphazardly in different 
areas and times from the fourth century until the eleventh century. Primarily the concerns of the early 
medieval canons are over the impression that Christianity makes in the West, and over corruption where the 
wives and children of all ranks of clergy would exert undue influence, or receive offices and financial gain, 
due to their husband’s ecclesiastical position. Synods from the sixth through tenth centuries were 
consistently attempting to place firm boundaries upon married clergy, for example, often by declaring their 
children to be illegitimate or making clergy sleep in separate quarters from their wives, and so on. These 
reforms met with limited success and it was only in the eleventh century under Pope Gregory VII that more 
lasting clerical reforms were achieved. In the Lenten Synod of 1074 a canon prohibiting clerical marriages 
was adopted, ordering that no one in the future should be admitted to an office without a vow of celibacy, 
and renewing an older canon that commanded the laity not to receive the ministration of those clergy who 
were in violation of the rule. Though there was significant resistance to the canons of the Lenten Synod 
(including riots and murder by affected clergy), Gregory managed to enforce the canon through the use of 
excommunication, public humiliation and the help of secular powers, who were more than happy to see the 
clergy’s power bases reduced. For a good survey of the history this issue see H.C. Lea’s The History of 
Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church (University Books, 1966). 
18 For example, Canon 3 of Nicea forbids clergy to have women “subindoctrinae”, or disciples, living in 
their homes with them. In addition, the non-extant “Proposed Action on Clerical Celibacy” of Nicea 
recounted by later historians, and Canon 33 of Elvira, show that there was significant impetus among the 
leadership of the early church to require celibacy of all clergy.  
19 See Canon 10 of the Council of Ancyra. 
20 Brown, Body and Society, p. 257. 
10 
 Second, within the social structure of the church, celibates took on the position of 
trusted and empowered examples of the true faith.  Alongside the clergy, who were also 
qualified and equipped for their position through celibacy, monastic celibates living in the 
deserts and communities also took on the role of local sages and patrons.21 Celibate 
figures became advisors for spiritual matters, arbiters over local disputes in the absence 
of civil authorities, local healers, and often gained large numbers of followers who would 
dwell close to them in order to access their divine wisdom. For example, one of the more 
renowned ascetics of the Syrian desert, Symeon Stylitus, was said to have large crowds 
appear daily at the base of his pillar in order to receive instruction and justice from his 
pronouncements. Indeed, it is said that individuals would travel for miles, often migrating 
from one ascetic figure to another, in search of truth or in search of a figure to follow.22 
In fact, both clergy and the monastics, as celibate loci of spiritual power, came to posse
enormous authority, sometimes even in conflict with one another.
s 
                                                          
23 The virgin and desert 
monk, then, had been included among the spiritual heroes of the early church, providing 
both inspiration and authority to Christian practice.  
III. Post-modern Scholarship on Asceticism: Historical-Critical 
 With the rise of post-modern criticism and new methodological perspectives in 
the 1980s, this historical picture of early Christian asceticism was criticized for being 
over simplified in its presentation.  In particular, a new emphasis on social theory and 
how it functions was critical of historical accounts of the development of celibacy that 
did not account for the role of asceticism in social and cultural dynamics.  Scholars of the 
21 See P. Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity”, in Society and the Holy in 
Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 103-152. 
22 Brown, Holy Man, pp. 112-114. 
23 For example, the Council of Saragossa is largely devoted to tensions over authority between monastics 
and regular clergy. See V. Burrus, “Ascesis, Authority and Text: The Acts of the Council of Saragossa” 
Semeia 58 (1992): 95-108.  
11 
 1980s and 1990s rightly emphasized that the practice of asceticism was more than just a 
spiritual discipline and that it encompassed a variety of social motivations and 
consequences.  In particular, the overarching theoretical approach to asceticism was to 
examine it in light of the social dynamics of power.  Thus asceticism and celibacy were 
considered from a variety of new points of view such as gender, family, politics, 
economics, Greek medicine, Roman civil life and sexuality, and scholars postulated many 
new perspectives on the motivations and technologies of ascetic practice.  Indeed, the 
complexity and breadth of these studies is such that the wide range of issues discussed, 
and the difficulty in integrating them comprehensively, can easily overwhelm the student 
of asceticism in the early church.  Since the general historical picture portrayed has 
already briefly been discussed, it is now important to examine the theories of power that 
informed late twentieth century scholarship and then to summarize the conclusions 
concerning asceticism drawn from those theories. 
 Interestingly, when it comes to the methodological approaches to the study of 
asceticism, there are few works directly dedicated to that subject alone.  Asceticism is 
most often studied as a historical phenomenon, with methodological concerns usually 
mentioned briefly in these works simply as a preamble to a particular conclusion that will 
be drawn from the data. There are really only two scholars who have had a significant 
influence on the study of asceticism in the past twenty-five years.  First, there is Geoffrey 
Harpham and his 1987 work The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism,24 which is 
a theoretical work exploring the role asceticism plays is social discourses.  Second, there 
                                                          
24 G.G. Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987). 
12 
 is the 1995 article “Constructions of Power in Asceticism” by Richard Valantasis,25 
which applies the broader theories of power specifically to the practice of asceticism in 
the early church.  More importantly, these two works represent two different periods of 
scholarly study and reflect how their methodological perspectives on asceticism shifted
initially towards social scientific explorations and then a complete redefinition of 
asceticism as a heuristic device to measure shifting power discourses of any culture.  
Following method, then, historical studies of asceticism have also followed a similar 
pattern, examining asceticism as defined by these metho
 
dological works.   
                                                          
 Turning to Harpham’s monograph, it is important to note that he is neither a 
scholar of religion nor a historian, but a literary critic.  This reflects the fact that recent 
methodological concerns in religious studies have been subsumed into the larger 
methodological discussions of post-modern philosophy and the humanities.  Harpham, 
and Valentasis, too, for that matter, take cues from post-modern thought that is rooted in 
deconstruction and a preoccupation with relations of power within social structures.  For 
Harpham, asceticism “refers not only to a particular set of beliefs and practices that 
erupted into high visibility during the early Christian era, but also to certain features of 
our own culture, features that have survived the loss of the ideological and theological 
structures within which they emerged.”26  According to Harpham, then, asceticism 
exceeds the “limitations” of religious belief systems and should be considered a “sub 
ideological” structure that functions within any given culture as a kind of self-reflection 
where that culture considers, resists and redefines itself.  For example, he argues that the 
self-denial and counter-worldly views of early Christian asceticism are the self-reflective 
25 R. Valantasis, “Constructions of Power in Asceticism” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 63 
(1995): 775-821. 
26 Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative, xi. 
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 dialogue of late Roman culture couched in Christian language.  Questions of temptation, 
wrestling with demons and remaking oneself in non-compliance with the world is a kind 
of conversation where one comprehends and resituates oneself within the culture, neither 
condemning culture fully or endorsing it either.27  In essence, asceticism becomes the 
resistance common to all peoples who live in a culture and, in an ambivalent and deeply 
human way, long for “the pre-cultural, post cultural, anti-cultural, or extra cultural.”28  In 
a post-modern world dominated by the resistance to power, asceticism has been portrayed 
the natural expression of that resistance in all cultures through history.  Harpham’s 
monograph, therefore, seeks to trace this impulse of resistance through early Christianity 
and into the modern world, with asceticism initially being dominated by Christian 
ideology and then subsequently stripped of it yet remaining in our own cultural 
discussion. 
 While Harpham’s work is largely a sociological exploration of the interaction of 
text and culture with small interest in historical matters, between about 1980 and 1995 its 
methodological perspective came to dominate the study of the historical phenomenon of 
asceticism.  Interest in studying asceticism primarily as a religious phenomenon shifted to 
studying it as a social one, and religious motivations behind ascetic practice became 
secondary or were assumed to be manipulated by the social dialectic that Harpham 
described.  The more significant functions of asceticism were to be found by examining 
the role it played in shifting cultural values, and historians turned initially to three broad 
areas of social interaction; 1) gender & family, 2) Christianisation of the Roman empire, 
and 3) philosophical and ideological roots of ascetic behaviour.  These categories, it must 
                                                          
27 Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative, xii. 
28 Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative, xii. 
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 be made clear, are simply placed into this work for organizational purposes and anyone 
familiar with these scholarly works will recognize that a great deal of crossover exists 
among these categories, and that they are by no means exclusive of one another. 
 First, the study of gender, self-identity, the self’s relation to the body, and how 
these elements interact with social and institutional forces is a massive field of scholarly 
exploration.  The perspective of feminism, in particular, has had a great deal of influence 
on the study of religion, and especially upon the study of the ascetic practice of celibacy.  
Feminist scholars have generally attempted to clearly demonstrate the relationship 
between gender, dominance and social power, and that sexual roles in the past have been 
portrayed as natural categories within dominant ideological institutions.29  The treatment 
of women, they argue, reflects a struggle for power on the basis of the “natural” qualities 
of their gender.  For example, they point out that in Greco-Roman society a woman’s 
status was defined by her marital condition; the only safe and proper place for her was to 
be married.30  Simply put, under the strong influence of Greek philosophy, Roman 
society understood women to be by nature more irrational and prone to weakness and 
temptation. Therefore, the more appropriate use of the female nature was to keep it 
private while encouraging and training it to produce the virtues needed to run a household
and defend family honour.  This ancient traditional role was the epitome for a good 
woman to strive for, and a good wife was often rhetorically contrasted with the
who dishonoured her family and herself by encouraging weakness in the public sph
 
 prostitute, 
ere. 
                                                          
29 See T. Shaw,  “Sex and Sexual Renunciation” in P. Esler, ed., The Early Christian World (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 401, and A. Cameron,“Virginity as Metaphor: Women and the Rhetoric of 
Christianity” in A. Cameron, ed., History as Text: The Writing of Ancient History (London: Duckworth, 
1989), p. 189. 
30 See P. Brown, Body and Society, pp. 11-17, A. Cameron, Virginity as Metaphor, pp. 189-91, and J.A. 
McNamara, “Sexuality and the Cult of Virginity in Early Christian Thought” Feminist Studies 3 (1976), p. 
152. 
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  For feminist scholars, the practice of celibacy as found in the Christian virgin and 
widow, therefore, is a striking contrast to the Greco-Roman ideal.  Consequently, they 
argue that for a woman to reject the socially expected position of a wife in the pursuit of a 
spiritual calling31 was to reject the very order of society and threaten the well-being of 
the community which relied upon women to produce heirs and order their familie
households.
s’ 
                                                          
32  Indeed, celibacy was sometimes met with derision or violence due to 
Roman perception of the practice,33 and Roman society occasionally portrayed Christian 
celibacy as yet another example of Christian obstinacy and unethical behaviour.34 For 
early feminist scholars, such as Clark and Ruether, the practice of celibacy was a shining 
example of Harpham’s theory of asceticism as resistance to the dominant culture.35  
Celibacy offered women the ability to resist the dominant expectations of marriage and 
31 The only apparent exception in Roman society was those women, such as the Vestal Virgins in the temple 
of Vesta or the Pythia prophetess in the temple of Apollo, who took oaths of virginity in order to attend to 
religious duties. This, however, was not considered counter cultural because these women were given many 
dignities and privileges, usually reserved for males, due to their service to city-state and empire. For a more 
in depth discussion see M. Beard, “The Sexual Status of Vestal Virgins” Journal of Roman Studies 70 
(1980): 12-27. 
32 It is interesting to note that this rejection of the social order would also be applicable to men as well, for 
the expectations of providing heirs and participating the political life of the city-state were equally 
demanding. This reflects one of the weaknesses of the feminist position that continues to emphasize only 
the autonomy granted to women by celibacy. A view that would include men in this pattern can be found in 
P. Brown’s work The Body and Society, chapter one “Body and City”, pp.5-32. 
33 K. Cooper’s exposition of the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles is an excellent demonstration of how the 
pre-Constantinian practice of celibacy often conflicted with the authority and ethos of the city-state, which 
expected women to marry and produce children. The heroines of these Acts are regularly portrayed in 
conflict with Roman authorities due to the wrath of unhappy spouses or snubbed fiancés. See “The Bride 
That Is No Bride” in The Virgin and the Bride: Idealized Womanhood in Late Antiquity, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 45-67. 
34 For example, the Roman doctor Galen mentions celibacy in association with Christian obstinacy in the 
face of martyrdom. Peter Brown also notes the irony that apologists such as Justin Martyr appealed to the 
sexual morality of the Christian in support of their religion in the empire. See P. Brown, Body and Society, 
pp. 60-61. 
35 Another weakness of this theory is that if it is argued that celibacy exploded after Christianity was 
already the dominant force of the empire, it would be difficult to argue that women celibates were resisting 
the culture which is already “Christian.” It will be noted shortly in this chapter that a recent re-definition of 
asceticism by R. Valantasis expands asceticism to a kind of dialogue over power that is either a resistance 
to the dominant culture or the inauguration and justification of a new one. Hence, feminist scholars could 
argue that Christianity embraced celibacy for women initially as resistance to Roman culture, but then 
continued that embrace as a justification of the newly inaugurated Christian culture. 
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 family by providing them with a role sanctioned by the community to avoid taking a 
husband and having children.36 Indeed, early Christian texts defending celibacy often 
pointed to the bondage, suffering and drudgery of marriage and how virginity provides an 
escape for the upright woman.37  Celibacy, at least for Clark and Ruether, was really a 
form of resistance to patriarchal dominance of women in late antiquity and the paradox 
lay in that empowerment came with a price, and celibate woman embraced a more 
oppressive set of rules in order to resist the male perspectives on female identity.38 
 However, this first wave of feminist perspectives on celibacy and asceticism was 
challenged by a number of scholars who argued that celibacy was still a practice 
constrained by male perspectives on women and society.39 Elizabeth Castelli simply 
states “the ideology of virginity did not challenge that of the surrounding culture, but 
rather adopted and added to it a theological division, producing perhaps an even more 
restrictive and coercive system.”40 McNamara, as well, points out that although celibacy 
may have given rise to an opportunity to escape marriage, it was predicated on the 
assumption that virginity represented equality with the male virtue of self-control.41 
Moreover, she points out that throughout the early Christian literature on virginity, the 
celibate female is sometimes praised for her “manliness”, thus requiring celibate women 
                                                          
36 E.A. Clark, “Ascetic Renunciation and Feminine Advancement: A Paradox of Late Ancient Christianity,” 
Anglican Theological Review 63 (1981): 240-57, and R. Ruether, “Mothers of the Church: Ascetic Women 
in the Late Patristic Age,” in Women of Spirit: Female Leaders in the Jewish and Chrisian Traditions, eds. 
R. Ruether and E. McLaughlin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 71-98. 
37 See McNamara, Sexuality and the Cult of Virginity, p. 151.  
38 See Castelli, E. “Virginity and Its Meaning for Women’s Sexuality in Early Christianity” Journal of 
Feminist Studies In Religion 2 (1986): 61-88. 
39 See E. Castelli, “Virginity and Its Meaning for Women’s Sexuality in Early Christianity” Journal of 
Feminist Studies In Religion 2 (1986): 61-88, and McNamara, J.A., “Sexuality and the Cult of Virginity in 
Early Christian Thought” Feminist Studies 3 (1976): 145-58. However, these studies again fail to take into 
account the fact that men were engaged in celibacy as well, and in the last chapter of this thesis a 
motivation for celibacy that would attract both men and women will need to be discussed.  
40 Castelli, Virginity and Its Meaning, p. 88. 
41 McNamara, Sexuality and the Cult of Virginity, pp. 153-54. 
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 to deny their gender. Similarly, Averill Cameron has pointed out that the rhetorical power 
found in early Christian praise for female chastity, for example in the cult of Mary, is 
only possible on the basis of male rhetoric about the status of women.42  In essence, the 
low opinion of the female nature makes virginity (when accomplished) all the more 
impressive an achievement, and therefore, all the more appropriate as an ideal and 
standard.  The more considered feminist position is that while conceding that celibacy 
may have given women another social option, it is difficult to defend it as an expression 
of resistance to male perspectives.  Rather, the practice seems to accept and emphasise 
ancient perspectives on female nature while transforming it through Christian doctrine. 
 A second area where postmodern ideas of resistance have affected the study of 
asceticism is in the whole question of the Christianisation of the Roman empire.  That is, 
what forces led to and aided in the transformation of the empire from a “pagan” culture to 
a Christian one that even dominated the political sphere?  Simply put, recent scholarship 
on asceticism in the early church has argued that celibacy and monasticism either overtly 
resisted Roman political, economic and social institutions, or naturally assimilated social 
and political roles held by Roman elites.  Either way, asceticism is seen to be a force that 
directly aids the Christianisation of the empire.  Peter Brown is the scholar of authority 
on these matters.  Much of his career has been spent trying to determine exactly how a 
religious faith could transform an entire culture with such rapidity.43  In particular, his 
thoughts on celibacy describe a practice that unconsciously challenges Roman culture on 
its deepest levels while undermining and replacing the social institutions that held Roman 
society together. 
                                                          
42 Cameron, Virginity as Metaphor, pp. 190-91. 
43 See P. Brown, Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
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  Amidst the myriad of historical details that Brown presents is a profound 
understanding of the communal nature of Greco-Roman society as rooted in the ethos of 
the polis, or city-state.  The whole first chapter of his work “The Body and Society” is a 
fine summary of the social pressures accompanying the needs of an ancient city-state to 
remain stable and productive.  Brown argues that among the many forms of social 
discourses found in the culture of these city-states, the discourses around sexuality are 
some of the most powerful.  In essence, Brown skilfully demonstrates that “the ancient 
city expected its citizens to expend a requisite portion of their energy begetting and 
rearing legitimate children.”44 This need for legitimate children, he points out, was in 
place for a variety of reasons:  stabilizing the community due to losses incurred through 
sickness, age and war, legitimating of the social order (i.e. privileged classes), and as a 
means to achieving personal virtue and honour.  Consequently, he concludes the vast 
majority of individuals in the city were expected to marry and immense social pressure 
was placed upon individuals to produce children.   
For example, Brown points out that bachelors were only tolerated in upper class 
circles and chastised regularly,45 while unmarried women, few as they were, were 
portrayed as unhealthy or immoral if not confined to the role of a guardian in a religious 
shrine.  In addition, he shows much textual and archaeological evidence clearly 
demonstrating that an aspect of virtue in late antiquity included fulfilling one’s duty to 
reproduce legitimate children.  Ancient grave markers speak of how an individual was an 
example of virtue because he had not broken the ancient lineage of his ancestors, while 
                                                          
44 Brown, Body and Society, p. 6. 
45 Brown, Body and Society, p. 7. 
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 numerous letters and treatises encourage young men to marry and to reproduce heirs.46 K. 
Gaca, too, supports Brown’s assessment by pointing out that even in the lower classes, 
which we sadly know little about from the evidence, the power of eros seems to have 
been popularly understood to be a divine force emanating from the gods, which could 
only be resisted through the use of magic or ritual appeals to the gods.47 Still, they argue 
that both the upper and lower classes worked from a basic cultural conception of human 
anthropology where the symbiosis of body and soul made the individual vulnerable to 
either inherent weaknesses of the body or overpowering by the gods,48 and required 
significant social responsibility in response to that weakness.  
While scholars of late antiquity have explored this phenomenon in great detail, 
Brown’s concern is simply to demonstrate the inexorably strong communal ethos of the 
city-state and how it placed codes of behaviour and conduct upon the individual.  For 
Brown, this pressure from the city-state carried enormous symbolic weight in regard to 
the body,49 and made the body the primary battleground for the demands of society upon 
the individual.50 Concerning the matter of celibacy, then, Brown argues that an individual 
engaging in sexual renunciation was performing a profoundly asocial (Brown’s term) act, 
defining oneself in such a way that they did not belong to any of society’s natural 
categories.51 The celibate, he concludes, was making an “abnormal” choice that 
                                                          
46 Brown, Body and Society, pp. 7-8.  
47 See K. Gaca, “Early Stoic Eros: The sexual ethics of Zeno and Chrysippus and Their Evaluation of the 
Greek Erotic Tradition” Aperion 33.3 (2000): 214-17. 
48 See chapter three of this thesis for a more in depth discussion of these issues, particularly those concerns 
of the philosophical schools of the Greco-Roman culture.  
49 See J. Behr’s discussion of Brown and Foucault in “ Shifting Sands: Foucault, Brown and the Framework 
of Christian Asceticism” Heythrop Journal 34.1 (1993), pp. 9-10. 
50 Brown, Body and Society, p. 28. 
51 P. Brown “The Notion of Virginity in the Early Church” in McGinn, Meyendorff and Leclercq, eds., 
Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century (London: SCM, 1989), pp. 434-35. 
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 emphasized the importance of the individual over society, and thus challenged the 
communal ethos that ordered Greco-Roman society.   
Therefore, according to Brown, the Christian emphasis upon resurrection of the 
body and embrace of celibacy as a means to transform the individual is an example of the 
kind of resistance that Harpham explored.  In Brown’s case, Christian celibacy 
demonstrates the resistance to a social structure that overly burdened individuals for the 
sake of social stability.  Celibacy, now justified by Christian theology, gave the 
individual, both male and female, the ability to resist social demands of marriage and 
children, and challenged the right of society to assert its demands upon the individual.  In 
that way, Brown sees Christian theology, which emphasizes individual and personal 
association with the divine through Christ, as a direct challenge to the Roman social 
structure.  For Brown, the embrace of celibacy by Christians in the first two or three 
centuries of the common era is a kind of first shot in the long drawn out process where 
Christianity slowly takes over as the dominant social structure in late antiquity. 
The inherent weakness in this position is that it could easily be argued that early 
Christianity, though definitely oriented towards the salvation of individuals, was as 
socially and communally minded as the culture from which it came. Indeed, the ascetic 
texts of both the pre and post Constantinian church contain demands upon the individual 
for the sake of the church as the new society, and emphasized the health of the church 
over the health of the individual. For example, as will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter, the majority of the corrections placed upon ascetics in the first three centuries CE 
are done for the well-being of the congregations and communities where ascetics lived.52 
                                                          
52 For example, Tertullian in his On the Veiling of Virgins writes “Turn we next to the examination of the 
reasons themselves which lead the apostle to teach that the female ought to be veiled, (to see) whether the 
21 
 Brown’s argument, then, contains an inherent contradiction that requires ascetic practices 
to support both the claims of the individual and responsibility to the new social structure 
of the Christian empire. It would be more accurate to say that rather than emphasizing the 
individual over the community, early Christian asceticism emphasized Christian society 
as better than the Roman society because of its theological and cosmological views. The 
role of the individual in relation to society has changed, but not in opposition to a 
communal ethos, which early Christianity clearly shares with Roman society. Instead, 
early Christian perspectives see the role of the individual as continuing to preserve well- 
being of the community, but now it is by helping the church live out its teleological 
goals.53 
 Still, one of Brown’s strengths is that he does not see celibacy as a fixed and static 
kind of practice. For him the role of celibacy changes following the emergence of 
monasticism as a formal institution in the fourth century.  The resistance to Roman social 
order found in celibacy prior to the emergence of monasticism continued to exist, but 
now celibacy (and asceticism in general) begins to erode the Roman social order by 
assimilating the role of patronage into the sphere of the ascetic.  Brown argues that in 
places where ascetics had begun to withdraw to the desert or cloister, a symbiotic 
relationship began to form between the ascetics and the nearby villages, towns and 
cities.54  The impressive nature of the ascetic as a moral, ethical person, who has chosen 
to live outside the social structure, gave the ascetic a great deal of authority due to his 
“unbiased” position in the universe, and because of the natural “power” he exhibited over 
                                                                                                                                                                             
self-same (reasons) apply to virgins likewise; so that hence also the community of the name between 
virgins and not-virgins may be established, while the self-same causes which necessitate the veil are found 
to exist in each case.” (On the Veiling of Virgins VII). 
53 This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
54 Brown, Holy Man, p. 110. 
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 himself and society.55  Consequently, Brown demonstrates that from the fourth century 
through to the sixth, ascetics began to take over the role of patron in the towns and cities 
of the empire.  The role of patron, that is, an individual who used his natural authority 
and power to bring benefit to his city and administer justice - a role formerly given to 
Roman nobility - was slowly transferred to local holy men and women.  Sometimes, the 
ascetic was able to accept the role of patron because the local Roman patron was too far 
away or had abdicated his responsibility as the empire was beginning to break down.  
However, more often, the local ascetic could clearly demonstrate that his natural power 
and authority were superior to those of the secular patron.  Not only could the ascetic 
provide judgement for local disputes with impartiality,56 he could also bring direct benefit 
to his area of patronage through protection from divine wrath,57 keeping violence from 
erupting,58 and as a healer, sage or confessor.59  For Brown, then, the process of 
Christianization was aided by celibacy and asceticism as they provided a new and more 
powerful alternative for the important social position of patron.60 
                                                          
55 Brown, Holy Man, 116. 
56 Brown, Holy Man, p. 132. 
57 Brown, Holy Man, p. 122. 
58 Brown, Holy Man, p. 126. 
59 Brown, Holy Man, p. 141. 
60 One weakness in this theory is that bishops in the early church had taken on the role of patrons as well. 
The bishops were not ascetic in the sense that the holy man was, but they still took on many of the same 
roles that the ascetics did (i.e. settling disputes, providing charity, aiding in social and political mobility, 
etc.). In that sense, the holy man gained authority through his asceticism, while the bishops had gained it 
through ordination to their office. Both were endowed with a special share of the Holy Spirit, had achieved 
a high level of virtue through self-formative discipline, and benefited others through public actions. 
However, the non-ascetic nature of the bishop makes it more difficult to argue that the role of asceticism is 
to undercut the dominant social order. The bishops adapted the role of patron but subverted the Roman 
social authority largely without engaging in asceticism, and the rise of Christianity can as much be 
attributed to them as to the ascetics. In addition, the bishops gained a more general authority that did not 
depend upon their location or charisma. For good surveys of how the bishops of the early church took the 
role of patron see H. A. Drake's Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), Claudia Rapp’s Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian 
Leadership in an Age of Transition. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005) and 
Andrea Sterk's Renouncing the World Yet Leading the Church: The Monk-Bishop in Late Antiquity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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  Another scholar who argues that celibacy and asceticism aided in the 
Christianization of the empire is Kate Cooper.  In trying to answer how Christianity was 
so successful in transforming Roman society, especially in its adherence to virginity as an 
ideal that seemingly undermined the fabric of ancient moral society, Cooper argues: “The 
reason for the Christians’ seemingly inexplicable success seems to lie in the way the 
political and moral theorists of the Roman empire understood the relationship of sexual 
morality to civic virtue. Unwittingly, they had left an unstable link in the system for 
judging a man’s fitness for public office.”61 Using the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, 
Cooper asserts that these texts, which show a conflict between the ideal of Christian 
virginity and a society resisting its validity,62 are not really concerned with issues of 
gender, women and reproduction.  Rather, she points out that it was pagan and Christian 
men of elite status who wrote these texts.  Consequently, Cooper argues that the conflict 
over virginity is a conflict over who has the authority and right to define the social 
order.63 
 Cooper reminds the reader that Greek and Roman moralists saw austerity (not 
abstinence) as providing the moral grounding to be socially responsible and politically 
astute.64  Too much sexual activity would create irrational weakness, but one still needed 
to engage it enough to produce children and provide balance to the body.65  Thus, 
controlled sexual habits were required to produce a superior moral person. Consequently, 
                                                          
61 Cooper, The Virgin and the Bride, p. ix. 
62 Cooper, The Virgin and the Bride, pp.55-56. 
63 Since the Apocryphal Acts date to the late second and early third century, Cooper’s thesis at least has the 
strength of seeing social resistance a good length of time before the Constantine’s victory. However, it still 
does not take into full account that men were embracing celibacy as well. Why do we not see “Chastity 
Tales” about men as well? 
64 More will be said on this issue in chapter three of this thesis.  
65 Brown, Body and Society, pp. 17-25. See also J. Lieu, “Embodiment and Gender” in J. Lieu, Christian 
Identity in the Jewish and Greco-Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 181-83. 
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 Cooper argues that in these texts both continuity and subversion are present: continuity in 
the heroic status of a woman who overcomes her nature is present, but subversive in that 
celibacy shows a virtue superior to that of the austere married male.66 In that way, moral 
theorists of the Roman world left an opening for a more superior morality to claim the 
authority to rule and determine social order.  Christians who practiced celibacy were able 
to claim authority through their greater virtue, and according to Cooper, the ideal of 
virginity is simply the rhetorical, textual expression of the early Christian claim to social 
power.  In essence, because sexual restraint was already an ideal of Greco-Roman society, 
the ideal of virginity, as the most intensive form of sexual restraint, lent moral superiority 
to Christian culture, and gave it that much more weight in its slow conquest of the Roman 
social order. 
 A final example of how celibacy and asceticism fit into an empire that was slowly 
coming under the influence of Christianity is the hypothesis that celibacy in the early 
church represents a stream of self-identity in opposition to Roman culture.  In particular, 
social theories about how communities form themselves67 have been used to demonstrate 
that celibacy may have been employed by the early Christian communities to differentiate 
themselves from the broader Roman culture.  Again, there is a distinction among scholars 
between the pre and post-Constantine empire.  Prior to Constantine’s conversion strict 
moral codes governing sexual behaviour had been placed upon Christians from the time 
of Paul onwards.  For example, Chadwick points out that the “world”, which happened to 
be Roman, was often held to be a “secular” world that lived in rebellion against God’s 
kingdom, and celibacy, or continence within marriage, was one way in which Christians 
                                                          
66 Cooper, The Virgin and the Bride, p. 55. 
67 For example, see D.B. MacKay’s article “Ethnicity” or B.L. Mack’s article “Social Formation” in Guide 
to the Study of Religion (Cassell: New York, 2000), eds. W. Braun & R.T. McCutcheon.  
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 might reject the “secular” world and clearly identify themselves with God and the 
church.68  Following Constantine’s conversion, and the mixture of Christian theological 
concerns with Roman political structures, scholars argue that there was a grass roots 
movement that rejected a perceived “watering down” of the Christian faith.  Christians 
might no longer face persecution, but now they faced the temptations of the city where 
beguiling pleasures still existed in large quantity.69  Many fled to the desert to engage in 
the “true” faith away from the world that was still corrupt and now Christian in name 
only.  In this way, an element in early Christianity continued to use celibacy as a tool to 
establish the boundaries of its own identity. 
 Moreover, celibacy used for the purposes of self-identity has also been linked to 
martyrdom and the internal Christian debate over orthodoxy.  Regarding the connection 
between celibacy and martyrdom, a number of scholars have argued there is a clear 
connection between the feats of faith done by martyrs and the power derived from 
celibacy.70  Celibacy and continence, they argue, provided the body with the power 
needed to keep faith under torture and to face death with certainty of salvation, while 
simultaneously providing a boundary between those who remain faithful (i.e. “us”), and 
those who persecuted or gave up their faith, (i.e. “them”).  In addition, as Ramsay argues, 
following Constantine’s conversion celibacy continued to be an identity marker for the 
                                                          
68 H. Chadwick,  “ Pachomius and the Idea of Sanctity” in The Byzantine Saint: University of Birmingham, 
Fourteenth Symposium of Byzantine Studies (1980), S. Hackel, ed. (London, 1981), pp. 11-24. Reprinted in 
History and Thought of the Early Church (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982), p. 13. 
69 For example, both Augustine and John Chrysostom often railed against the pleasures of the city in 
sermons and argued that marriage was the only safety valve that would provide sufficiently regular 
intercourse to dampen desire. See Brown, Body and Society, p. 308-10. 
70 See Brown, Body and Society, pp. 73-77; S.P. Brock, “Early Syrian Asceticism,” Numen 20 (1973), p. 2; 
G. Clark, “Women and Asceticism in Late Antiquity: The Refusal of Status and Gender” in Asceticism, 
Wimbush, V.L. & Valantasis, R. eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 47-48; B. Ramsey, 
“Martyrdom and Virginity” in Beginning to Read the Fathers (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 122-
48. 
26 
 true Christian, but now expressed through “death” to the “self”, sometimes called a “long 
martyrdom”, that was proof of genuine religion. Ramsay points out that the language of 
celibacy, after the possibilities of martyrdom were gone, contained the language of the 
“athlete” who was engaged in a “contest”. This language, he argues, was formerly used 
primarily of the martyrs, and after Constantine’s victory the adversary is one’s own weak 
nature and the spiritual adversary of the devil.71  In both cases, celibacy clearly defined 
one as being truly an insider to the faith, and failure in the face of temptation showed that 
one’s motives were never pure from the start, hence membership had been a sham.72 
 A more complicated example of the issues of identity with regard to celibacy is 
the whole matter or orthodoxy and heterodoxy.  The well-known struggle the church had 
with “heretical” and Gnostic groups also spilled over into the practice of celibacy, with a 
number of heterodox Christians practicing celibacy to the extreme of rejecting marriage 
entirely.73 For example, T. Shaw argues that the orthodox position included a finely tuned  
(sometimes not so finely tuned) argument that struggled to define the true Christian who 
recognized the superiority of celibacy without compromising the goodness of creation 
and marriage,74 whereas some heterodox groups argued that sexual activity, including 
marriage, was part of the sinful order of the world. Consequently, through the first five 
centuries of Christian history celibacy was often used as a measure to define appropriate 
                                                          
71 Ramsay, Martyrdom and Virginity, p. 147. 
72 The limitation of this theory is that it would require that the martyrs were drawn only from the class of 
celibates in the early church. However, the martyrs were drawn from all classes of society, and perhaps it 
would be more accurate to say that celibacy and martyrdom were given the same status rhetorically. It is 
more likely that celibacy developed at the same time that martyrdom was occurring, and the high honours 
and status of both occurred simultaneously. Really, only a few texts link the two, largely found among 
accounts of martyrdoms, and they do not represent a large segment of early Christian thought.  
73 For example, the followers of Marcion, as well as a number of other Gnostic thinkers, were guilty of 
rejecting marriage as a sin and the world as evil. Book III of Clement’s Stromaties is essentially one long 
defence of the goodness of marriage held in balance with the proper place of celibacy. 
74 See T. Shaw, “Sex and Sexual Renunciation” in P. Esler, ed., The Early Christian World (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 415, and Elizabeth Clark’s monograph Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and 
Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999).  
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 theological values and used to help condemn groups like the Manicheans and Marcionites 
as something “other” than Christian.75  In that way, some scholars argue that celibacy 
seems to have had an impact on formation of the Christian identity on the basis of 
theological views. Indeed, well into the fifth century the church fathers continued to 
argue over the matter of celibacy as an element of the Originist controversy and often 
accused one another of being heterodox for defending a particular position on celibacy.76  
 A third area of research pursued by scholars has been into the ideological and 
philosophical disposition of the Roman Empire and the extent to which early Christianity 
adapted it.  In particular, Peter Brown and Teresa Shaw77 have spent much effort 
explaining how Christianity adopted Greco-Roman moral and philosophical traditions in 
its idealization of celibacy and virginity.  Although Brown’s Body and Society does not 
deal directly with Greco-Roman philosophy, he points out on numerous occasions that 
Greek philosophical concepts of the body and soul conceived the body as the locus of 
sexual danger for the individual and community.78  Due to its material nature the body 
was a constant source of danger for irrational and destructive behaviour, and, for Brown, 
celibacy was the next natural step in controlling the weaknesses of the individual.79  
Consequently, he argues that the inherent weakness of the body and the temptation of 
“female” seductiveness could be avoided through continence, and the “virtue” of the 
Roman world was adapted by Christians and granted to those who lived in abstinence.  
                                                          
75 More will be said about this in chapter two. 
76 These accusations are largely rhetorical in that they can easily connect an individual to Gnostic practices 
through their position on asceticism. As will be seen in chapter two, though, celibacy’s relationship to 
Gnosticism is far more complex and does not necessarily reflect either an orthodox or heterodox position. 
See E. Clark, , Reading Renunciation, p. 5-7. See also, D. Hunter, “Resistance to the Virginal Ideal in Late 
Fourth Century Rome: The Case of Jovinian.” Theological Studies 48 (1987): 45-64. 
77 See Shaw, T., The Burden of the Flesh: Fasting and Sexuality in Early Christianity (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1998). 
78 A full treatment of this concept will be in chapter three.  
79 Brown, Body and Society, p. 81.  
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 However, Brown does not explore any reasons as to why celibacy would be the next 
natural step in Roman society, and he simply assumes that early Christians were 
practicing their own version of sexual austerity. Indeed, the need for an explanation as to 
why early Christians embraced celibacy instead of the simply austere morality of the 
Greeks and Romans will ultimately be the crux of the issue for this thesis. Chapters three 
and four will be dedicated to answering that question. 
Teresa Shaw’s work, as well, points to medical models of antiquity as a source for 
Christian idealization of celibacy.80  Her work walks the reader through both Greek and 
Roman medical understanding of the human body, and how ancient doctors perceived the 
inherent danger in sexual activity that was often the cause of madness and illness.81 She 
argues, then, that the early Christians often used contemporary medical knowledge in 
support of virginity, claiming with some of their “pagan” counterparts that the sole 
purpose of sexual intercourse was procreation, and that all other sexual activity was 
detrimental to physical and emotional health.  For many scholars, then, Christian celibacy 
is simply an adapted religious version of a sexual austerity that already existed in the 
Greco-Roman world. However, like Brown, Shaw’s argument does not explain the early 
Christian escalation of the cultural norm of austerity in Greco-Roman society to the 
complete abstinence of celibacy. To explain this, it will be argued in succeeding chapters 
that the philosophical and medical speculations of the Greco-Roman world were adapted 
by early Christians to defend an already established practice of celibacy using the 
                                                          
80 Shaw, Burden of the Flesh, pp. 27-78. 
81 Shaw focuses on the fact that “The modern tendency to see the body and soul as two distinct and 
unrelated or even conflicting spheres of activity and attention does not translate well into Greco-Roman 
antiquity, when medical and philosophical practitioners and theorists paint a more complicated and 
dynamic picture of their relationship.” Burden of the Flesh, p. 29. In that regard, she focuses on the 
reciprocal nature of body and soul in ancient thought and how their medical speculation often addressed 
illness in regard to that relationship. Her argument is essentially that early Christianity adopted and adapted 
the medical knowledge of the Greco-Roman world and used it as the basis of the need for celibacy.  
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 common and accepted knowledge of the society. For if it could be shown that the practice 
of celibacy was compatible with the accepted notions of morality in the Roman elites, it 
would be much easier to defend and justify. However, this does not mean that early 
Christians were initially motivated solely by philosophical and medical considerations. 
Therefore, the task of this thesis is also to explore how early Christians employed the 
accepted knowledge of the Roman world and how they changed it.  
IV. Post-modern Scholarship on Asceticism: Social Theorists 
 Now, in many ways, this survey of scholarly literature on asceticism and celibacy 
is a vast over-simplification.  All of the positions described above are supported by 
complex historical data, and none of the scholars mentioned would endeavour to 
encourage anything but a complex view of asceticism in the early church.  That said, it is 
still clear that methodological theories of social formation and resistance have led 
scholars to focus on many aspects of asceticism that had previously been unexplored.  
But this is not the end of the story either, as another important shift in methodology in the 
mid 1990’s has led to a new perspective on asceticism.  This shift occurred due to the 
frustration of scholars over two issues:  1) social theory’s inability to bring consensus on 
the origins of asceticism in the early church, and 2) a new concern for cross-cultural 
studies that demanded a definition of asceticism that would be universally applicable.82  
In response to this frustration, Richard Valantasis wrote “Constructions of Power in 
Asceticism” in an attempt to formulate an overarching theoretical framework that would 
both be inclusive of all types and expressions of asceticism found in religious traditions 
                                                          
82 See  R. Valantasis & V.L. Wimbush, “Introduction” in Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush, & R. Valantasis, eds. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. xxiii ff. 
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 world wide, and that would put an end to the search for the “origins” of any ascetic 
practice.83 
 Valantasis’ article is essentially an unrestricted application of post-modern 
theories of power to the concept of asceticism.  Indeed, more than half of this lengthy 
article is devoted to summarizing the progression of theories of power in the past twenty 
years.  Beginning with T.E. Wartenberg and L. Althusser and working his way through to 
Foucault, Hodge and Kress, Valantisis demonstrates that theories of power - which 
basically argue for one social agent wielding power over a second agent in order to make 
that agent do or act in some way they would not otherwise naturally act - move from 
arguing for a simplistic and naïve notion of unrestricted use of power to a more 
sophisticated and complex understanding of the nature of power within social discourses.  
Initially theorists of power focussed on the blatant mechanisms of economic and political 
power, and emphasized the unrestricted oppression of one agent over another.84 However, 
this view was criticized by a second generation of power theorists who rejected the 
mechanistic and simple conception of power as oppression.  Instead, these scholars 
focussed on the social dynamics of power where both agents in a relationship attempted 
to control or resist the other through more subtle means such as gender, race, family, 
morality and a host of other areas where social relationships exist.85  In particular, it was 
emphasized that people do not usually blatantly assimilate into a culture, but go through a 
complex process of initiation and formation where the dominant structure attempts to 
create solidarity with it, while simultaneously being resisted on an instinctual level. 
                                                          
83 R. Valantasis, “Constructions of Power in Asceticism” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 63 
(1995): 775-821. 
84 Valantasis, Constructions of Power, pp. 777-82. 
85 Valantasis, Constructions of Power, pp. 782-92. 
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  More importantly, social theories of power insist that individuals and social 
groups create and employ ideological complexes as a means of constraining behaviour, 
either structuring reality in agreement with the dominant social structure, or creating a 
new world view that challenges the dominant social structure.86 Consequently, the 
concept of “truth” in a given culture is simply regarded as a function of the solidarity and 
power of a group, and regardless of the content of that “truth” the most important role of 
asceticism is to foster a social change through a reinvention of a worldview.  Taking all 
this theory of power to heart, Valantasis is finally able to offer a new definition of 
asceticism:  “Asceticism may be defined as performances within a dominant social 
environment intended to inaugurate a new subjectivity, different social relations, and an 
alternative symbolic universe.”87  With this definition in hand, scholars were now able to 
alleviate the frustrations of earlier social theory.  First, this definition can be applicable to 
any culture, in any historical period, so cross-cultural definitions and discussions should 
be able to occur.  And second, since asceticism is simply a function of every culture, it 
was bound to appear when Christianity challenged the Roman order, and the elusive 
origins and motivations of asceticism in the early church need no longer be defined.  
Christianity, some have argued, created its own worldview, which included an ascetic 
ideology, in order to inaugurate its own dominance within the Roman Empire. 
 Consequently, this theoretical shift in the study of asceticism in the early 
church produced an odd combination of miscategorization of ascetic behaviour and an 
abandonment of any serious search for early Christian motivations of celibacy. Valantasis’ 
definition is too broad in that any action that attempts to change the distribution of social 
                                                          
86 Valantasis, Constructions of Power, p. 788. 
87 Valantasis, Constructions of Power, p. 797. 
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 power in a culture could be considered ascetic, and that many actions, either deliberate or 
subconscious, successfully change power structures and world views, but without 
engaging in what would be considered traditional forms of asceticism. Consequently, 
there is a tendency to define any set of texts or behaviours that attempt to change 
worldviews or moral conduct as ascetic.  What this means in terms of historical study is 
that since the mid 1990s, the concept of asceticism has been used as a measuring device 
that can be applied to any religious behaviour that encourages social transformation or 
new worldviews. Two examples, at least in terms of early Christianity, will suffice.  
In addition to his methodological work on asceticism, Richard Valantasis also has 
written a critical commentary on the Gospel of Thomas, where he speaks of Thomas’ 
gospel message in terms of asceticism.88 Although there are a few references in Thomas 
to what might be considered traditional ascetic practices, Valantasis argues that Thomas’ 
message is ascetic as a whole and actually one of three competing worldviews found in 
early Christianity.89 Thomas’ sayings gospel is ascetic because it is competing with the 
Johannine and synoptic theological presentation of Jesus, and contesting for the limited 
power over the Christian worldview. So despite the fact that the Gospel of Thomas is not 
particularly known for encouraging fasting or celibacy or any other practice we usually 
associate with asceticism, some scholars can now see it as an ascetic text because it 
competes for power within a specific world view.  
Another example of this trend in the collection of essays edited by Lief Vaage in 
1999 called Asceticism in the New Testament.90 In this work, the documents of the New 
Testament are examined for their ascetic nature as documents that are attempting to 
                                                          
88 R. Valantasis, The Gospel of Thomas (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
89 R. Valantasis, The Gospel of Thomas, pp.21-24.  
90 L.E.Vaage, & V.L. Wimbush, eds. Asceticism and the New Testament (NY: Routledge, 1999). 
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 transform the dominant worldviews found in either Judaism or Greco-Roman society. In 
that way, despite the fact that there are only a few examples of traditional ascetic practice 
in the gospels and Paul’s letters, all of the texts of the New Testament are considered to 
be either partially or fully ascetic documents. For example, the Gospels are naturally 
attempting to transform the Jewish view of the Messiah and the Law, or Paul’s letters, 
being driven by praxis, are perfect examples of the ascetic nature of early Christianity. 
Consequently, the book concludes on the whole that early Christianity is an ascetic 
movement found within the broader religious milieu of the Roman world.  
 Second, there is little interest in continuing to search for a religious or theological 
motivation behind early Christian asceticism.  Elizabeth Clark has admitted as much in a 
recent study: “The study of early Christian asceticism in recent years has retreated from 
the two questions that dominated discussion in decades past, namely, “Where did 
Christian asceticism come from?” and “Why did ascetic practitioners do what they did?” 
For convenience, we may label these the “origins” question and the “motivations” 
question. Both, I think, have proved unproductive for future research.”91  Most scholars 
still examine the belief structures of early Christianity, but primarily as a kind of rhetoric 
or propaganda that is either an unconscious or subconscious attempt to undermine the 
larger culture.92  And if they do admit that belief systems may have factored into 
motivations for asceticism it is done as an oversimplified dependence upon some other 
cultural norm or social construct.  For example, Daniel Boyarin traces the impetus behind 
Christian celibacy to certain pessimistic notions of sexuality found in first century 
                                                          
91 E. Clark, Reading Renunciation, p. 18. 
92 For example, A. Cameron’s essay “Ascetic Closure and the End of Antiquity” in Asceticism V.L. 
Wimbush & R. Valantasis, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 147-61. Cameron’s main goal 
is to explore how ascetic practice in the fourth and fifth century was a kind of discourse where certain 
theological or philosophical themes were employed to shift the balance of power and authority in the 
empire into the hands of Christianity.  
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 Judaism.93  And, of course, as discussed previously, many scholars assume that early 
Christianity simply adapted Greco-Roman medical and philosophical concepts of the 
body and produced a whole series of theological justifications for adopting the more 
severe perspectives of cultural views on sex and the dangers of desire. Either way, there 
is a strong sentiment among scholars that early Christian asceticism is simply bound up in 
the cultures that produced it and does not represent any religious construct unique or 
independent from the culture. 
 It can clearly be seen, then, that social theories of power and resistance have come 
to dominate the study of asceticism in the early church.  Asceticism has been described as 
a form of resistance to the dominant culture for most, and more recently, as the 
mechanism of social change in any given society or culture.  It is thought, therefore, that 
Early Christian celibacy challenges the Greco-Roman social order by rejecting social and 
familial responsibilities, it aids in the Christianization of the empire, both before and after 
Constantine’s conversion, and paradoxically, does it by adapting Greco-Roman concepts 
of the body to a Christian worldview.  The ideal of virginity is the construction of a 
growing Christian culture, employed to take power in the empire and control over 
political institutions and individual lives.  And, indeed, any new practice or belief system 
should be considered as ascetic since ascetic practices function as a catalyst for change 
and can be examined as a reflection of social discourses in any culture. 
                                                          
93 D. Boyarin, “Body Politic among the Brides of Christ: Paul and the Origins of Sexual Renunciation” in 
Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush, & R. Valantasis, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 459-78. 
Boyarin’s position is difficult to defend since it is unlikely that the influence of Judaism on Christianity 
continued much beyond the early part of the second century. In addition, it is also difficult to defend 
Boyarin’s position because Judaism as a whole encouraged marriage and having children as part of 
fulfilling their covenant with God. Are we to argue that a small number of texts, representative of a small 
stream of ascetic Jews, was to become the foundation of early Christian asceticism? Certainly, early 
Christian ascetic texts are compatible with Jewish ascetic texts, but that does not prove literary or historical 
dependence.  
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 VI. Critique of Modern Scholarship on Asceticism  
 The concern of this thesis is that the dominance of social theory has led to a 
variety of problems for understanding celibacy and asceticism in the early church.  In 
particular, there are several assumptions of social theories of power that lead to mistakes 
in interpreting the primary data of asceticism, and to avoiding application of important 
data that social theory ignores. 
 The largest and most important assumption that social theories of power make is 
that ideologies and religious belief systems are created to inaugurate new social 
discourses or to bolster old ones.  In this way, for example, the rise of Christianity as a 
community that challenges the old Roman social institutions required that Christianity 
create its own set of ideals and institutions to replace the old.  Therefore, the theological 
and ideological beliefs of Christianity were formed out of the need to authorize and 
justify their acquisition of social power, and among those idealized concepts, of course, 
was virginity. However, it is a mistaken assumption to argue that ideological and 
theological beliefs are primarily fabricated to support a struggle for social power, and that 
the “real” motivation behind the emergence of asceticism, or any religious phenomenon, 
is an a priori natural human competition for power.  There is a logical inconsistency in 
this theory in that it requires that a social group come into existence accidentally or 
without warrant of a belief system before it then struggles to gain social influence and 
creates its own set of ideals to challenge the dominant social order.  How could a social 
group come together with enough organization and identity to challenge the dominant 
social order without an already established alternative belief system?  Rather, it makes 
more sense to argue that an altered world view or belief system would have natural social 
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 ramifications where society would be complicit or resistant to it on the basis of an older 
ideological perspective.  In that way, a new world view held by Christians is more likely 
to have caused the idealization of celibacy, or at least mutually developed its ascendancy 
as Christianity became a cultural force, than to argue Christians developed an ideology of 
virginity to support their growth as a social power. 
 This does not mean, however, that social theories are of no value to the historian.  
The consequences and ramifications of new belief systems on a culture are of great 
interest to the historian, but it is important not to put the “cart before the horse”, so to 
speak.  Nor does it mean that current scholarship is oblivious to the religious and 
theological motives behind celibacy, which they obviously recognize and respect. It is 
more properly a matter of sensitivity and priority, and currently scholarship is more 
sensitive to asceticism as a social force than to its place as a religious practice motivated 
by religious beliefs.  There is a slippage here where the consequences of an action have 
sometimes been mistaken for its motivation or intention; that is, that because early 
Christianity gained social power in the empire as a consequence of its belief system, its 
belief system must have come into existence for that purpose.  Hence, celibacy, or 
fasting, or creed, or whatever might signify a unified Christian social power must have 
been employed by the early church to gain power.  While it is clear that Christianity did 
gain the social power to undo the institutions of Rome, it is not clear that early 
Christianity was always motivated by a search for power.  Did early Christians exert 
power and influence?  Yes.  Did they use rhetoric and philosophy to persuade others of 
the validity of their worldview?  Yes, of course.  But the intentions for ascetic behaviour 
also must include conviction of religious belief, as well as acknowledging the power that 
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 accrues to it, and scholars of recent years have let that fact slip from their investigations. 
In that way, some recent scholarship has been guilty of the same monolithic portrayal of 
asceticism that earlier confessional views had been criticized for; only the caricature of 
ascetic behaviour is limited to the sphere of social discourse.94 
 That slip actually represents the second major assumption of social theories of 
power, that is, the assumption that all societies across space and time universally act the 
same.  In particular, the assumption is also that ancient cultures behave in a manner 
similar to modern ones.  Modern western society has been dominated by ideologies, with 
political and economic institutions that have manipulated those ideologies in order 
produce a given result.  Modern culture is driven by the media, advertising and popular 
culture, which are all deeply rooted in the manipulation of images and ideas.  Further, 
technology and mass communication have made it difficult to determine truth from lies, 
and in the modern world the fear of illusion is very real.  That being said, it is not difficult 
to see how theorists can accuse modern cultures and nations with manipulating belief 
systems for the sake of power and control.  However, it is mistaken to assume that non-
modern and non-western cultures had a similar habit of manipulating reality to 
consolidate power.  Again, this does not mean that ancient or non-western cultures did not 
compete for power, only that scholars cannot assume a similarity with modern culture in 
terms of extent, scope and intent.  Further, scholars must engage in a methodological 
sensitivity that can differentiate between a play for social power and a genuine religious 
motivation, and the extent to which each has influence.  The problem scholars face is that 
the two are often so intertwined that it is difficult to say which takes priority.  The 
                                                          
94 Indeed, motivations for any act are seldom simple. Not only are the religious convictions and beliefs of 
both individuals and social groups important, but empowerment need not be understood only in terms of 
social discourses.   
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 methodological mistake, then, is to always give priority to theories of social power, when 
both are needed to fully understand history.95   
 The result of this imbalance created by methodology, at least in terms of early 
Christian asceticism, is twofold.  First, although there is recognition that celibacy and 
asceticism existed prior to the emergence of institutional monasticism in the fourth 
century, the loss of interest in the origins of asceticism has left the earliest theological 
considerations of Christian history on celibacy– from the New Testament to the end of 
the third century – largely un-investigated.96 The assumption is that prior to the mid third 
century, the early Christian communities were not unified or well enough defined to 
encourage asceticism as a resistance to the Roman social order.  The habit of scholars, 
therefore, is to study the emergence of asceticism as it is expressed in monasticism in the 
post-Constantine church, and although celibacy is present in all the major Christian 
literature from Paul onward, little comprehensive investigation of second and third 
century asceticism has been undertaken or incorporated into method and theory.  Indeed, 
the majority of scholarly works on virginity and asceticism in the early church focus on 
the works of the fourth and fifth century fathers, and the pre-fourth century documents 
are treated as isolated phenomena that reflect only local interests or developments,97 or as 
a part of conflicts with heterodox groups.  The possibility that asceticism may have 
                                                          
95 Elizabeth Clark gives fair warning: “Where we stand in our investigations is equally important. As 
William Deal notes, if we took Shinto as our definitive model of asceticism rather than Christianity, we 
might think that asceticism essence lay in bodily purification, not in union with God. But further: it is not 
only our models, it is our contexts. Each of us – this writer included – would benefit from being more 
attentive to the conditions under which we have produced our own versions of asceticism, for we are very 
differently grounded in relation to religion, ideology and institutions.” See “The Ascetic Impulse in 
Religious Life: A General Response” in Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush & R. Valantasis eds. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 510. 
96 E. Clark, Reading Renunciation, pp. 27-33. 
97 Aside from a few exceptions that will be examined later in the thesis, most of the major treatments of 
early Christian asceticism, while acknowledging the presence of asceticism from the New Testament period 
on, limit their research to the late third century and forward, linking it primarily to the practice of 
monasticism. 
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 existed in significant amounts in the early church prior to the fourth century does not 
receive much interest, and its motivations and origins during those centuries remain 
largely unexplored. 
 Second, the gap between theorists and historians continues to widen.  Despite the 
sophisticated variety of approaches to asceticism, scholarly attempts at defining it have 
sometimes led to ahistorical and areligious interpretations of ascetic behaviours and texts.  
Definitions of asceticism become ahistorical in the sense that the commitment to social 
theories of power could predetermine an interpretation that may be contradictory to the 
historical reality.  For example, as mentioned earlier, documents from the New Testament 
and Gnostic texts are now being categorized as ascetic even though they largely do not 
encourage asceticism as a set of religious practices that include the well-known elements 
of sexual and bodily self-denial. Simply being texts that encourage a worldview different 
from the dominant culture (i.e. Christian versus Roman) has now led some scholars to 
mislabel certain behaviours and texts as ascetic when they are clearly not.  In addition, 
the gap between theorists and historians widens because the theorist, again, incorrectly 
assumes that asceticism only has meaning in relation to other behaviours in a culture.98  
But scholars often forget that asceticism is primarily the practice of an elite group within 
a community that may or may not form the dominant culture of society.  For example, not 
all Christians are ascetic though both non-ascetic and ascetic Christians would subscribe 
to a similar worldview.  Those who practice asceticism have a particular religious 
intention or goal that is relevant in relation to their insider world view and may only 
come in contact with the broader culture in a secondary way as a part of inevitable human 
connections. 
                                                          
98 E. Clark, Ascetic Impulse, p. 507. 
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  In this way, interpretations of social theory also become areligious.  Again, it is 
not being suggested that asceticism has no role to play in the social dynamics of the 
culture in which it exists; it is once again a matter of priority and sensitivity.  To 
downplay the importance of real religious intentions of ascetic practitioners (even if 
difficult to retrieve) is to misunderstand them at the most important level and may lead to 
a misunderstanding of the historical realities.  In the case of early Christian asceticism, it 
has led to both miscatagorization of texts as ascetic and to a demotion of religious belief 
as an important factor in these practices.  What is required of scholars is a more sensitive 
matrix of interpretation that places the motivations for asceticism in relation to their 
religious worldview while still acknowledging that those practices will have 
consequences upon social dynamics.  Both the religious motivations and the social 
ramifications must be examined and neither can be sacrificed as unimportant. 
 Obviously, much work has been done on the role that asceticism plays in social 
dynamics, but there is still much work to be done on asceticism as a religious practice.  
With that in mind, a refined view of asceticism will be adopted in this thesis in order to 
help direct further investigation of celibacy in the early church.  The refinement offered is 
to reintegrate religious notions into the motivation and practice of asceticism.  In this 
regard, Weber’s old definition of “methodically controlled behaviour specifically within 
the teleological path towards salvation”99 is a good starting point.  However, unlike 
Weber, whose emphasis was on the wider economic and political forces that the 
Protestant work ethic resisted, the emphasis of the new definition will focus on the 
teleological path towards salvation.  Remembering that asceticism is an elite set of 
                                                          
99 R. Valantasis, quoting Weber in “A Theory of Social Function of Asceticism” in Asceticism, V.L. 
Wimbush, & R. Valantasis eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 545. 
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 practices engaged in by a minority of a religious community, it is safe to say that 
asceticism intends to bring about a teleological goal with greater efficacy than for an 
“average” member. Whether it is a Christian monk seeking righteousness or union with 
God, or a Sannyasin renouncer seeking liberation, both have established a set of practices 
to achieve their goal through extra effort.  The teleological goal will, of course, depend 
upon cosmological and anthropological speculation within a particular belief system, as 
will the technology100 used to achieve it.  Thus, the nature of the universe and how 
human beings fit into the cosmological scheme will direct the goal and the path to 
achieve the goal. 
                                                          
 For example, all Hindus attempt to escape samsara, but only in the Sannyasin 
stage of life do many Hindus make an extraordinary effort to engage a yogic path to 
achieve liberation.  The kinds of disciplines of meditation, fasting and abstinence are 
designed to be more effective in achieving liberation through extra effort and focus.  
Moreover, the technologies of ascetic disciplines are based on helping individuals escape 
the illusion (maya) that keeps them bound in the cycle of rebirth.  Similarly Christians 
wish to achieve salvation and redemption, but only the monastic attempts to achieve that 
redemption through a greater effort.  However, Christian technologies of ascetic 
discipline focus on cleansing and prevention of sin due to their uniquely Christian 
perspective on cosmology and human nature.  In both cases, there are naturally going to 
be ramifications for the community and the distribution of social power, or upon the 
dominant structures worldview, but one of the primary motivations continues to be a 
religious belief or conviction.  Working with Valantasis’ definition, asceticism may be re-
100 The most comprehensive work on technologies of altering the self and worldviews in Western history is 
still Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volumes I-III (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). 
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 defined as “Performances done to inaugurate a teleological goal (either individually or 
communally) that have social ramifications for the distribution of power and an effect on 
the worldviews which those performances come into contact with.”  This definition would 
allow for a cross-cultural application while simultaneously encouraging an understanding 
of both the religious motivations and social significance of ascetic practice. 
 However, many kinds of religious performances are done to inaugurate a 
teleological goal, and no religious performance necessarily has an effect on the social 
distribution of power or the world-views it comes into contact with. For example, the 
Essene community is considered to have been strongly ascetic, but in the larger picture of 
Second Temple Judaism within the Roman empire their ascetic practices affected the 
Jewish world only in a minor way, and the Greco-Roman culture not at all. Likewise, the 
practice of the Eucharist was meant to aid in achieving salvation, but was not considered 
an ascetic practice though it has an obvious teleological goal. What is it, then, that makes 
ascetic practice “ascetic”? An element of ascetic practice that is often overlooked is 
asceticism’s nature as an elite practice within a specific social group. That is, asceticism 
is practiced by a small minority of people within a larger religious group where the 
majority acts differently. More importantly, it is this difference that holds the key to 
understanding asceticism because it demonstrates that ascetic practice is engaged over 
against the community in which the ascetics live, and not necessarily over against the 
broader culture.101 Rather, the difference between an ascetic and a non-ascetic member of 
the religious group is not that they have different teleological goals, but that they attempt 
                                                          
101 If this fact is taken seriously, it would require scholars to have some sensitivity as to whether a particular 
ascetic practice is over against the broader culture or simply in regard to the religious community in which 
it operates. It is likely that it could be both, with the motivation primarily being their religious or 
philosophical position, while possibly having social ramifications that the culture, or the religious 
community for that matter, either resists or is complicit with it.  
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 to achieve that goal differently. When compared, then, the ascetic differs from the non-
ascetic members in two respects.  
First, the ascetic engages in practices that are both negatively and positively102 
oriented in ways that non-ascetic members are not. Negatively, an ascetic gives up 
elements of natural existence that are permissible under their teleological and 
cosmological schemes. For example, it is normally permissible to marry or to eat to 
sustain oneself, but ascetics relinquish those elements of life to an extent that is deemed 
appropriate to achieve their teleological goals with greater efficacy. Thus celibacy is the 
relinquishing of the normally permissible natural function of marriage and procreation, 
and fasting is the relinquishing of the normally permissible natural function of eating to 
sustain oneself. Positively, the ascetic attempts to bring about the teleological goal in a 
more immanent and effective way.  For example, the achievement of virtue or union with 
God is the goal in Western traditions, but the ascetic attempts to achieve that goal in the 
present instead of in some future eschatological moment. Likewise, the Eastern ascetic 
attempts to overcome illusion or attachment so that enlightenment can occur in the 
present and not in some future incarnation.  
Still, it could be argued that the positive element of asceticism is found in non-
ascetic members as well. Ideally, do not non-ascetic members of the Western traditions 
seek salvation through the achievement of virtue and union with God? Do not non-ascetic 
members of the Eastern traditions seek enlightenment through overcoming illusion and 
attachment?103 In that regard, the major difference between ascetic and non-ascetic is the 
                                                          
102 See Kalistos Ware, “The Way of the Ascetics: Negative or Positive?” in Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush, & R. 
Valantasis eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-15. 
103 Even in traditions such as Chinese & Taoist Philosophies, there is still an attempt to overcome human 
nature and the “sage” of those traditions is attempting to realize their potential in the present.  
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 second respect in which they differ: effort. Without a doubt, it is obvious that the ascetic 
attempts to achieve the teleological goal through greater effort, and the intensified extent 
of practices, discipline and focus are the hallmarks of asceticism. In that way, the word 
“asceticism”, which has its roots in the Greek word askesis (ajskhsiv), is actually 
quite accurate in its depiction of this set of practices. Askesis was the word used by the 
Greeks to describe the intensified training and effort found in the gymnasium or athletic 
arena,104 obviously done to achieve the transformation of the individual for a larger 
purpose. The ascetic, then, is marked by the extra effort and discipline made in regard to 
the negative and positive aspects of achieving their teleological goals.105  
With this in mind, we can offer up a revised definition of asceticism: 
“Performances done to immanently inaugurate a teleological goal, either individually or 
communally, through negative renunciation and intensified positive effort of discipline 
that may have social ramifications for the distribution of power and/or an effect on the 
worldviews it comes into contact with.” This definition should be broad enough to be 
inclusive of the variety of ascetic forms across cultures, while remaining specific enough 
to differentiate ascetic practices from other religious practices. However, the important 
thing to remember is that there will be no cut and dried way to separate and categorize 
ascetic and non-ascetic practices, as though there are only two categories. Rather, there 
will be many levels of ascetic engagement, and scholars should be sensitive to the extent 
to which individuals or communities engage ascetic practices. In that way, there will be 
                                                          
104 See Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, G. Kittel ed., Volume I (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s 
Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 494-95. 
105 It is important to recognise that this element of asceticism is often employed by ascetics in knowing the 
boundaries of their practices. For example, the Encratites of the early church were condemned for making 
their asceticism the requirement of all people, thus making what is permissible a sin. Likewise, the 
flagellents of were condemned for making the aspects their ascetic practice destructive, and censured by the 
church canons. 
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 groups that are very clearly ascetic and those that are clearly not, with a range of 
individuals and groups that are “more ascetic” and “less ascetic”. For example, a group of 
puritan Christians in the seventeenth century are “more ascetic” than most Protestants, 
and “less ascetic” than Benedictines in the twelfth century. Therefore, scholars should be 
more perceptive to the degree of ascetic practice displayed by persons and groups, as well 
as paying attention to how their theological and cosmological views direct them in regard 
to both the culture and group in which they exist. 
 With these criticisms in mind, and with a redefinition of asceticism that re-
emphasizes religious belief systems as an important element of asceticism while 
preserving a more accurate definition, the remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to 
examining the first three centuries of Christian asceticism to determine the origins of 
celibacy in the early church. First, this thesis will summarize the historical data on early 
Christian celibacy in order to demonstrate that asceticism was more than just an isolated 
or local phenomenon prior to the fourth century. Following this survey, Greco-Roman 
philosophical perspectives on sexuality will be examined to provide a point of 
comparison for how early Christianity differs from the culture in which it developed. 
Finally, the early Christian texts on celibacy from the first three centuries of the Common 
Era will be examined to demonstrate how developing early Christian cosmology and 
anthropology amalgamated accepted cultural perspectives on sexuality with Christian 
theological concerns, which in turn led to an idealization of sexual renunciation.  
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 Chapter Two - Early Christian Celibacy:  
New Testament Times to the Third Century 
I. Introduction 
 If the origins of early Christian asceticism are to be discerned and understood in 
the light of the teleological goals of early Christian theology, several crucial issues must 
be addressed. The recent scholarly position that describes early Christian asceticism 
primarily in relation to the appearance of monasticism in the fourth century must be 
corrected. Although scholars do not dispute the presence of asceticism prior to the 
beginning of the fourth century, the extent of its presence has often been dismissed as 
localized and isolated incidences that demonstrate a sort of “proto” ascetic behaviour.106 
This contention reflects the recent trend of some scholars to argue that Christianity was 
not a unified group with a clearly defined self-identity until the end of the third 
century,107 and, therefore, would not have the social strength to either challenge the 
                                                          
106 For example, Elizabeth Clark’s recent summary of scholarly explorations of early Christian celibacy 
notes that the search for the “origins” of early Christian asceticism has largely been abandoned. Clark 
explains that recent scholarship has preferred to trace parallel ascetic developments within various religious 
and philosophical groups in the third and fourth century monasticism, while the evidence of the first and 
second century ascetics are thought to be anomalous or pre-monastic. The anomaly of early examples of 
ascetic behaviour, it seems, is rooted in their “non-monastic” forms (i.e no anachoresis), and Clark shows 
that scholarly investigations of first and second century examples of ascetic behaviour primarily explore the 
relationship of heterodoxy and orthodoxy to ascetics more than attempting to understand the practice as a 
whole. At best, there is an attempt to locate an ascetic tendency or inclination that could have been 
inherited by early Christianity. In that regard, Clark notes that both Greco-Roman ethical considerations, as 
well as Jewish ascetic trends, have been considered as the roots of ascetic behaviour in early Christianity. 
However, Clark deems these arguments as “suggestive” but not “substantiated,” due to a lack of clear data 
on the subject in the earliest Christian texts. As such, she writes “Given considerations such as these, 
scholars of early Christian asceticism now deem it misguided to locate some particular moment after the 
late second century when Christianity took an ascetic turn.” (p. 22) See E. Clark, Reading Renunciation: 
Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 14-42. 
107 This current trend blurs the lines between early Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism, arguing that 
Christians were not a distinctly identifiable group separate from Judaism until well into the third century. 
The result is a debate over the semantics of identity and the difference between the image of self-identity 
created by a social group and the reality of its true social position. It has been argued, then, that early 
Christian self-presentation, which identified Christians as distinct from both Jews and “pagans,” was really 
only an image that was fostered for the sake of encouraging group solidarity, when the reality was that 
Roman society did not differentiate Christians from Jews. Consequently, the tendency among these scholars 
is to argue that early Christianity did not develop as a real social force until the third century when 
Christianity really became a distinct social group in the empire. For a good survey and critique of this trend 
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 dominant social structure or develop a unified ideological rationale for the idealization of 
celibacy.108 Consequently, the task of this chapter will be to examine the evidence dealing 
with early Christian asceticism that dates from the first three centuries of Christian 
history in order to determine its extent and nature. 
  The crux of the issue is in the interpretation of early Christian texts on asceticism, 
particularly celibacy. The problem arises in the kinds of literature from which historical 
data can be drawn and the question of how to determine the extent of ascetic behaviour 
from such literature. There are, in fact, a substantial number of early Christian texts that 
mention the presence of celibate ascetics from the earliest periods of Christian history 
and in a variety of geographical locations. However, these texts are often largely 
dismissed as showing only that a few ascetics lived among the Christian communities up 
until the end of the third century, and, therefore, it is assumed that asceticism was not a 
significant movement in early Christianity until then. In addition, it is thought that these 
early texts are of little value in determining the motivations of asceticism, since the texts 
that mention celibate Christians from the first, second, and early third centuries are often 
considered ad hoc treatments that addressed local issues or conflicts with Gnostic groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
see T.A. Robinson’s upcoming book Ignatius and the Way that Parted: The Formation of Early Christian 
Identity (Forthcoming, 2007).  
108 A recent study on asceticism, The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies: Gender, Asceticism and 
Haigiography (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), D.B. Martin and P. Cox Miller, eds., is largely a 
study on how ascetic/monastic texts of the fourth century were employed by early Christianity in an 
ideological fashion to bolster Christianity’s newly established cultural dominance. In essence, the authors in 
this book argue that the “reality” portrayed by ascetic texts is a rhetorically created artifice employed to 
create a mythical unity to aid in the naturalization of the early Christian cultural dominance. For example, 
J. Goerhing compares ascetic texts to a nineteenth century English painting of a peaceful rural scene meant 
to be more acceptable in the drawing rooms of polite society, where they served the elite by lending 
ideological support to new land divisions and industrialization. In that regard, he argues, the Life of 
Anthony was meant to operate on similar grounds: “The process of fashioning this illusionary, mythic 
landscape witness in the Life of Anthony developed its own momentum as the desert myth grew by 
naturalizing its image reality in the emerging Christian culture.” See J.E. Goehring, “The Dark Side of the 
Landscape: Ideology and Power in the Christian Myth of the Desert”, in The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient 
Studies: Gender, Asceticism and Haigiography (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), D.B. Martin and P. 
Cox Miller, eds., p. 141. 
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 Most scholars note that it is only in the late third and mid fourth century that we find any 
extensive description of the theological motives for the practice of celibacy, and, it is 
argued, only in the early fourth century that the number of Christian ascetics becomes 
significant. Therefore, it may be argued, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
those early texts are representative of a broader early Christian perspective on ascetic 
practices.  
It is easy to see how scholars can argue that Christian asceticism found its origins 
primarily in monasticism. One assumption that social theories work from is that texts 
function as ideological tools that help undercut the dominant social order while 
establishing a competing worldview. In addition, when the texts on asceticism in the early 
church are examined, one finds that the texts that seem the most strongly ideological in 
nature are from the fourth and fifth centuries. For example, the first fully philosophical 
and theological treatment of celibacy is Methodius of Olympias’ work The Symposium: A 
Treatise on Chastity from the late third or early fourth century.109 The work basically 
adapts the form of the dialogues found in Plato’s Symposium, only now it is a group of 
celibate women attending a dinner party and exploring the rationale and theology behind 
the practice of celibacy. In particular, it is a fascinating amalgamation of systematic 
exploration of Biblical theology and Platonic philosophical allegory. It is significant, also, 
to note that this work coincides with the period when the monastic movement seems to 
                                                          
109 Dating this work is difficult. There are no fewer than five manuscript traditions as well as disagreement 
among scholars over which persecution Methodius died under. Possible dates range from between 270 to 
320 CE, but the most likely date is martyrdom under the Diocletian persecution of 311. Consequently, the 
Symposium could land anywhere in the last two decades of the third century of the first decade of the 
fourth. See H. Musurillo, St. Methodius: The Symposium - A Treatise on Chastity (Westminster, MD: 
Newman Press, 1958), pp. 1-37. 
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 have taken off.110 Also, in the fourth century Athanasius’s Life of Anthony and Gregory of 
Nyssa’s On Virginity represent major works encouraging celibacy using heroic idealism 
and Platonic philosophy, respectively. If one adds to those works the homilies, letters and 
treatises of Jerome, John Chrysostom and Augustine, the explosion of monastic practice 
in the fourth century can seemingly be easily explained. In addition, these kinds of texts 
could demonstrate the justifications of a socially driven practice that represents Christian 
resistance to the Roman social order and the construction of a new Christian one. 
Working from recent methodological assumptions that asceticism is motivated by 
social resistance and change, it is thought that until early Christianity had developed a 
social identity that was capable enough to challenge the Roman social order, it would not 
naturally develop an ascetic movement. In essence, the scholarly assumption that early 
Christianity did not differentiate itself from Rabbinic Judaism, or that there were a variety 
of competing “Christianities” in different areas of the empire until the third century, 
automatically precludes Christianity from developing as a unified social group with 
enough influence to challenge the social order. Consequently, any ascetic practice that 
existed prior to the rise of Christianity as a social force111 is automatically assumed to be 
an isolated incident or unique to a particular geographic locale. The irony of this situation 
is that by scholarly standards, “early Christianity” has become a cluster of “ascetic” 
movements from the New Testament period forward because it challenges Jewish and 
                                                          
110 From 270 to 305, Anthony had lived a life of solitude in the desert and then emerged to gather disciples, 
and Pachomius, as well, lived out his communal style of monasticism from the turn of the fourth century 
until his death in 346.   
111 This is particularly difficult to measure. It is not insignificant to note that scholars see the social power 
of Christianity coinciding with its rise as a political power, but that may be overly simplistic. Can a culture 
or social group have influence and power without political power, and if it can, how can the social 
influence of early Christianity be measured prior to Constantine? 
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 Roman world views,112 but does not engage in an idealized ascetic practice until the late 
third and early fourth centuries when it has fused into a cohesive social group. There is an 
inherent contradiction in this position. How can early Christianity be ascetic, but not 
engage in ascetic practices? And, if ascetic practices had been occurring prior to the rise 
of Christianity as a social power, what could have motivated such practices apart from a 
religious or philosophical world-view? 
It has become the habit of many scholars, then, to fall back on social theory to 
explain early Christian asceticism, and claim that its origins have been lost in a perceived 
lack of applicable data. It is assumed that the ad hoc nature of the earliest data on 
celibacy does not represent the ideological creations of a unified social group with a 
clearly defined self-identity. The result, as was discussed in the first chapter, has been a 
description of celibacy primarily as an expression of social resistance and/or change as 
Christianity formed its identity and managed to become one of the dominant social forces 
in the empire. However, the overemphasis on social theory has unnecessarily limited 
scholarly perception of the origins of asceticism, and needlessly forced an abandonment 
of the search for understanding its religious motivations.  
In many respects, scholars of the early church have been working backwards. It is 
important to remember that monasticism has generally been the only foil for comparison 
                                                          
112 See L. Vaage & V.L. Wimbush, eds. Asceticism and the New Testament (New York: Routledge, 2000) & 
R. Valantasis, The Gospel of Thomas (New York: Routledge, 1997). For example, Anthony Saladrini, in his 
opening article on “Asceticism in the Gospel of Matthew,” admits that within Matthew no traditional 
practices associated with asceticism (prayer, meditation, sexual renunciation, fasting, vigils, poverty, etc.) 
can be detected, but using Valantasis’ redefinition of asceticism he can write “The probable social context 
of the Gospel of Matthew also fits the ascetical enterprise. Matthew’s group is most probably a sect or 
deviant association within the larger Jewish community. Alternatively, many hold that Matthew’s group has 
just felt or been expelled from the Jewish community. In either case, the late first century CE tensions and 
conflicts mirrored in Matthew’s narrative demand a pattern of resistant behaviour and the construction of a 
revised subjectitvity and identity for the deviant group. The stringent demands [for righteousness] that 
Matthew makes on his audience are typical of new religious movements that meet social opposition and 
oppression.” (p.19) 
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 as the sole manifestation of early Christian asceticism that scholars have used in their 
historical investigations. Naturally, scholars looking backward through history see many 
instances of ascetic behaviour prior to the emergence of monasticism, and after 
comparing the practices, they rightly point to a variety of differences. For example, they 
point to the fact that asceticism existed long before monasticism, that it was not limited to 
the desert alone, and that there were a variety of local manifestations of ascetic behaviour 
that engaged in different forms and practices than monasticism. However, because of the 
heavy reliance upon social theory to explain those differences, it is assumed that the 
emergence of monasticism reflects an expression of unified Christian solidarity against 
the dominant culture and that the varieties of “pre-monastic” asceticism could not 
possibly reflect anything but early manifestations of Christian identity over against the 
broader culture. As a result, while a few scholars have been interested in those particular 
early manifestations of ascetic behaviour in the church, rarely have all the relevant texts 
been examined together or comprehensively.113 Moreover, little exploration has been 
undertaken to discern any broader themes and patterns within these earliest texts.  
What has occurred under the influence of social theory is a false assumption 
based upon a true historical reality. It is true that monasticism reflects the shift of the 
Roman Empire to the hierarchical world of the Constantinian “Great Church”. As Sydney 
Griffiths writes, “ ‘Monasticism’ is the term which has come to functionally designate the 
new fashion, the hallmark of which, from a phenomenological point of view, was what 
the Greeks called anachoresis, the departure of individuals or groups from the life of the 
                                                          
113 Teresa Shaw’s article “Sex and Sexual Renunciation” in P. Esler, ed., The Early Christian World (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), has a decent survey, but is all too brief due to its broad treatment of the subject. 
G.S. Gasparro’s article “Asceticism and Anthropology: Enkrateia and “Double Creation” in Early 
Christianity” in Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush, & R. Valantasis, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 127-46, is a decent survey of many of the earliest texts in an attempt to discern their theological 
motives, but again, the article does not go into great detail or engage in a comprehensive analysis.  
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 city’s church community to an environment more suited to the practice of asceticism 
seemingly for its own sake, or at least free of the entanglements of day to day 
ecclesiastical life.”114 However, it is an false assumption to say that asceticism was new 
to Christian practice and thought. Only the forms of asceticism changed with the rise of 
the Great Church, and the earliest texts reflecting ascetic behaviour show a variety of 
ascetic practices as they manifest across the empire without the influence of the 
hierarchical and political pressures of the institutional church. By an examination of the 
texts on celibacy from the pre-Constantinian church, it can be demonstrated that celibacy 
was present in the early church in substantial ways, and had developed out of theological 
concerns well before the emergence of the Great Church.  
In fact, despite the protest that the ad hoc nature of the earliest texts represents 
only isolated incidents, it is their ad hoc nature that demonstrates that early Christians 
were both practicing and thinking a great deal about asceticism. Simply put, there were 
enough early believers engaging in ascetic practice that there was disagreement and 
argument over it.  The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to show that there was, 
in fact, a strong ascetic impulse from the earliest period of Christian history and that the 
ad hoc nature of the texts reflects corrective boundaries placed upon ascetic behaviour on 
the basis of theological and social considerations. If the early Christian texts on celibacy 
from the first century through to the fifth are examined as a whole, a pattern emerges. 
This pattern, as will be shown, is found in the establishment and correction of proper 
ascetic forms that are driven by a broadly consistent early Christian understanding of 
God, the world, human anthropology and salvation. Indeed, the corrections placed on 
                                                          
114 S. Griffith, “Asceticism in the Church of Syria: The Hermeneutics of Early Syrian Monasticism” in 
Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush & R. Valantasis eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 223. 
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 ascetic behaviour did not stop with the rise of the Great Church, but continued to be 
placed on all ascetics, including monastics, through the employment of the canons 
established by ecumenical councils. In addition, the highly philosophical and theological 
considerations of fourth and fifth century texts do not represent the emergence of a new 
Christian asceticism, but the transformation of an old and well-established one.  
Therefore the assumption of this thesis is that while recognizing that asceticism 
has natural social consequences, many of which have been explored in depth by scholars, 
a better solution to explain the origins of celibacy is to understand it primarily as a 
religious phenomenon. If the altering the social distribution of power is not forced upon 
asceticism as its primary function then it becomes possible again to examine the evidence 
of the first three centuries of Christian history for the origins and motivations that led to 
the idealization of celibacy. No doubt, as many scholars have demonstrated, as 
Christianity became a dominant social force in the empire, there were many changes in 
the social order by which asceticism affected the culture and was affected by it. But, 
despite scholarly protest, the origins of early Christian asceticism are not found in social 
discourses, but in the world-view of early Christian theology. In addition, despite the 
recent recognition that early Christianity was not monolithic in nature and practice, the 
variety of ascetic practice found in early Christian texts does not necessarily imply 
differences distinct enough to rule out a unified early “Christian” motivation for celibacy.  
But how early can celibacy and asceticism be said to have existed in the early 
church? While scholars are clear enough that celibacy and asceticism were present in the 
century before the emergence of monasticism, they have not come to terms with the 
extent to which asceticism, especially celibacy, can be found in the earliest writings of 
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 the early church. Indeed, Paul was forced to address issues of sexual renunciation in the 
church in Corinth, and every major Christian writer of the first three centuries of the 
Christian era, from Clement of Rome to Tertullian, made comment on the practice. By 
the time of the great monastic explosion of the fourth and fifth centuries, which one 
might see as the normal realm of sexual renunciation, the practice was so well accepted in 
Christianity that the monastic way of life necessarily included sexual abstinence. We will 
now turn to a brief survey of Christian texts on celibacy prior to the end of the third 
century.   
II. The New Testament and Apostolic Fathers  
The earliest evidence of Christians practicing ascetic celibacy appears to be from 
the New Testament. Three passages in particular are of importance: I Corinthians 7, I 
Timothy 5 and Revelation 14. In I Corinthians 7 Paul is addressing a situation where 
celibate Christians were trying to enforce celibacy upon others or were divorcing their 
spouses in order to be celibate in their service to God.115 Paul’s solution is simple 
enough: celibacy is desirable since one is able to serve the Lord without distraction and 
anxiety (7:25-35), but one should not divorce to become celibate (7:10-11), nor force 
celibacy upon those who are not capable of or inclined to it (7:9).116 Unfortuna
motivations behind the practice of continence are not described in the passage, with the 
only reference being the ambiguous opening statement of 7:1 “It is good for a man not to 
tely, the 
                                                          
115 See I Cor. 7. Scholars generally agree that the passage includes comment and direction for those who 
had adopted abstinence as a spiritual practice. Some had obviously stopped having sexual intercourse with 
their spouses while others had even gone so far as to divorce their spouse to pursue their ascetic goals. See 
G. Fee’s discussion his commentary The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 
pp. 269-70. 
116 Here Paul covers a range of particular situations including unmarried virgins and betrothed individuals 
who have yet to marry, widows or individuals who have already divorced who wish to re-marry, and 
married individuals whose spouse has refused sexual intimacy or happens to be non-Christian.  
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 touch a woman.”117 Scholars have suggested a number of possible motivations of celibate 
activity in Corinth, including Stoic influences,118 possible interactions with early 
Gnostics,119 ascetic streams of Judaism,120 and eschatological fervour.121 However, these 
explanations only demonstrate a certain compatibility of celibacy with concurrent views 
of the Greco-Roman world, and no dependency or clear historical connection can be 
demonstrated from the contents of I Corinthians 7. Paul is content to simply agree with 
the Corinthians that celibacy is better than marriage and provides no clear explanation of 
either his or the Corinthians’ motives. But he is also clear that if an individual is not 
gifted by the Spirit with the capacity for continence (7:7), then it is no sin to marry, and 
equally clear that if married, spouses are duty bound to provide conjugal rights, and by no 
means entitled to a divorce for the purposes of celibacy. Naturally, in the future the 
proponents of sexual renunciation in the early church would use Paul’s endorsement of 
celibacy with great effect.122  
In I Timothy 5, there seemed to be some concern over the age of those assigned to 
the list of widows in the congregation. The author of I Timothy prohibits entering a 
widow into the list if she is too young on the basis of concerns over her ability to remain 
chaste. A woman who is too young may yet give in to sensual desire and violate her 
                                                          
117 There is even some disagreement on whether Paul is quoting the Corinthian position or describing his 
own views. See Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, p. 270-71. 
118 See Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, p. 519. n. 21. 
119 For example see W.F. Orr & J.A. Walther’s commentary I Corinthians, The Anchor Bible Vol. 32 
(NewYork: Doubleday, 1976), p. 208. 
120 D. Boyarin, “Body Politic among the Brides of Christ: Paul and the Origins of Sexual Renunciation” in 
Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush, & R. Valantasis, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 459-78. 
121 C.K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 
153-87. Barrett argues that the immanent return of Jesus and the present reality of the Holy Spirit in 
Corinth may have prompted some to reject marriage on the grounds that it is no longer necessary in the new 
age, or that the presence of the Holy Spirit should be reflected in a superior spirituality of celibacy.  
122 For an excellent survey of the use of scripture in order to support the idealization of celibacy in the early 
church, see E. Clark’s Clark’s monograph Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early 
Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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 pledge of celibacy as a widow (5:11-12). Again, though, while I Timothy 5 is concerned 
with the proper distribution of material goods to “real” widows,123 the reasons for 
expecting widows to be celibate remains unclear. Only 5: 11 mentions that sensual desire 
may tempt younger widows to remarry, but scholars disagree as to whether giving in to 
“sensual desire” is sexual in nature.124 However, I Timothy 4:3-4 does indicate that some 
group in that city was in fact urging a rejection of marriage and abstinence from food, and 
to counter them the author of I Timothy argues that marriage is a good act that can be 
sanctified by God. Thus, although celibacy seems to be a clear requirement of widows in 
Asia Minor and that ascetic practice may have been encouraged by a group of early 
Christians in Asia Minor, there is little to indicate their motivations for such expectations, 
though it is important to note that like I Corinthians 7, I Timothy sees no sin in 
remarriage, if to another believer.  
One final New Testament text which indicates the presence of celibates is 
Revelation 14:1-5: 
Then I looked, and there was the Lamb, standing on Mount Zion! And 
with him were one hundred forty-four thousand who had his name and his 
Father's name written on their foreheads.  And I heard a voice from heaven 
like the sound of many waters and like the sound of loud thunder; the voice I 
heard was like the sound of harpists playing on their harps, and they sing a 
new song before the throne and before the four living creatures and before the 
elders. No one could learn that song except the one hundred forty-four 
thousand who have been redeemed from the earth.  It is these who have not 
defiled themselves with women, for they are virgins; these follow the Lamb 
wherever he goes. They have been redeemed from humankind as first fruits 
                                                          
123 See D.C. Arichea & H.A. Hatton, A Handbook on Paul’s Letters to Timothy and to Titus (New York: 
United Bible Societies, 1995), p.110-24. 
124 For example, G. Fee argues that “sensual desires” refers back to I Tim. 5:5-6 and widows who remained 
under the care of their family yet still accepted material goods from the church in order to live a more 
luxurious lifestyle. Thus the “pledge”(5:12) that widows who remarry are breaking, is their pledge to 
Christ, which they abandon to remarry in order to live comfortably. Verse 15, then, refers to widows who 
have turned away to follow Satan, or more simply, widows who have remarried a non-Christian and given 
up her faith in Christ to gain material comfort. See G. Fee, 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus (San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1984), pp.75-81. 
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 for God and the Lamb, and in their mouth no lie was found; they are 
blameless. 
 
The context of this passage within the structure of the book of Revelation is 
incredibly difficult to summarize, but the basic situation in John’s vision is that the 
Beast (Satan’s agent on earth) has been waging war upon the saints, here depicted 
as one hundred forty-four thousand believers who had been numbered for holy war. 
This passage pictures their song of victory before God’s throne after having been 
martyred,125 and for the purposes of this study it is significant to note that John has 
chosen to describe them as “virgins” (parqenoi) since they had “not defiled 
themselves with women”(meta gunaikwn o0uk e0molunqhsan). J. 
Massyngberde Ford has summarized the scholarly opinions about John’s use of the 
term “virgin”: 1) a literal expression of sexual renunciation, either of genuine 
ascetics during the late first century (Allo) or as a later interpolation by celibate 
scribes (Charles), 2) a metaphorical use of “virgin” that is intended to convey the 
purity of the martyrs in the same way that a sacrifice in the Old Testament was 
required to be unblemished (Swete, Kiddle), and 3) since the martyrs have been 
“numbered” for battle against God’s enemies, “virgin” should represent an 
expression of the Old Testament regulations to consecrate warriors for holy war 
through a period of abstinence before battle (Caird, Zahn).126 While the opinions 
that link the “virgins” to Old Testament imagery are more than likely correct in 
terms of visionary intertextuality, the opinion that “virgins” literally represents men 
who have renounced sexual intercourse is a valid interpretation as well.  
                                                          
125 The notion that martyrdom is a victory over Satan and the world is a consistent theme in Revelation. See 
R. Bauckham, The Theology of the Book of Revelation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 
93-95. 
126 J. Massyngberde Ford, Revelation, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1975), pp. 234-35.  
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 First, though obviously not referring to any specific historical group of 
celibates, the text does show that John’s audience was familiar enough with the 
concept of sexual renunciation that he could use it as an image in this text. It is 
clear from I Corinthians and I Timothy that the practice of celibacy did exist during 
this period, and since both I Timothy and Revelation were written to the churches in 
Asia Minor (I Tim 1:3, Rev. 1:11, 2:1), it is not unlikely that John was aware of 
celibacy, and then employed the practice as a visual image that would be obviously 
recognizable, as well as having compatibility with the additional meanings of 
sacrificial purity and regulations for holy war. Second, the choice of terminology 
for the passage indicates a concern for sexual renunciation as an ascetic practice, 
since it is obvious that the one hundred forty-four thousand are not described as 
unwed individuals of marriageable age. In addition, the phrase “they did not defile 
themselves with women” is also an indicator that “virgins” refers to celibate 
individuals who abstained from sexual intercourse. The regularly employed early 
Christian term for avoiding idolatrous or immoral sexual activity in general is 
porneia,127 or “fornication”, and John uses it often in Revelation.128 However, in 
this passage John has chosen not to use porneia, more likely indicating a specific 
practice that is not part of early Christianity’s broader sexual ethic to avoid 
“fornication.”129 Indeed, it is because the practice of celibacy was present in the 
New Testament period in visible quantities that John has a distinctly Christian 
practice which he can adapt in continuity with Old Testament and apocalyptic 
                                                          
127 More will be said on the meaning and use of porneia in chapter four. 
128 Rev. 14:8; 17:2; 18:3,9; 19:2. 
129 Ironically, this is Charles’ reasoning behind his assertion that Rev. 14:4 represents a later interpolation 
by scribes with ascetic sympathies.  
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 imagery. Thus, it is safe to say that this passage from Revelation provides evidence 
that celibacy was widespread enough ways that John could circulate a letter to 
seven churches across Asia Minor and expect his audience to recognize his use of 
“virgins” in his imagery.  
It seems, then, that during the New Testament period there was an early, though 
not clearly explained, impetus among some Christian communities to encourage or 
expect celibacy of some of their members. Turning to the late first and early second 
centuries, when it comes to sexual renunciation in the early church following the initial 
phases of the New Testament period, scholars are frustrated by the lack of sources. From 
the turn of the century until about the 140’s CE only a smattering of Christian writings is 
extant, and the best sources for life in the early church during this period come from 
Ignatius of Antioch, and to a lesser degree, from Polycarp and Clement of Rome. 
Consequently, what can be pieced together concerning sexual renunciation during this 
period is general at best, and often thought only to be demonstrable for specific locations 
or areas.  
 The first piece of evidence for the practice of second century sexual renunciation 
appears in Clement of Rome’s letter to the church in Corinth. Writing from Rome shortly 
after the persecution under Domitian (ca. 97CE), Clement was addressing a terrible 
schism that seems to have occurred in Corinth, which had resulted in several presbyters 
being deposed from their office.130 Amidst Clement’s admonitions to humility and 
repentance, there is a short passage that indicates that sexual renunciation was still 
practiced in Corinth: 
                                                          
130 See Kirsopp Lake’s introduction to Clement in The Apostolic Fathers, Vol. I, Loeb Classical Library, 
(London: Heinemann, 1912-13), pp. 3-7. 
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 Let him that is pure in the flesh not grow proud of it, and boast, knowing 
that it was another who bestowed on him the gift of continence 
(enkrateia).131 
 
It would seem, then, that in Corinth the practice of sexual renunciation continued to be 
present, with some engaging in enkrateia. Indeed, it seems that some had boasted of their 
purity and the practice of sexual renunciation was partly at the center of the schism that 
Clement was addressing. Yet there is little else in terms of information about the practice 
and nothing about the nature and form of such practices can be surmised. 
 Approximately ten to fifteen years later, Ignatius of Antioch was on his way to 
Rome to be martyred and wrote his famous series of letters to early Christians across the 
empire. While it might seem hopeful in that Ignatius is the first to give a picture of 
Christianity as a whole during this period, he unfortunately says very little about celibacy, 
although the fact that he mentions celibates at all in letters that say little about early 
Christian practice in general makes the presence of celibates all the more obvious. 
Regardless, all of his letters are heavily weighted towards establishing the charismatic 
authority of church offices (bishop, presbyter, deacon),132 and although there are a 
number of warnings against lust,133 he only mentions those who practice sexual 
renunciation on a couple of occasions. For example, in his letter to Polycarp, Ignatius 
writes:  
Flee from evil arts; but rather preach against them. Speak to my sisters, 
that they love the Lord, and be content with their husbands both in the 
                                                          
131 I Clement 38. Here it seems that the early Christians have already adopted the Greek term “enkrateia” as 
a term for continence. The term has a long history of use in the Greco-Roman world as “self-mastery” or 
the virtue of “temperance”, found in individuals who have achieved a level of discipline necessary to 
control the lower, irrational desires linked to the body. However, the term was very rarely used to indicate 
complete sexual abstinence. For a more in depth discussion see chapter three of this thesis.  
132 See H.O. Maier, The Social Setting of the Ministry as Reflected in the Writings of Hermas, Clement and 
Ignatius (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1991), pp.156-70. 
133 See for example, Ignatius’ letters: To Polycarp, 4; To the Ephesians, 8; To the Romans, 7; To the 
Philippians, 6. 
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 flesh and spirit. In the same way, enjoin on my brothers, in the name of 
Jesus Christ, “to love their wives, even as the Lord loved the Church.” If 
any one can continue in continence,134 to the honor of the flesh of the 
Lord, let him so remain without boasting. If he begins to boast, he is lost; 
and if it be made known except to the bishop, he is polluted. But it is right 
for men and women who marry to be united with the consent of the 
bishop, that their marriage may be according to Lord and not according to 
lust. Let all things be done to the honor of God.135 
 
 This passage is interesting in that Ignatius’ advice seems to indicate that problems 
over celibates were also present in Polycarp’s church in Smyrna. It appears that those 
who engaged in celibacy in Smyrna felt themselves to be spiritually superior, which led 
some to refrain from marriage, on some level or worse yet, at least for Ignatius, to deem 
themselves better than the bishop.  
In addition, another of Ignatius’ letters mentions a group of celibate women in 
Smyrna, who seem to cross over both the categories of virgin and widow. In 13:1 of his 
letter to the Smyrneans, Ignatius sends greetings: “I salute the households of my brethren 
with their wives and children, and the virgins who are called widows.” The ambiguity of 
the phrase “virgins who are called widows,” seems to be one largely because of the 
English word “widow.” The English term “widow” refers unambiguously to a woman 
whose husband has died, but in Greek and Latin, the term is less clear in its meaning. 
Scholars have argued that the ambiguity in the term is focused upon a woman’s marital 
status, and that a “widow” (cera) was regularly used to describe a woman who did not 
live with a husband.136 Consequently, according to Andrew Louth, the phrase may refer 
                                                          
134 It is interesting to note that Kirsopp Lake’s translation uses the word “continence” for the Greek e0n 
a(gneia|, which would normally be translated as “purity” or “holiness”. Lake correctly uses 
“continence” instead of “purity” in order to capture the nuance that this passage contrasts those who marry 
and those who do not. Thus, there appeared to be some in Smyrna had been renouncing sexual intercourse 
and marriage.   
135 Ignatius, Letter to Polycarp, 5. 
136 See C. Methuen, “The ‘Virgin Widow’: A Problematic Social Role for the Early Church?” Harvard 
Theological Review 90.3 (1997): 286-88. 
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 to “either actual widows whom because of their purity and devotion [Ignatius] 
characterizes as virgins,137 or perhaps unmarried women included in the widows’ re
for the purposes of charity.”
gister 
 
of their motives.  
                                                          
138 Again, though, the statement of Ignatius simply 
acknowledges the existence of celibate Christians who have chosen a life of sexual 
continence, either as lifelong virgins or after the death of a spouse, but he does not inform
the reader 
Shortly after the martyrdom of Ignatius, Polycarp, the bishop of Smyrna and 
friend of Ignatius, wrote a letter to the Philippians, partly to address apostasy in Philippi 
and partly in response to Philippians’ request for copies of the letters of Ignatius, to which 
he had access. In the fifth chapter of his letter Polycarp writes: 
In like manner, let the young men also be blameless in all things, being 
especially careful to preserve purity, and keeping themselves in, as with a 
bridle, from every kind of evil. For it is well that they should be cut off 
from the lusts that are in the world, since “every lust wars against the 
spirit; “ and “neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves 
with mankind, shall inherit the kingdom of God,” nor those who do things 
inconsistent and unbecoming. Wherefore, it is needful to abstain from all 
these things, being subject to the presbyters and deacons, as unto God and 
Christ. The virgins also must walk in a blameless and pure conscience.139 
 
 This passage contains prescriptions against sexual immorality similar to those of  
Ignatius, but now it is directed generally towards young men and virgins. This is typical 
early Christian sentiment about sexuality and, as demonstrated by his references of New 
137 Despite what ambiguity may have existed in the term “widow” (xhra), it is still difficult to argue that a 
widow, that is an individual whose spouse had died, would have been categorized as a “virgin widow”, as 
though in accepting celibacy after the death of their spouse they have somehow regained their virginity. 
First, there is no textual evidence supporting that widows considered their celibacy in such a manner. 
Second, all of the references of the “virgin widows” indicate that these celibates were young women who 
chose not to marry and expected the honour and charity given to widows to be allotted to them as well. See 
I Tim. 5, Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins 9. 
138 A. Louth, Early Christian Writings (Harmondsworh, UK: Penguin, 1987), p. 105. Methuen also notes 
that this passage from Ignatius indirectly supports the passage from I Timothy 5 and acknowledges the 
existence of women who were young, unmarried and celibate and included on the rolls of widows to 
receive charity. See Methuen, p. The ‘Virgin Widow’, p. 291. 
139 Polycarp, To the Philippians, 5. 
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 Testament epistles,140 it falls in line with Pauline thought. However, the significant issue 
here is that Polycarp has included virgins among those he advises.  Unfortunately, 
Polycarp does not describe that role in much detail and we are left to speculate that it may 
have been similar to the continence described by other Christian texts, or that it may 
simply have been Polycarp addressing the young, unmarried people to encourage them to 
remain sexually austere.141 
 It appears, then, that such renunciation of sexual activity was present in various 
locales across the empire during the period of the Apostolic Fathers. Clement knows of it 
in Rome and writes of it in Corinth, Ignatius knows and writes of it in Smyrna,142 and 
Polycarp obviously knows of it in Smyrna and writes of it in Philippi. Although this is not 
an all-inclusive list, it does cover Rome, Greece and Asia Minor, a large portion of the 
northern half of the empire, and more or less in the areas for which there is 
documentation of early Christian activity.  
III. The Mid to Late Second Century Texts 
From the 140’s CE through to the beginning of the third century the writings of 
Hermas, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria reveal the presence of sexual 
renunciation in early Christianity during the second century up until the time of 
Tertullian. 
The Muratorian Canon states that The Shepherd of Hermas was written by the 
Presbyter Hermas in the city of Rome at the time when Pius was the bishop of Rome (ca. 
                                                          
140 Polycarp is quoting Galatians 5:17 and I Corinthians 6:9-10. See chapter four for more on the general 
early Christian position on sexual morality.  
141 It is likely that at this point in the development of early Christianity the terminology of celibacy was not 
distinct yet from the terminology of the sexual restraint expected of all Christians, perhaps using a9gnoj 
and e0gkrateia interchangeably.  
142 It is more than likely that he knew of celibacy from his home church in Antioch, since his comments 
concerning celibates did not indicate in any way that he was unfamiliar with the practice.  
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 140’s CE).143 It is a series of apocalyptic visions designed to encourage, correct and 
motivate the church in Rome in a time of persecution. In this series of visions, Hermas is 
visited by a lady who appears in a variety of forms (young, old, angelic), and who gives 
Hermas visionary revelations and then interprets them for him. Important for this study is 
the fact that among the myriad of visions and interpretations is an emphasis upon 
celibacy, referred to as continence (enkrateia). First, Hermas is called “Hermas the 
Continent” (vis. I.ii.4, vis. II.iii.2), and is described as one “who abstains from every evil 
desire (epithumia) and is full of simplicity and great innocence.” As the model for his 
readers, he is marked by the sort of virtue already attributed to celibates by Clement and 
Ignatius – self-mastery (enkrateia) marked by a rejection of desire. He is the model of 
continence and righteousness, which are now held as almost synonyms in The Shepherd 
of Hermas. 
 Second, among the visions there are several examples of continence as the most 
appropriate expression of faith. For example, in a vision where Hermas sees seven 
women standing around a tower, his guide tells him: 
This tower is being supported by them according to the command of the 
Lord. Hear now their qualities. The first of them who is clasping her hands 
is called faith; through her the chosen are saved. The second, who is 
girded and looks like a man, is called Continence (enkrateia); she is the 
daughter of faith. Whosoever then shall follow her will abstain from all 
evil deeds, believing that if he refrains from every evil lust (epithumia) he 
will inherit eternal life.144 
 
                                                          
143 There is considerable dispute among scholars as to the dating of this work. Some are comfortable with  
the date set forth by the Muratorian Canon, while others think it was written much earlier, as early as the  
turn of the first century. Basically, if the Muratorian Canon is considered unreliable, one needs to fall back  
upon the internal evidence of the document itself, which is full of ambiguities. (See H. Maier, The Social  
Setting of the Ministry as Reflected in the Writings of Hermas, Clement and Ignatius (Waterloo: Wilfred  
Laurier University Press, 1991), pp. 55-58, for a full discussion of the issues) The position taken in this  
study is that due to the apocalyptic nature of the work it is difficult to assign historical value to obviously  
visionary and literary symbols of Hermas and that the Muratorian Canon is correct in its date of Hermas. 
144 Shepherd of Hermas, Vis. III.viii.2-4. 
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  And shortly after: 
 From faith is born continence (enkrateia), from continence 
simplicity, from simplicity innocence, from innocence reverence, from 
reverence knowledge, from knowledge love.145 
 
For Hermas, enkrateia is the natural response or consequence to faith and, in turn, 
provides the basis for all Christian virtues culminating in love. Moreover, aside from 
including avoidance of desire as the basis for enkrateia, Hermas expected everyone to 
embrace enkrateia as an appropriate expression of faith, especially in the face of 
persecution.146 So, although Hermas does not specifically mention celibate figures, it 
does help show how the ideal of continence had spread and become a popular notion in 
the practice of piety.  
 Justin Martyr (ca. 150-65 C.E.), as well, mentions those who practice sexual 
renunciation: 
The function of the womb is to become pregnant; and of the member of 
the male to impregnate. But as, though these members are destined to 
discharge such functions, it is not therefore necessary that they from the 
beginning discharge them (since we see many women who do not become 
pregnant, as those that are barren, even though they have wombs), so 
pregnancy is not the immediate and necessary consequence of having a 
womb; but those even who are not barren abstain from sexual intercourse, 
some being virgins from the first, and others from a certain time. And we 
see men also keeping themselves virgins, some from the first, and some 
from a certain time; so that by their means, marriage, made lawless 
through lust, is destroyed. And we find that some even of the lower 
animals, though possessed of wombs, do not bear, such as the mule; and 
the male mules do not beget their kind. So that both in the case of men and 
the irrational animals we can see sexual intercourse abolished; and this, 
too, before the future world. And our Lord Jesus Christ was born of a 
virgin, for no other reason than that He might destroy the begetting by 
lawless desire, and might show to the ruler that the formation of man was 
                                                          
145 Shepherd of Hermas, Vis. III.viii.7. Other examples include Mand. 1; Mand. 6; Mand. 8; Sim. V.i.5; 
Sim. IX.xv1-3. 
146 In II.iii.2, the angelic figure tells Hermas to be faithful in the face of persecution because he will be 
saved “by not having broken away from the living God [i.e recanted] and by your simplicity and continence 
(enkratia).” The eternal life earned by his faith will be the ultimate victory over persecition.  
66 
 possible to God without human intervention. And when He had been born, 
and had submitted to the other conditions of the flesh, — I mean food, 
drink, and clothing, — this one condition only of discharging the sexual 
function He did not submit to; for, regarding the desires of the flesh, He 
accepted some as necessary, while others, which were unnecessary, He did 
not submit to. For if the flesh were deprived of food, drink, and clothing, it 
would be destroyed; but being deprived of lawless desire, it suffers no 
harm. And at the same time He foretold that, in the future world, sexual 
intercourse should be done away with; as He says, “The children of this 
world marry, and are given in marriage; but the children of the world to 
come neither marry nor are given in marriage, but shall be like the angels 
in heaven.” Let not, then, those that are unbelieving marvel, if in the world 
to come He do away with those acts of our fleshly members which even in 
this present life are abolished.147   
 
Here Justin mentions both men and women who have embraced sexual 
renunciation, some from their youth and others from later in life, as a lifelong practice in 
order to avoid lustful desire that accompanies the members of their bodies (i.e. 
reproductive organs). Significant in this instance is the fact that these Christians and 
Justin have interpreted their sexual renunciation both in light of Hellenistic philosophical 
concerns as well as theological ones. The entire discussion is held in the realm of the 
natural functions of the body, similar to the discussion that Aristotle had concerning the 
natural function of sexual desire as the impetus for reproduction.148 These Christians had 
even abandoned the natural and necessary functions of the body so as to avoid “lawless” 
desire and some early Christians seem to even have abandoned marriage itself. Justin is 
able to defend their actions on account of a theological interpretation of the life and 
words of Christ; Jesus himself, though recognizing the necessity of desire for the sake of 
producing children, did not let even those natural desires function in his life. Indeed, 
Jesus even claims that in heaven marriage will end, thus proving that the natural 
functions of the body are temporary necessities prior to the coming age.  
                                                          
147 Justin Martyr, On the Resurrection, III. 
148 See chapter three’s discussion on Aristotle’s understanding of human nature. 
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  Shortly after this, during a persecution in 177CE, the Christian apologist 
Atheangoras wrote to the emperor Marcus Aurelius to defend the Christian faith from the 
charges of atheism, cannibalism, incest and a number of accustations of immorality. 
Amidst his defense of the Christians against charges of immorality Athenagoras points 
out: 
 Since we hope for eternal life, we despise the things of this life, 
including even the pleasures of the soul. Thus each of us thinks of his 
wife, whom he married according to the laws we have laid down, with a 
view to nothing more than procreation. For as a farmer casts seed into the 
ground and awaits the havest without further planting, so also procreation 
is the limit we set for the undulgence of our lust. You could find many 
among us, both men and women, growing old unmarried in the hope of 
being united more closely with God.149 
 
Like Justin Martyr, Athenagoras bears witness to the fact that by the second half of the 
second century, many Christians had embraced a lifelong celibacy, and at the very least, 
the austerity of sexual intercourse solely for the purpose of procreation. More 
importantly, Athenagoras bears witness to the fact that some early Christians had 
developed laws by which they had placed limits upon their sexual activities.  
 Athenagoras’ apology also suggests that celibacy was hardly a practice done in 
isolated areas or by few people. How could he write such a thing to the emperor as a 
representative of early Christianity as a whole if he did not assume that celibacy was a 
practice prevalent enough to be recognized as a Christian one? It is clear that Athenagoras 
thinks of celibacy as a uniquely Christian moral practice, and one that Christians are 
recognized for across the empire. In fact, he is quick to point out the hypocrisy of pagans 
that accuse Christians of immorality when Roman society, at least to Christian 
                                                          
149 Athenagoras, Legatio 33, trans. W.R. Scheodel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
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 sensibilities, exhibits excessive sexual immorality. Indeed, in Legatio 34 he writes that 
pagans have no right to criticize Christian morality: 
These adulterers and pederasts reproach men who abstain from intercourse 
or are satisfied with a single marriage, whereas they themselves live like 
fish. For they swallow up whoever comes their way, the stronger driving 
out the weaker. And this is what it really means to feed on human flesh: 
that when laws have been promulgated to further every form of justice, 
they violate these ordinances so that the governors of the provinces which 
you have sent out cannot even handle all the lawsuits.150  
 
It is not insignificant, either, that a mid second century pagan text confirms that 
Christians were recognized for their celibacy. The Roman doctor Galen briefly alludes to 
Christians in some correspondance with Marcus Aurelius and his son, Commodus: 
…Most people are unable to follow any demonstrative argument 
consecutively; hence they need parables and benefit from them - and he 
[Galen- adds the editor who preserved this extract] understands by 
parables tales of rewards and punishments in a future life – just as now we 
see the people called Christians drawing their faith from parables and 
miracles, and yet sometimes acting in the same way as those who 
philosophize. For their contempt of death, and of its sequel, is patent to us 
every day, and likewise their restraint in cohabitation. For they include not 
only men but also women who refrain from cohabiting all through their 
lives; and they also number individuals who have reached such a point in 
their control regarding their daily conduct and in their intense desire for 
rectitude that they have in fact become not inferior to those who are true 
philosophers.151 
 
At first glance this passing remark may only seem a curiosity, but methodologically it is 
of great importance when a non-member of a social group can provide important 
evidence for that group’s distinct identity markers within a society. Recently scholars 
have focused a great deal on the concept of self-identity within social groups and how 
those identies are often idealogical due to their inherent biases towards group solidarity. 
But here there is an example of an outsider being able to identify distinguishing 
                                                          
150 Athenagoras, Legatio 34.  
151 See R. Waltzer, Galen on Jews and Christians (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). 
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 characteristics of a social group to which he does not belong. Galen chose to identify 
three distinctive qualities: 1) Christians use parables but paradoxically are capable of 
philosophical behaviour, 2) they have contempt for death in the face of persecution, and 
3) they are known for their practice of sexual renunciation. Assuming that Galen is not 
misrepresenting Christians, and his grudgingly respectful attitude would seem to support 
that he was not,152 it could be argued that by the mid second century Christians were 
known for embracing celibacy to an extent that it became part of their identity in relation 
to society. Not only did Christians identify themselves as those who engaged in celibacy 
over against the broader society, pagans also identified them as those who practiced 
celibacy.153 
IV. Anti-Gnostic and Apocryphal Texts  
 The relationship between orthodox and Gnostic Christianity in the second and 
early third century is a complex and difficult issue. The old scholarly perspective of an 
orthodox group of Christians fending off a world of Gnostic heretics (who promoted a 
philosophical duality and a rejection of the goodness of the supreme God as the creator of 
the world) has been replaced by a more flexible and careful presentation. Rather, early 
Christianity of the second century is described as more fluid and flexible, as various 
doctrinal positions and religious practices were simultaneously developing in different 
Christian circles. While it is not necessary, as some scholars think, to envisage “a 
                                                          
152 Harnack boldly states “One can hardly imagine a more impartial and brilliant testimony to the morality 
of the Christians.” See A. Harnack, the Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries, 
Trans. J. Moffatt (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1972), p. 213.  
153 It is interesting to note that taken seriously, this self-proclaimed part of the early Christian identity, along 
with the pagan recognition of that identity, brings into doubt the scholarly position that early Christianity 
had not formed a cohesive self-identity until the end of the third century. At the very least, you can argue 
from this that Christian identity was fairly well established by the mid second century for it to have 
received recognition by Roman outsiders. 
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 continuum of ideas” with markedly varied content,154 it is nonetheless more proper to 
refer to Gnosticizing elements and orthodox elements within the church that existed in a 
tension of popular support. With that in mind, the notion that the two existed in a pure 
antithetic dichotomy has been rejected, and most scholars now recognize that there were 
probably “more Gnostic” or “less Gnostic” groups within early Christianity and that 
many degrees of “Gnosticism” can be detected in the “Gnostic” texts of the early church. 
Thus, in some texts the philosophical dualism of Gnosticism, when pushed to the 
extreme, results in the rejection of God and Creation, while in others, that dualism may 
be only barely discernable.155 Inclusion under the umbrella of orthodoxy, then, may have 
been a more complicated and flexible proposition than previously suspected.   
 What this means for the present discussion is that a number of texts concerning 
celibacy in the second century are going to be affected by how we consider the issue of 
Gnosticism. Two kinds of texts need to be addressed: first, there are the Apocryphal Acts, 
and second, the apologetic works of Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria, all of which 
date to the second half of the second century CE. Essentially, both the Apocryphal Acts 
and the anti-Gnostic apologetic works of the church fathers can be used to demonstrate 
the popularity of celibacy in the second century. The key to understanding their 
perspectives lies in understanding the Acts as positive support for popular ascetcism, 
while the apologetic works demonstrate the correctives placed on celibates who are 
judged to have erred in their perspectives. 
                                                          
154 See S.L. Davies’ summary of scholarly positions in Revolt of the Widows: The Social World of the 
Apochryphal Acts (London: Feffer & Simons, Inc., 1980). 
155 Davies’ comparison is to modern American Christians who all have a variety of doctrinal differences but 
are still considered orthodox Christians. See Davies, Revolt, p. 11.   
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  The problem with the Apocryphal Acts is that they are clearly ficticious 
(idiosyncratic haigiography at best), and therefore often dismissed from serious 
considerations as the “ridiculous pseudo-history originating from the disturbed minds of 
unhappy heretics.”156 Recently, however, some scholars have rehabilitated the Acts, not 
by claiming there is clear historical data in them, but by examining them as forms of 
popular literature that reflect the values and life-styles of the early Christian 
community.157 By examining the Acts as a type of ancient literature, scholars like Kate 
Cooper, Virginia Burrus and Stevan Davies have identified the Apochryphal Acts as a 
variety of the ancient folk-tale or novel. Burrus, for example, demonstrates that the 
Apocryphal Acts have a literary structure that is common to all of the Acts in the same 
way that there are literary structures common to the ancient novel. She first shows how 
the ancient novel, such as Chariton’s Chaereas and Callirohe or Xenophon’s Ephesian 
Tale, has four structural elements: 
1) A young and beautiful couple fall in love and are betrother or married. 
2) They leave home on a ship voyage and become separated.  
3) They endure persecutions and threats to their chastity, yet remain faithful. 
4) They are reunited and return home.158 
 
Similarly, the Apochryphal Acts show a literary structure she calls the “Chastity Tale”, 
which is designed to encourage faithfulness to God through celibacy. The structure of the 
Chastity Tale is as follows: 159 
1) Apsotle arrives in a town. 
                                                          
156 This is Davies’ characterization of some scholarly opinions that dismiss the Acts off hand, while he 
himself argues that the Apocryphal Acts derive from “the common people who agreed on the proper way of 
living for a Christians but had differing doctrinal positions.” Revolt, p. 11. 
157 See V. Burrus, Chastity as Autonomy: Women in the Stories of the Apochryphal Acts (New York: The 
Edward Mellen Press, 1987), S.L. Davies, Revolt of the Widows: The Social World of the Apochryphal Acts 
(London: Feffer & Simons, Inc., 1980), and K. Cooper, The Virgin and the Bride: Idealized Womanhood in 
Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
158 Burrus, Chastity as Autonomy, p. 48. 
159 Burrus, Chastity as Autonomy, p. 34-35. 
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 2) Woman goes to hear apostle preach. 
3) Woman vows chastity. 
4) Husband attempts to violate vow. 
5) Apostle encourages woman. 
6) Woman resists husband. 
7) Husband/governor imprisons apostle 
8) Woman visits apostle in prison (encouragement; baptism of woman). 
9) Husband/ governor attempts to kill apostle. 
10) Apostle dies as martyr or is rescued miraculously. 
11) Husband/ governor persecutes woman. 
12) Woman is rescued miraculously. 
13) Woman defeats husband/governor (who may be converted or punished, and 
never succeeds in persuading the woman). 
14)  Woman is freed and allowed to remain chaste.  
 
   Of eleven examples of Chastity Tales in the Apochryphal Acts, only two are 
missing any of the usual functions of the story, and in her opinion they are only 
secondary sequences of the tale.160 
 Although this concern for chastity is the driving force for the Acts of Peter, 
Andrew, Thomas and John, the best example of these texts supporting the church’s 
adoption of celibacy as a pious activity is The Acts of Paul.161 Philip Sellew correctly 
summarizes the work of scholars that recognize the apocryphal Acts of Paul, dating from 
the mid second century, as a work in which “…Paul is pictured as traveling from city to 
city, converting gentiles and proclaiming the need for a life of sexual abstinence and 
other encratite practices.”162 Notice, too, how the story follows the literary structure 
Burrus suggested for the “Chastity Tale.” In this story, Paul arrives in Iconium and 
preaches celibacy as the core expression of faith in Jesus Christ: 
 And when Paul entered into the house of Onesiphorus, there was great joy, 
and bowing of knees and breaking of bread, and the word of God concerning 
abstinence (or continence) and the resurrection; for Paul said:  
                                                          
160 Burrus, Chastity as Autonomy, p. 61-62. 
161 Sometimes referred to as the Acts of Paul and Thecla. 
162 P. Sellew, “The Acts of Paul” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, Volume 5, D.N. Freedman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), p. 201-02. 
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 Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.  
Blessed are they that keep the flesh chaste, for they shall become the temple 
of God.  
Blessed are they that abstain (or the continent), for unto them shall God 
speak.  
Blessed are they that have renounced this world, for they shall be well 
pleasing unto God.  
Blessed are they that possess their wives as though they had them not, for 
they shall inherit God.  
Blessed are they that have the fear of God, for they shall become angels of 
God.  
Blessed are they that tremble at the oracles of God, for they shall be 
comforted.  
Blessed are they that receive the wisdom of Jesus Christ, for they shall be 
called sons of the Most High.  
Blessed are they that have kept their baptism pure, for they shall rest with the 
Father and with the Son.  
Blessed are they that have compassed the understanding of Jesus Christ, for 
they shall be in light.  
Blessed are they that for love of God have departed from the fashion of this 
world, for they shall judge angels, and shall be blessed at the right hand of the 
Father.  
Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy and shall not see the 
bitter day of judgement.  
Blessed are the bodies of the virgins, for they shall be well- pleasing unto God 
and shall not lose the reward of their continence (chastity), for the word of 
the Father shall be unto them a work of salvation in the day of his Son, and 
they shall have rest world without end.”163 
 
Obviously, this work represents the popular nature of the text as it has been blended with 
the style of Jesus’ Beatitudes and spoken from the mouth of Paul. Then, a virgin named 
Thecla hears Paul’s preaching on celibacy and vows chastity,164 incurring the wrath of 
her fiance and other men of the town.165 After having his appeals for marriage rejected, 
her former fiancé manages to have Paul thrown into prison where she visits him and
encouraged.
 is 
                                                          
166 Finally, she too is condemned to martyrdom by the city’s officials,167 and 
163 Acts of Paul, 2.5-6. 
164 Acts of Paul, 2.7. 
165 Acts of Paul, 2.8-14. 
166 Acts of Paul, 2.18. 
167 Acts of Paul, 2.21ff. 
74 
 instead of being killed by the beasts in the arena, Thecla’s power miraculously prevents 
her death and the people of the city are fearful and awe-inspired.168 Thecla then leaves 
Iconium to live out her days in a cave where she lives the life of an ascetic.169 
 Scholars now see the Apocryphal Acts as a kind of literature similar to the novel, 
derived from the common people to provide instruction through entertainment for the less 
educated. In that regard, the Acts “…are testimonies to varieties of Christian belief and to 
a particular way of life. They derive from common people who agreed on the proper way 
of living for Christians but had differing doctrinal opinions.”170 In addition, the tendency 
to assume that the Apochryphal Acts are Gnostic in character has been challenged due to 
a lack of clearly discernible Gnostic tendencies of dualism and the rejection of God and 
creation. The assumption that an encratite position implies a Gnostic one is simply not 
true for the Apochryphal Acts. Rather, each of the Acts has a degree of Gnostic quality in 
relation to orthodoxy. For example, M.R. James has assessed the orthodoxy of each of the 
Acts and pronounced the Acts of Paul to be orthodox, while Peter is less so than Paul but 
more than John.171 As Schneemelcher puts it: 
One of the most distinctive features on these works is that they are not 
determined by theological reflections but rather directed by practical 
intentions. Thus the encratite strain that occurs in different forms in the 
several apocryphal Acts should undoubtedly be understood as showing the 
authors of these Acts took sexual continence to be an essential feature, or 
sometimes indeed the essential content, of the Christian message.172 
 
                                                          
168 Acts of Paul, 2.22, 2.36. 
169 Acts of Paul, 2.43.  
170 Davies, Revolt, p.11. 
171  M.R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 270, 300. In addition, 
S.P. Brock argues that the Acts of Thomas reflect Syriac Christianity, including both its Gnostic tendencies 
and cultural tendencies. See Holy Women of the Syrian Orient (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1987). 
Thus, while most of the Acts are from Greece or Asia Minor, the Acts of Thomas seem to reflect the 
presence of asceticism and celibacy in Syria during the late second century.  
172 See W. Schneemelcher and E. Hennecke, eds, The New Testament Apochrypha, Vol 2. English 
translation edited by R. McL. Wilson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 172. 
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  Interstingly, Eusebius can confirm this position for us. In an account of a letter 
written by Dionysius, the bishop of Corinth from 166-75CE, Eusebius tells us that 
Dionysius had some comments concerning overly harsh encratism among the orthodox: 
He gives them much advice also in regard to marriage and chastity, and 
commands them to receive those who come back again after any fall, 
whether it be delinquency or heresy. Among these is inserted also another 
epistle addressed to the Cnosians, in which he exhorts Pinytus, bishop of 
the parish, not to lay upon the brethren a grievous and compulsory burden 
in regard to chastity, but to have regard to the weakness of the multitude. 
Pinytus, replying to this epistle, admires and commends Dionysius, but 
exhorts him in turn to impart some time more solid food, and to feed the 
people under him when he wrote again, with more advanced teaching, that 
they might not be fed continually on these milky doctrines and 
imperceptibly grow old under a training calculated for children. In this 
epistle also Pinytus’ orthodoxy in the faith and his care for the welfare of 
those placed under him, his learning and his comprehension of divine 
things, are revealed as in a most perfect image.173 
 
 As can be seen, regardless of one’s theological position it was possible to be orthodox 
and hold the encratite position in regard to celibacy. Pinytus’ orthodoxy was not in 
question, nor was the orthodoxy of Dionysius, though both had differing opinions on the 
enforcement of celibacy. This passage, in combination with the clear popularity of 
celibacy demonstrated by the Apochryphal Acts, makes it safe to say that celibacy was 
frequently practiced during the second century.  
 Finally, by the end of the century, Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria had 
begun to defend and teach Christianity through large-scale projects, such as their works 
against heresy or works of instruction for Christians. In particular, their work against 
encratist thought during the second century included correctives to the effects of 
Gnosticism on sexuality in the early church. The basic situation appears to be that 
Gnostic thought had prompted some Christians to adopt either a too libertine attitude 
                                                          
173 Eusebius, Church History, IV.23.6-10.  
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 towards sexuality,174 or much more prevalent, too harsh a one that rejected God’s 
creation and the goodness of marriage and children.175 Naturally, both Irenaeus and 
Clement weigh in on the situation, and their comments luckily give us another clear 
picture of the presence of celibacy in the second century. 
Irenaeus offers up theological defenses of orthodoxy that include correctives that 
addressed the Gnostic rejection of marriage and their excessive use of celibacy. Two 
passages are relevant. First, in Against Heresies 1.28.1 Irenaeus specifically mentions the 
Encratites: 
Many offshoots of numerous heresies have already been formed from those 
heretics we have described. This arises from the fact that numbers of them-
indeed, we may say all-desire themselves to be teachers, and to break off 
from the particular heresy in which they have been involved. Forming one 
set of doctrines out of a totally different system of opinions, and then again 
others from others, they insist upon teaching something new, declaring 
themselves the inventors of any sort of opinion which they may have been 
able to call into existence. To give an example: Springing from Saturninus 
and Marcion, those who are called Encratites preached against marriage, 
thus setting aside the original creation of God, and indirectly blaming Him 
who made the male and female for the propagation of the human race. Some 
of those reckoned among them have also introduced abstinence from animal 
food, thus proving themselves ungrateful to God, who formed all things. 
They deny, too, the salvation of him who was first created. It is but lately, 
however, that this opinion has been invented among them. A certain man 
named Tatian first introduced the blasphemy. He was a hearer of Justin's, 
and as long as he continued with him he expressed no such views; but after 
his martyrdom he separated from the Church, and, excited and puffed up by 
the thought of being a teacher, as if he were superior to others, he composed 
his own peculiar type of doctrine. He invented a system of certain invisible 
Aeons, like the followers of Valentinus; while, like Marcion and Saturninus, 
he declared that marriage was nothing else than corruption and fornication. 
But his denial of Adam's salvation was an opinion due entirely to himself. 
                                                          
174 For example, Clement reports that the followers of Epiphanes had felt the eschatological redemption of 
Christ was now fully present and all social boundaries could be rejected as from a previous sinful era. The 
result was that wives were held in common in Epiphanes’ community and prompted sharp rebuke by 
Clement. See Stromaties III.2. 
175 The followers of Marcion in particular, as well as a number of other thinkers, were guilty of rejecting 
marriage as a sin and the world as evil. Book III of Clement’s Stromaties is essentially one long defence of 
the goodness of marriage held in balance with the proper place of celibacy.  
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 Second, in another passage from Against Heresies, Irenaeus make a unique comparison 
of the encratite position with the response of Adam & Eve following their sin in the 
Garden.  
For [Adam] showed his repentance by his conduct, through means of the 
girdle [which he used], covering himself with fig-leaves, while there were 
many other leaves, which would have irritated his body in a less degree. He, 
however, adopted a dress conformable to his disobedience, being awed by the 
fear of God; and resisting the erring, the lustful propensity of his flesh (since 
he had lost his natural disposition and child-like mind, and had come to the 
knowledge of evil things), he girded a bridle of continence (celibacy) upon 
himself and his wife, fearing God, and waiting for His coming, and indicating, 
as it were, some such thing [as follows]: Inasmuch as, he says, I have by 
disobedience lost that robe of sanctity which I had from the Spirit, I do now 
also acknowledge that I am deserving of a covering of this nature, which 
affords no gratification, but which gnaws and frets the body. And he would 
no doubt have retained this clothing forever, thus humbling himself, if God, 
who is merciful, had not clothed them with tunics of skins instead of fig 
leaves.176 
 
In essence, as J. Behr explains, Irenaeus makes the analogy that the encratite position is 
similar to how Adam and Eve’s immature and fallen reasoning led them to sew garments 
out of fig leaves that would “gnaw and fret” the body.177 Irenaeus’ analogy to the 
encratite position, this “bridle of continence”, represents a response to guilt that will 
prevent a true return to God, and Irenaeus argues that God gently corrects them by giving 
them “garments of skin.” Irenaeus’ corrective, then, was to make a distinction between 
the immature asceticism, the “feigned continence” of the encratites,178 and a celibacy 
under the guidance of the Spirit, which in no way could ever root itself in a rejection of 
                                                          
176 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 3.23.5 
177 For a full exploration of this critique see J. Behr’s Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), and his article “Irenaeus AH 3.23.5 and the Ascetic Ideal” St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Quarterly 37.4 (1993): 305-13. 
178 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.24.2. 
78 
 marriage or God’s good creation.179 Regardless, it is yet another clear demonstration of 
the presence of celibacy and asceticism in the second century.  
Finally, Clement of Alexandria also addresses the problems facing the early 
church in regard to the practices of the encratite Gnostics. Book three of his Stromaties is 
basically one long discussion and refutation of the two Gnostic positions on sexuality. As 
briefly stated earlier, on the one hand a small number of Gnostics, like Epiphanes for 
example, had adopted a theological position that enabled them to justify living in an open 
community where wives were held in common.180 Naturally, Clement is not impressed 
and simply states that those Christians are living in adultery and fall under God’s 
judgment.181 On the other hand, and in greater numbers, were Christians who had 
rejected the body, sex, and marriage as part of the sinful order of the world under their 
Gnostic worldview.182 Clement’s response is to affirm the goodness of God’s creation, of
sex for procreation, and of marriage using both biblical proofs and extensive discussi
of correlative wisdom found among the Greeks and Romans.
 
ons 
o 
                                                          
183 In short, Gnostics wh
embrace an exclusive asceticism of celibacy and reject marriage are denying God’s will 
179 See Behr, The Ascetic Ideal, pp. 212-13. 
180 Stromaties III.5. 
181 Stromaties III.8-11. 
182 In StromatiesIII.81 he writes “I believe Tatian the Syrian made bold to teach these doctrines. At any rate 
he writes these words in his book On Perfection According to the Saviour: ‘While agreement to be 
continent makes prayer possible, intercourse of corruption destroys it. By the very disparaging way in 
which he allows it, he forbids it. For although he allowed them to come together again because of Satan and 
the temptation to incontinence, he indicated that the man who takes advantage of this permission will be 
serving two masters, God if there is 'agreement,' but, if there is no such agreement, incontinence, 
fornication, and the devil.’ This he says in expounding the apostle. But he falsifies the truth in that by 
means of what is true he tries to prove what is untrue. We too confess that incontinence and fornication are 
diabolical passions, but the agreement of a controlled marriage occupies a middle position. If the married 
couple agree to be continent, it helps them to pray; if they agree with reverence to have sexual relations it 
leads them to beget children.” 
183 One can detect in Clement’s writings knowledge of nearly every school of Greco-Roman philosophy 
(including Pythagorean, Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean and Stoic thought) and he is more than 
comfortable drawing upon those philosophies when needed and rejecting them when they conflict with his 
understanding of biblical principles.  
79 
 for humanity and condemning creation as sinful, and Clement clearly rejects celibacy 
engaged in on the basis of that position. 
Moreover, what is of great value for historians is that amidst the correctives 
placed on the Gnostics, Clement describes what he understands to be the majority early 
Christian position on celibacy and asceticism. While the Greeks would suffer desire for 
the sake of balance and necessity, Clement claims that Christians actually go one step 
further: 
The human ideal of continence, I mean that which is set forth by Greek 
philosophers, teaches that one should fight desire and not be subservient to 
it so as to bring it to practical effect. But our ideal is not to experience 
desire at all. Our aim is not that while a man feels desire he should get the 
better of it, but that he should be continent even respecting desire itself. 
This continence cannot be attained in any other way except by God's 
grace. That was why he said "Ask and it shall be given you." This grace 
was received even by Moses, though clothed in his needy body, so that for 
forty days he felt neither thirst nor hunger. Just as it is better to be in good 
health than for a sick man to talk about health, so to be light is better than 
to discuss light, and true chastity is better than that taught by the 
philosophers. Where there is light there is no darkness. But where there is 
inward desire, even if it goes no further than desire and is quiescent so far 
as bodily action is concerned, union takes place in thought with the object 
of desire, although that object is not present.184  
 
For Clement, the goal of Christians is to feel no desire at all, but the difference between 
them and the encratites is that such an endeavour is undertaken in devotion to God and 
not out of a rejection of the created order. “As for ourselves,” he writes, “we set high 
value on continence which arises from love to the Lord and seeks that which is good for 
its own sake, sanctifying the temple of the Holy Spirit. It is good if for the sake of the 
kingdom of heaven a man emasculates himself from all desire, and ‘purifies his 
conscience from dead works to serve the living God.’”185 Indeed, elsewhere in the 
                                                          
184 Stromaties, III.57. 
185 Stromaties, III.59. 
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 Stromaties, he is well aware of ascetics and celibates in the church and he even uses them 
as examples of the “true Gnostic” who uses continence as a means of self-restraint out of 
fear of God.186 
In addition, Clement’s discussion also gives us insight into the fact that by the 
second half of the second century celibacy was seen as the root virtue of a broader 
asceticism embraced by Christians. Two passages are enlightening: 
Our general argument concerning marriage, food, and other matters, may 
proceed to show that we should do nothing from desire. Our will is to be 
directed only towards that which is necessary. For we are children not of 
desire but of will.  A man who marries for the sake of begetting children 
must practice continence so that it is not desire he feels for his wife, whom 
he ought to love, and that he may beget children with a mastered and 
controlled will. For we have learnt not to "have thought for the flesh to 
fulfil its desires." We are to "walk honourably as in the way", that is in 
Christ and in the enlightened conduct of the Lord's way, "not in revelling 
and drunkenness, not in debauchery and lasciviousness, not in strife and 
envy."187 
 
And once more: 
However, one ought to consider continence not merely in relation to one 
form of it, that is, sexual relations, but in relation to all the other 
indulgences for which the soul craves when it is ill content with what is 
necessary and seeks for luxury. It is continence to despise money, 
softness, property, to hold in small esteem outward appearance, to control 
one's tongue, to master evil thoughts. In the past certain angels became 
incontinent and were seized by desire they fell from heaven to earth. And 
Valentine says in the letter to Agathopus: "Jesus endured " all things and 
was continent; It was his endeavor to earn a divine nature; he ate and 
drank in a manner peculiar to himself, and the food did not pass out of his 
body. Such was the power of his continence that food was not corrupted 
within him; for he himself was not subject to the process of corruption."188 
                                                          
186 Stromaties, VII.12. 
187 Stromaties, VII.12. 
188 Stromaties III.59. It is interesting to note that Clement is appealing here to Valentinus, a Gnostic he 
clearly associates with other Gnostic teachers. However, reading through the Stromaties it is also clear that 
Clement sees Valentinus and his followers as the least heretical of the Gnostic sects. He primarily 
understands Valentinus as a Gnostic who appeals to a kind of elitist spirituality that focused too greatly 
upon the soul’s non-corporeal relation to God through knowledge and obvious Neoplatonic conceptions of 
the soul’s immortal nature. Yet nowhere does Clement accuse Valentinus of the same dualistic tendencies of 
Gnostic thought that result in the rejection of God and Creation as good, nor of the encratism of other 
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The picture, then, is one where asceticism has been embraced as an ideal for all 
Christians. Some would be able to embrace celibacy and asceticism as a lifestyle, serving 
the church as we have explored earlier (widows, virgins, clergy) or simply as ascetics 
dedicated to living out a life of faith within the community.189 But along side those 
people, Clement sees all Christians embracing continence on some level. Beginning with 
sexual continence, the Christian is to eliminate desire for all things that may threaten to 
induce ungodly behaviour. For our purposes it is also most important to note that 
Clement pictures the ideal Christian as one that both embraces proper Christian 
continence and rejects encratite teachings; the true Christian is the married believer who 
remains celibate within marriage except for the purpose of begetting children, or a 
celibate who does not denigrate the goodness of God and Creation. In this way, Clement 
joins Irenaeus, and likely a number of early Christians, in embracing asceticism rooted in 
celibacy that is based on dedication to God, and not on a rejection of God’s good 
creation.  
V. The Third Century Texts 
Moving into the third century, Tertullian wrote On the Veiling of Virgins, wherein 
he discussed several matters pertaining to the order of virgins and widows in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Gnostic sects. In fact, Clement notes that the Valentinians do not reject marriage (Strom.III.1) and that they 
still acknowledged the goodness of God, the incarnation of the Logos and the goodness of Creation 
(Srom.II.20). Indeed, he even quotes Valentinus on several occasions, such as the passage above, in support 
of his arguments. It seems, then, that Clement’s opinion of Valentius is similar to his attitude towards the 
Greek philosophical schools: he simply picks and chooses what wisdom supports his understanding of 
Christianity, while discarding what is not in agreement with it. Moreover, it may also provide support to the 
thesis of scholars who study the Apocryphal Acts and argue that there was a range of Gnostic thought that 
may or may not have been encratite in its position, and that there is not necessarily a correlation between 
encratism and Gnostic theology. Here it seems that the Valentinians, though Gnostic in some respects, did 
not go so far as to embrace a rejection of marriage while recognizing the superiority of continence.  
189 A contemporary of Clement’s, Athenagoras, states, “Nay, you would find many among us, both men and 
women, growing old unmarried, in hope of living in closer communion with God.” On the Resurrection, 
33. 
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 congregations under his care. In Carthage, there seemed to be some disagreement over 
whether virgins should wear a veil, a right normally limited to a married woman. 
Apparently, a number of the male celibates in those congregations took exception to the 
status granted by such a visible marking of virginity,190 and argued that a woman who 
had reached physical maturity but remained a virgin did not have the right to wear the 
veil of matrimony. In addition, Tertullilan’s exposition seems to also point to the fact that
some married or remarried women had attempted to acquire the same status as virgins 
through either accepting the honour of virgins while married
 
o 
ows.194   
                                                          
191 or refusing to wear the 
marriage veil altogether.192 Tertullian argues that a virgin should wear the veil on the 
basis of her requirement for modesty and humility,193 and he also prohibits a virgin of to
young an age from being accepted into the roll of wid
 It is also interesting that while much of Tertullian’s On the Veiling of Virgins is an 
exegetical exposition of New Testament distinctions between a woman, a virgin and a 
widow, the first three chapters of the work are dedicated to examining the customs 
concerning the use of veils passed down by the church. For example, Tertullian writes: 
Throughout Greece, and certain of its barbaric provinces, the majority of 
Churches keep their virgins covered. There are places, too, beneath this 
(African) sky, where this practice obtains; lest any ascribe the custom to 
Greek or barbarian Gentilehood. But I have proposed (as models) those 
190 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 10. 
191 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 3.  
192 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 17. 
193 Tertullian actually argues that the veil is a concession granted because of the virgin’s nature as a female. 
In chapter 10 he argues that the male virgin is not granted any concession because he has been granted the 
authority of the virtue inherent in the male gender, thus making the continence of the male a reasonable 
expectation due to the superiority of his nature. But those females who have remained virgins, or become 
continent after having been married, are overcoming their inferior nature, and the Holy Spirit has granted 
them the concession of acknowledgement through the veil.  
194 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 9. Here also, as it was with I Timothy 5 and Ignatius, Terullian 
bears witness to the fact that some churches had young unmarried virgins enrolled in the register of 
widows. In this situation, it seems that the young woman not only stopped wearing the veil but also took a 
seat of honor reserved for widows in the church. Apparently, these “virgin-widows” continued to exist in 
some areas into the third century.  
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 Churches which were founded by apostles or apostolic men; and 
antecedently, I think, to certain (founders, who shall be nameless). Those 
Churches therefore, as well (as others), have the selfsame authority of 
custom (to appeal to); in opposing phalanx they range “times” and 
“teachers,” more than these later (Churches do). What shall we observe? 
What shall we choose? We cannot contemptuously reject a custom which 
we cannot condemn, inasmuch as it is not “strange,” since it is not among 
“strangers” that we find it, but among those, to wit, with whom we share 
the law of peace and the name of brotherhood. They and we have one 
faith, one God, the same Christ, the same hope, the same baptismal 
sacraments; let me say it once for all, we are one Church. Thus, whatever 
belongs to our brethren is ours: only, the body divides us.195 
 
Not only does Tertullian bear witness to the extent of the practice of celibacy across the 
Mediterranean, he also shows that by the beginning of the third century the church has 
conceived of celibate practices as part of the “customs” that are passed down as part of 
church tradition. More importantly, Terullian points out that up until his time the customs 
concerning veiling had been treated with indifference,196 but because the scandals of his 
era concerned prideful disputes over the honour and privileges granted to celibates in the 
church, a new rigour should be embraced in recognition that the truth outweighs the 
indifference of custom and, therefore, the veil should be worn out of modesty and 
humility.197 It could be concluded, then, that by Tertullian’s time celibacy had been 
                                                          
195 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 2. 
196 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 3. 
197 Tertullian’s entire argument rests on his assertion that custom is only valid when it agrees with the truth. 
In chapters one to three of the text he argues that any custom is developed slowly, and that unless clearly in 
opposition to the truth, the custom could be either accepted or rejected as a matter of choice. Tertullian 
informs the reader, then, that in the past whether a virgin wore a veil was treated with indifference because 
it was a matter of choice, as the choice carried no inherent opposition to the truth. However, in chapter 
three he writes, “But not even between customs have those most chaste teachers chosen to examine. Still, 
until very recently, among us, either custom was, with comparative indifference, admitted to communion. 
The matter had been left to choice, for each virgin to veil herself or expose herself, as she might have 
chosen, just as (she had equal liberty) as to marrying, which itself withal is neither enforced nor prohibited. 
Truth had been content to make an agreement with custom, in order that under the name of custom it might 
enjoy itself even partially. But when the power of discerning began to advance, so that the licence granted 
to either fashion was becoming the mean whereby the indication of the better part emerged; immediately 
the great adversary of good things-and much more of good institutions-set to his own work. The virgins of 
men go about, in opposition to the virgins of God, with front quite bare, excited to a rash audacity; and the 
semblance of virgins is exhibited by women who have the power of asking somewhat from husbands, not to 
say such a request as that (forsooth) their rivals-all the more "free" in that they are the "hand-maids" of 
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 practiced long enough in the church that it both could be considered as part of the 
apostolic traditions, and had gained enough prestige that there was now competition for 
the honours it drew within the church communities.198  
The third century also shows evidence of celibate women that have taken on a 
specific and unique roll in the social structure of the church. Though reaching the height 
of their operation in the third century, the widow and the deaconess were found in various 
positions across the Christian church from the early second century, and continued to be a 
viable ascetic option for women well into the fifth century.199 By the third century their 
responsibilities were considered to encompass the devotional arena, and in that regard, 
widows, virgins and deaconesses were involved with the care of the sick and the 
poor200and increasingly focused upon spiritual guidance for women, especially those who 
were housebound.201 Some scholars, such as Mary Malone, have argued it is possible that 
the church initially considered these positions to be ordained “offices”, but that by the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Christ alone -may be surrendered to them. "We are scandalized," they say, "because others walk otherwise 
(than we do); "and they prefer being "scandalized" to being provoked (to modesty).” (On the Veiling of 
Virgins, ch. 3). In other words, the custom of veiling of virgins has become a matter of moral significance 
because through pride it has created audacity among some and jealousy among others. Tertullian can then 
argue in the remainder of his treatise that the custom of veiling virgins should be enforced with more rigor 
because that would agree with the truth’s demand for modesty and humility. Therefore, the young female 
virgins should wear the veil in order to preserve their modesty, and married women should continue to do 
so as well, also in order to preserve their modesty, but also to resist the inclinations of a jealous heart.  
198 Proponents of social theory and the use of power would likely argue that Terullian and the church had 
claimed the antiquity of celibacy in order to justify their growing social influence. However, this would be 
to let the data be coerced by the theory, and there is no reason to suspect that Tertullian considered the 
practice of celibacy as a new phenomenon. Male virgins simply need to have humility to respect what 
honours are given them. See n. 193. 
199 Some have argued that Paul’s greeting to Phoebe in Romans 16:1, where she is listed as diakonos, is a 
clear reference to a “deaconess” in the first century. However, the first clear use of a technical distinction of 
the deaconess is in Pliny’s letter to Trajan ca. 110 where he informs the emperor that he had at some point 
examined two “deaconesses” in his investigations against Christians. In addition, it is also clear that 
widows and virgins were also often the recipients of charity. As was explored in discussion of I Timothy 5 
and Tertullian’s On the Veiling of Virgins, both indicate that some early Christian women were abusing the 
charity reserved for “real” virgins and widows. For a good survey of issues surrounding these offices see 
M.T. Malone, Women and Christianity, Vol. I: The First Thousand Years (Ottawa: Novalis, 2000) and C. 
Methuen, “The ‘Virgin Widow’: A Problematic Social Role for the Early Church? Harvard Theological 
Review 90.3 (1997): 285-98. 
200 Malone, Women and Christianity, p. 124. 
201 Methuen, The ‘Virgin Widow’, p. 292. 
85 
 end of the fourth century the councils of the church had removed that status from celibate 
women who performed this role. Hence, she argues, the appearance of the canonesses 
(kanonai) in the fourth century,202 who were essentially the same as virgins, widows and 
deaconesses, but now portrayed as piously refusing ordination as deaconesses203 while 
continuing to educate, minister and care for the destitute without ecclesiastical 
authority.204 However, this could only clearly be argued for the deaconesses, and then 
perhaps only for the third century when the Didascalia Apostolorum indicates that 
ordination may have been granted to them for a short period of time in some areas.205 
Despite the obvious role that they played in the life of their congregations, evidence for 
widows and virgins as an ordained office does not exist.206  
Nonetheless, the literature of the early church records that local congregations had 
“orders”, “registers” or “lists” of celibate women who performed a variety of functions in 
                                                          
202 For example, Basil writes a letter (Letter CLXXII ) to a “Canoness” to encourage her to remain faithful 
to the path she has chosen.  
203 Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History, 8.23. 
204 Malone, Women and Christianity, p. 130-31. 
205 Not only does the Apostolic Constitutions clearly refer to deaconesses as ordained clergy (3.11, 3.15), in 
8.20 includes a prayer to be used in the ordination of a deaconess: “O Eternal God, the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ, the Creator of man and of woman, who didst replenish with the Spirit Miriam, and Deborah, 
and Anna, and Huldah; who didst not disdain that Thy only begotten Son should be born of a woman; who 
also in the tabernacle of the testimony, and in the temple, didst ordain women to be keepers of Thy holy 
gates,—do Thou now also look down upon this Thy servant, who is to be ordained to the office of a 
deaconess, and grant her Thy Holy Spirit, and “cleanse her from all filthiness of flesh and spirit,” that she 
may worthily discharge the work which is committed to her to Thy glory, and the praise of Thy Christ, with 
whom glory and adoration be to Thee and the Holy Spirit for ever. Amen.” 
206 By “ordained office” I mean inclusion in the church’s hierarchical structure of authority to administer 
the sacraments and lead in continuity with apostolic succession.  The Apostolic Constitutions, however, 
does indicate that by the third century virgins were taking formal vows celibacy and service. For example: 
“Concerning virginity we have received no commandment; but we leave it to the power of those that are 
willing, as a vow: exhorting them so far in this matter that they do not promise anything rashly; since 
Solomon says, "It is better not to vow, than to vow and not pay." Let such a virgin, therefore, be holy in 
body and soul, as the temple of God, as the house of Christ, as the habitation of the Holy Spirit. For she that 
vows ought to do such works as are suitable to her vow; and to show that her vow is real, and made on 
account of leisure for piety, not to cast a reproach on marriage. Let her not be a gadder abroad, nor one that 
rambles about unseasonably; not double-minded, but grave, continent, sober, pure, avoiding the 
conversation of many, and especially of those that are of ill reputation.” Apostolic Constitutions 4.14. 
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 the church.207 What is important for our purposes is to remember that despite the variety 
of functions and ambiguity of “ordained” statuses, women in these positions were 
expected to be celibate and ascetic while living and serving among the local 
congregations, and they represented a significant population of celibate ascetics in the 
early church.208 The third century provides evidence of this ascetic behaviour in two of 
its important legislative works, the Didascalia Apostolorum and the Apostol
Constitutions.
ic 
, 
                                                          
209 The Didascalia, for example, prohibits the election of a widow unless 
she is beyond all suspicion of desiring a second husband and requires that the bishops 
encourage those who have been widowed young to remain chaste until they are able to 
properly enter the order of widows with their virtue intact.210 The Apostolic 
Constitutions, as well as providing almost identical recommendations for widows,211 
provides evidence that deaconesses were also required to be virgins saying “Let the 
deaconess be a pure virgin; or, at the least, a widow who has been but once married
faithful, and well esteemed.”212 So it seems that for the time that widows and 
207 Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, 1.17, mentions a register for virgins. Interestingly, the mention of the 
register occurs during a story portraying Constantine’s mother, Helen, as a woman performing the role of a 
virgin amidst here feverish building schedule. She is portrayed as a woman who cares for the sick, prays 
with other women and looks after the poor, having assumed a virginal aspect late in life.  Basil, too, in a 
letter to Amphilochius (Letter 194) explaining the church’s canons, describes both the church’s views of the 
“order of virgins” (Canon 18) and mentions the “list of widows” in response to a specific question about re-
marriage.  
208 Bishop Cornelius sent a letter to Fabian in Antioch in 251, and mentions that there were forty-six 
presbyters, seven deacons, seven sub-deacons, forty-two acolytes, fifty-two exorcists, readers, and janitors, 
and over fifteen hundred widows and persons in distress in Rome. Granted, Rome would be one of the 
larger cities of the empire, and would therefore have a larger number of widows. Still, if the ratio of 
widows to clergy is generally correct, then it would seem that they made up a significant cross-section of 
the early church.  
209 The dating of these works in a matter of considerable debate, though it is clear that the Didascalia dates 
from the early to mid third century and the Constitutions, which contains some of the materials from the 
Didascalia, is of a later date, likely the early fourth century. However, most scholars agree that the 
materials found in the Constitutions do represent the considerations of an earlier period, most agreeing the 
third century. 
210 Didascalia Apostolorum, XIV.3.1-4. 
211 Apostolic Constitutions 3.1-2. 
212 Apostolic Constitutions 6.17. 
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 deaconesses were operating among the third century Christian communities they were 
also required to be celibate ascetics as part of their service. 
                                                          
By the later half of the third century the extent and practice of celibacy also 
resulted in the appearance of localized expressions of the forms of celibacy. The 
apotaktikoi in Egypt and the îhîdāyā in Syria were groups of celibate Christians that 
emerged as unique expressions of celibates in their particular cultures. We can 
confidently locate these forms in the latter half of the third century because they likely 
existed long enough to have been incorporated into ascetic works from those regions and 
been around long enough to require correction as disagreement over the form began to 
appear. For example, Griffith argues that although the main sources for the study of the 
îhîdāyā are the works of two fourth century Syrian ascetics, Ephraem and Aphraphat, 
those sources do demonstrate that the ascetic institutions of Syria “…were already well 
enough established that certain abuses had crept into them, and currents of change and 
reform in the ascetical establishment were already afoot, prompted perhaps by the Peace 
of Constantine.”213 E.A. Judge, as well, argues that the apotaktikoi were essentially the 
Egyptian parallels of widows and virgins of the third century, and that once monasticism 
came on scene, the apotaktikoi were rapidly overshadowed and eventually absorbed 
within the anchoritic ideal of Anthony’s experience in the desert.214  
Asceticism and celibacy in Egypt reveals a situation where many Egyptian 
celibates were practicing their asceticism without engaging in a withdrawal to the desert. 
Despite the fact that the practice of asceticism in Egypt contained numerous examples of 
213 S. Griffiths, “Asceticism in the Church of Syria: The Hermeneutics of Early Syrian Monasticism” in 
Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush & R. Valantasis eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 235. 
214 E.A. Judge, “The Earliest Use of Monachos for ‘Monk’ and  the Origins of Monasticism.” Jehrbuch fur 
Antike und Christentum 10 (1977), p. 75. 
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 “classic” anachoresis and enkrateia in the desert, it is also clear from the sources that a 
class of ascetics called apotaktikoi existed as an option to the hermit or communal style 
monk. E.A. Judge and J. Goehring215 have explored the meaning of this term at length 
and have demonstrated that the apotaktikoi (loosely translated “set apart”) were 
essentially “inner-city ascetics”216 who embraced celibacy and set up houses of their own 
in towns and cities from where they could practice their asceticism and offer services to 
the church. What is interesting about the apotaktikoi is that out of necessity for a location 
within the towns and cities, many of them continued to own property, and did not engage 
in the renunciation of property typical of other ascetics.217 Again, however, regardless of 
their status or location, the apotaktikoi were expected to practice celibacy as the core 
discipline of their asceticism.  
 A similar situation existed in Syria. Although the Syrian deserts and 
mountains contained some of the most idiosyncratic and extreme examples of ascetic 
withdrawal,218 it is also clear that there were celibate ascetics who continued to live 
within the communities of the Syrian-speaking churches. Sidney Griffith219 has recently 
published an article detailing a summary of scholarly views about the position of a group 
of people called the “Îhîdāyā” (roughly translated “single”), who were a unique form of 
celibate Christians in the Syrian churches. The term îhîdāyā, Griffith writes, “in general 
came to include both male and female celibates, as well as persons who may have once 
been married, but who subsequently consecrated themselves in a special way and who 
                                                          
215 J. Goehring, “Through a Glass Darkly: Diverse Images of the Apotaktikoi(ai) of Early Egyptian 
Monasticism” Semeia 58 (1992): 25-45. 
216 Goehring, Through a Glass, p. 27. 
217 Goehring, Through a Glass, pp. 30-35. 
218 One of the most famous examples, of course, is Simeon Stylitus who spent 36 years on the top of a 
marble column.  
219 Griffiths, “Asceticism in the Church of Syria”, pp. 220-245. 
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 then lived as consecrated celibates in the Christian community under the name qaddîšê 
(saints or holy ones).”220 Additionally, Griffith demonstrates that the term îhîdāyā 
actually has a significant theological meaning and it reflects the individual’s consecration 
to God in single-minded devotion or as an imitator of Christ’s “only begotten” 
relationship with the Father,221 but does not reflect the “singleness” of the Greek 
monachos, or desert monk. These îhîdāyā, then, served their congregations as both 
spiritual examples and as guides for spiritual development, and it was their celibacy that 
was the key to their status within the church.222 
In addition, the two pseudonymous Epistles to Virgins,223 falsely attributed to 
Clement of Rome, date from the mid-third century and exist only in Syriac, leading 
scholars to believe they are Syrian in origin.224 These two letters, which address both 
male and female ascetics, support the theory that the îhîdāyā served their congregations 
as part of their devotion to God. For example, both letters address situations that these 
ascetics would face in their travels, and instruct them on what to do in those situations to 
prevent offence or sin.225 Moreover, the first letter employs nearly half its length in the 
description of the motives behind celibacy and attempts to show the nobility of the 
                                                          
220 Griffiths, “Asceticism in the Church of Syria”, p. 223. 
221 Griffiths, “Asceticism in the Church of Syria”, pp. 227-29. 
222 R. Murray even argues that baptism was reserved for those who vowed celibacy, with many people 
waiting until late in life or their deathbed to get baptised. See R. Murray, “The Exhortation to Candidates 
for Ascetical Vows at Baptism in the Ancient Syriac Church,” New Testament Studies 21 (1974-74): 59-80. 
223 See Epistolae ad Virgines, trans. B.P. Pratten, Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. VIII, A. Roberts and J. 
Donaldson eds. (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1970). 
224 See S.P. Brock, “Early Syrian Asceticism,” Numen 20 (1973), p. 7, and R. Macmullen and E.N. Lane’s 
introduction to the letters in Paganism and Christianity 100-425 C.E.: A Sourcebook (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1992), p. 170. 
225 For example, the first letter refers to avoiding places where men live unmarried with women (First 
Letter, ch.10), rules of conduct when visiting the sick or performing exorcisms (First Letter, ch. 12) and 
how to work peacefully with each other (First Letter, ch. 13). The second letter as well, gives advice on 
how to minister in places where there are only married Christians (First Letter, ch. 10) and where there are 
only women (Second Letter, ch. 3), and how they should behave when they are around non-Christians 
(Second Letter, ch. 6). 
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 profession. In essence, the letter argues that virginity is necessary for perfect virtue, 
rooted in self-denial and effected through the imitation of Jesus and Mary and the laying 
aside of carnal desire. In that regard, it shows how the Christians of third century Syria 
were engaging celibacy on a deep level, making theological and moral speculation in 
support of asceticism well before the appearance of the well considered treatments of the 
fourth century.226 
Another example of the presence of significant numbers of celibate Christians in 
the late third century is demonstrated by the corrective canons put in place by a number 
of church councils. The Councils of Ancyra (314 CE), Neocaesarea (ca. 315 CE), Gangra 
(ca. 320-40 CE?),227 and Laodicea (340’s CE) established canons to correct the behaviour 
of ascetics who clearly lived among the larger communities of cities and villages. For 
example, the Council of Ancyra forbids male and female ascetics from living together in 
personal residence (Canon 19). Canon I of Neorcaesarea shows the general support of the 
popular notion that the clergy should be celibate by deposing Presbyters who marry. 
Canon 30 of the Council of Laodicea forbids ascetics, as well as clergy and Christians in 
general, from bathing with women in public baths. The Council of Gangra, too, has a 
                                                          
226 More will be said about this in chapter four.  
227 The date of this council is highly debated with dates ranging from 325 CE to 376 CE being proposed. 
Scholars are sure that it occurred between the first and second ecumenical councils, but there are many 
chronological difficulties in attempting to identify those who were present at the council. The clearest 
indication of the date seems to be the traditional ordering of the councils that place it after Neocaesarea in 
315, but before Antioch in 340. The only other indications of its date are that it condemned an Armenian 
bishop, one Eustathius, of excessive asceticism and Arian sympathies, and that the council was presided 
over by a man named Eusebius. Unfortunately it is known that Eustathius was in operation as a priest from 
the early 300’s until his death in 377, so that does little to help narrow the date. What remains is which 
Eusebius is being talked about, and a number of possibilities have been suggested. In the end, the only 
solution that aligns with the traditional ordering of the councils is Lightfoot’s suggestion that the episcopate 
of Eusebius Pamphili from 317-337 is the only “Eusebius” that fits the chronology. Hence, we may 
hesitantly date the council between 317 and 337, but more likely in the later years of his episcopate since 
he may have needed to prove himself as bishop before being given the task of presiding over a council. For 
a full discussion see H. Percival’s summary in his introduction to the council of Gangra in the Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. XIV (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), pp.89-90. 
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 series of correctives for ascetics living in urban areas, including a prohibition on wearing 
the periboloeum (Canon 12), or philosopher’s mantle, in order to appear superior to the 
lay congregation. Similarly, Gangra also prohibits fasting or absence from church on 
Sundays (Canon 18) and in general despises ascetics who act superior to regular folk in 
the church. It is important to remember, then, that the councils of the early fourth century 
place correctives on celibates living in urban areas, which means that the practice of 
asceticism had been around long enough for abuses and concerns over their interactions 
with the church to form. 
 Finally, with regard to monasticism as a particular manifestation of asceticism, we 
know from Athanasius’ Life of Anthony that when Anthony first went into the desert there 
were already a few monasteries in the desert and that he sought the advice of an elderly 
hermit who had lived in the desert since his youth.228 So too, the earliest Greek Lives of 
Pachomius reveal that when he first became a Christian and began to pursue the 
communal life in the desert, he went to live with an old hermit named Palamon who had 
already engaged in the anachoresis, or withdrawl, of classic monasticism. In addition, 
Pachomius’ attempts at forming a monastic community were contrasted with an earlier 
unsuccessful attempt by an ascetic named Aotas.229 Although the number of ascetics 
living in the desert prior to the lives of Anthony and Pachomius was likely small, it is still 
important to note because it clearly demonstrates that asceticism was present to a large 
enough extent within Christian culture that it could be transformed into the formal 
monastic practices of the fourth and fifth centuries. Indeed, often overlooked by scholars 
                                                          
228 Athanasius, Life of Anthony, 3. 
229 H. Chadwick, “ Pachomius and the Idea of Sanctity” in The Byzantine Saint: University of Birmingham, 
Fourteenth Symposium of Byzantine Studies (1980), S. Hackel, ed. (London, 1981), pp. 11-24. Reprinted in 
History and Thought of the Early Church (London : Variorum Reprints, 1982).  
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 is the fact that monasticism simply assumed that celibacy and other ascetic practices 
would be the foundation at the heart of the movement to the desert. For ascetic practice to 
be adapted by the monastics, it necessarily means that the origins of ascetic practice in 
the church are earlier than the beginning of the fourth century. 
VI. Conclusion 
 This survey of the early Christian texts on celibacy and asceticism was meant to 
show that there are significant data available demonstrating the extent of ascetic 
behaviour prior to the end of the third century. The question remains, though, how 
representative are these texts of early Christianity as a whole, and how can we determine 
the extent of asceticism prior to the appearance of monasticism? It could be argued that 
these texts only tell us about the local situation where celibacy had become an issue. 
Undeniably, many scholars are hesitant to see these texts as representative of early 
Christian behaviour as a whole, especially since the rise of the theory that early 
Christianity did not have a unified set of beliefs, practices and identities until after the 
end of the third century. If it is assumed that this theory is correct, then any text 
describing celibacy or asceticism must be localized to a specific geographical arena. 
However, it is helpful to step back and examine exactly where and when each of these 
texts reveals the presence of celibacy. Here is a list of the texts examined in this chapter 
with both their date and geographical location: 
 1) New Testament – Asia Minor & Greece - mid to late 1st century 
 2) Apostolic Fathers – Asia Minor, Greece & Rome230 - late 1st / early 2nd century 
 3) Shepherd of Hermas – Rome – early mid 2nd century 
 4) Justin Marytr – Asia Minor & Rome – mid 2nd century 
                                                          
230 Ignatius was from Antioch in Syria, but none of his letters mention anything about celibacy in the region 
where he was from. One could argue that his ability to give attention to celibates in his letters to Asia Minor 
might indicate that he was familiar with the practice in his own church. However, that would be at best only 
a reasonable guess.  
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  5) Athenagoras – Greece – mid to late 2nd century 
 6) Galen – Greece & Rome – mid 2nd century 
6) Irenaeus – Asia Minor & Gaul – mid to late 2nd century 
 7) Clement of Alexandria – Egypt – late 2nd century 
 8) Apocryphal Acts – Greece, Asia Minor & Syria – mid 2nd / early 3rd century 
 9) Dionysius (from Eusebius) – Greece – late 2nd century 
 10) Tertullian – Carthage – late 2nd to early 3rd century 
 11) Apostolic Constitutions & Didascalia – Syria & Asia Minor – mid 3rd century 
 12) Apotaktikoi – Egypt – 3rd century 
 13) îhîdāyā – Syria – 3rd century 
 14) Appearance of Anthony & Pachomius – Egypt – late 3rd century 
 15) Methodius’ Sympiosium – Asia Minor & Syria – late 3rd to early 4th century 
 16) Councils – Asia Minor – early 4th century 
 
 Considering that most scholars argue that there is a general lack of data from the 
first three centuries of early Christian history, this survey represents a significant amount 
of data concerning celibacy. Seen as a whole, this group of texts tells us that celibacy and 
ascetic practices were present in the early church right from its inception and that as 
Christianity spread, so did the practice of celibacy. Looking at the list it is clearly 
discernable that celibacy had spread to Asia Minor, Greece & Rome during the late first 
and early second centuries. By the mid second century it is attested in Egypt, Syria231 and 
Gaul as well, with both Irenaeus and Athenagoras describing Christians who by then had 
been celibate their whole lives. By the end of the second century celibacy is found in 
Tertullian’s North Africa, and described by him as part of the church’s traditions. By 
about early to mid third century, there are unique cultural expressions of celibacy in 
Egypt and Syria as well, and by the fourth century the councils of the church have begun 
to weigh in on issues surrounding celibate activity in the major centres of Christianity. 
This survey hardly represents a series of isolated incidents of “proto”-ascetic behaviour. 
Rather, it shows that early Christianity had quickly adopted celibacy as an ascetic 
                                                          
231 Remember that both Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria attest to Tatian’s Encratism in Syria during the 
mid to late second century. S. P. Brock also notes that Tatian’s Diatessaron has redactions that emphasize 
Tatian’s encratite position. See S.P. Brock, “Early Syrian Asceticism,” Numen 20 (1973), p. 5. 
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 practice and that by the middle of the second century it had spread to nearly everywhere 
that Christians existed. 
 The explosion of monasticism in the early fourth century, therefore, does not 
represent a largely new ascetic element of early Christian behaviour. Rather, it represents 
a development of a new form of asceticism that eventually transformed and absorbed the 
older forms by the end of the sixth century. This survey shows that there was a long 
tradition of the practice of celibacy prior to the monastic explosion, and long before one 
might be able to argue that Christianity had developed the ability to challenge the Roman 
social order. Therefore, we must look to these passages in an attempt to discern their 
motivations for embracing celibacy, which will be the task of the remaining two chapters.  
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 Chapter Three - Sexual Ethics in Greco-Roman Philosophy 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Now that it has been established that ascetic practices in the early church were 
present to a significant extent prior to the fourth century, we can turn to the question of 
the origins and motivations of early Christian celibacy. Because so much scholarly work 
has been done on the basis of social theory, the remainder of this thesis will generally 
leave social theory aside and focus on the theological, philosophical and cosmological 
speculations of the Greco-Roman world and early Christianity. The goal of this chapter, 
then, is to attempt to understand the accepted philosophical and cosmological wisdom of 
Greco-Roman philosophy in regard to sexuality, so that a point of comparison can be 
established for the motivations of early Christian idealization of celibacy. As was stated 
in chapter one, the crux of the issue will be found in understanding the similarities and 
differences between Greco-Roman influences and Christian theological perspectives, and 
understanding why early Christianity escalated austerity in regard to sexuality to the 
idealization of sexual renunciation. 
 Naturally, to fully understand the precise nature of the influences that affected 
early Christian perspectives of sexuality, it is important to understand those pre-existing 
territories of thought on their own terms. Only then can a proper comparison be made in 
order to determine the extent and character of their sway upon Christian theology and 
spirituality. This chapter’s aim is to explore and summarize attitudes towards sexuality 
found in the philosophical schools of the Greco-Roman era. Although most schools of 
thought in ancient philosophy originated centuries prior to the Christian era, those 
schools still had devoted followers and substantial influence well after the appearance of 
Christianity. Indeed, the philosophers who reworked and reorganized the systems of 
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 Hellenistic philosophy during the first few centuries of the Common Era often found 
themselves in conversation with Christians, and their work was both used and 
contradicted by Christian thinkers around them. 
 It is important to remember that the ethical considerations of ancient 
philosophical schools were firmly rooted in their cosmological speculations. The nature 
of the body and soul were determined by their place in the cosmological order, and the 
goal, or telos, of body and soul was equally established by its relationship to the world 
and the ordering principles of the universe. Only when the goal of human existence was 
clearly understood, and the means of directing the body and soul towards that goal 
established, could human beings reach their full potential. Ethical behaviour, then, was 
largely thought to be the most efficient and rational means of achieving the telos of 
human existence. How one acted directly affected the condition and state of body and 
soul, and was thus important matters for consideration. This study will examine the series 
of steps – cosmology to telos to ethics – of the major philosophical schools of the Greco-
Roman era, specifically as they relate to their views on sexuality. 
 Broadly speaking, ancient philosophical theories can be divided into two camps, 
the materialist camp and the metaphysical camp. The metaphysical camp, inspired 
primarily by the works of Plato and Pythagoras, understood the universe to be composed 
of both material and non-material realities. The physical world, however, was the lesser 
manifestation of the metaphysical realities that provided the universe with order. Thus, 
Plato’s “Forms” were the metaphysical essences that were superior to the corporeal and 
material substances that they ordered. Similarly, the body was seen as the corporeal and 
material substance that was ordered and directed by the immaterial soul, with the soul 
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 often seen as contained, even trapped, within the body. This hierarchy of superior 
metaphysical essences over their inferior material counterparts, or dualism, has played a 
large role in that camp’s attitudes towards sexuality. 
 The second camp, the materialists, understood the universe to be made up purely 
of matter, and that the rational principles which ordered it were not separate essences that 
existed independently. With Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s metaphysics at the heart of this 
position, materialists saw everything in existence as essential to itself, made up of matter 
organized by various qualities and principles. Thus a chair, for example, was not made of 
material (wood) and Form (“chairness”), but simply material (wood) organized in a 
recognizable pattern or with a specific quality (qualities necessary to be a chair). Those 
patterns and qualities could be observed, ordered, and systematized, and the rational 
principles that underlay them could be understood. In this system of thought the soul, too, 
was material substance, the matter that animated the physical body, but no less material 
than the body itself. The soul was marked by the quality of rational thought or the ability 
to think in an ordered and unified way, but at death it would dissipate and break down, 
just as the body would. Ethics for the materialist, then, were largely directed at the 
present existence of body and soul, since there was no metaphysical reality to be 
considered. 
  For both camps, however, the telos of human existence was happiness 
(eu0daimonia). Both Plato and Aristotle acknowledged that the basic impulse of 
human beings was to be happy, and that even bad and irrational decisions were simply 
poor or ignorant attempts at achieving happiness. However, both they and the 
philosophers who followed them disagreed on how happiness was to be achieved. Aside 
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 from generally agreeing that happiness was to be found in rational (logou)232 behaviour, 
the many schools of thought took a variety of different tacks in their explanations of how 
eu0daimonia was to be found. Even within cosmological camps, there were a variety 
of opinions, and both materialist and metaphysical camps were divided into smaller 
schools founded around the views of one particular thinker or group. As we shall see, the 
metaphysical schools saw eu0daimonia as rooted in the soul’s connection with non-
material essences, while the materialist schools focused upon the present realities of 
material existence.  
An examination of attitudes towards sexuality, which were deeply rooted for both 
schools in the concepts of body and soul, will naturally depend upon a full understanding 
of the cosmology, teleology, and ethics of each school. We will now examine Platonist, 
Neo-Platonist, and Pythagorean speculation as the major schools of metaphysical 
thought, and Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean speculation as the major schools of the 
materialist camp.  
II. The Metaphysical Cosmologies 
A. Platonism 
 Plato’s views on sexuality are actually the terminus of a long line of theorizing 
about the nature of body and soul, and he speaks of sexual activity (a)frodisia), and 
the desires (e)piqumia) and pleasures (h(donh) associated with it, on many 
occasions. However, there is some debate as to how to sort through the variety of 
metaphors and dialogues about sexuality which Plato engages.233 At times, Plato speaks 
                                                          
232 Literally “from the logos”, in the genitive of source.  
233 K.L. Gaca, , The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and 
Early Christianity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 31-33. See also R. Robinson, 
“Plato’s Separation of Reason and Desire”, Phronesis 16 (1971): 38-48; C.H. Kahn, “Plato’s Theory of 
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 of the sexual appetites as a natural function of the body (Laws I, 636c; Rep. 580e2-4; 
Tim. 91) that ensure the perpetuation of the community. In this regard, the sexual 
appetites are similar to thirst, or hunger, driven by a natural desire to provide for an 
appropriate need. At other times, Plato seems to speak of sexuality in terms of a 
dangerous appetite that has the potential to be imperiously irrational. Often referring to it 
as an irrational function of the soul, Plato provides a variety of colourful imagery 
depicting sexual desire, such as that of a mindless animal (Rep. 439b4), a rebellious 
faction of a civil war (Rep.444b), a tyrant (Rep. 573b) and so on. The sexual appetite in 
these highly rhetorical passages is depicted as a “raving and beastly master” (Rep. 329c) 
of raging lusts that is intensely opposed to rational behaviour, often to such an extent that 
the irrational basis of sexual behaviour is the root of all other vices.234  
 At the same time, often in the same breath or passage, Plato refers to sexuality 
with a more balanced description. Particularly in the Republic and the Symposium, Plato 
refers to the sexual appetite as one of the faculties of the soul that is both necessary and 
even linked to reason in a roundabout kind of way.235 C.H. Kahn argues that in the 
Republic 580-81 (as well as the Phaedrus 254) Plato demonstrates a more developed 
concept of the soul that he (Plato) divides into three parts. First, there is the rational 
faculty of the soul (logistikon), which essentially pursues the Good and determines 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Desire”, Review of Metaphysics 41 (1987): 77-103 and J.M. Dillon, “Rejecting the Body, Refining the 
Body: Some Remarks on the Development of Platonist Asceticism” in Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush & R. 
Valantais eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 80-87. 
234 Gaca writes “Plato is contending that all vicious desires are propagated from the unregulated core 
appetites and from sexual desire especially. The unrestrained appetites bring about injustice, 
Licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance, folly, and in general, every vice (cullhbdhn pasan kakian)’ 
(Rep 444a10-b8). A tree of vices to illustrate this idea would have a three pronged tap root, with the longest 
root at the center being uncontrolled sexual desire.” The Making of Fornication, p. 35. 
235 This is the argument of C.H. Kahn’s article “Plato’s Theory of Desire” Review of Metaphysics 41 
(1987): 77-103. 
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 the rational and reasonable paths to achieve it.236 Second, there are the natural appetites 
(e)piqumia) which ensure the survival of the body and person but also provide the 
impetus for action in the soul (i.e. ensures that the Good is desired as well as 
reasoned).237 Finally, there is the “spirited” faculty (qumoeidhj), sometimes referred to 
as “anger”, which rules both the rational and appetitive faculties in order to make them 
work together.  
In the Phaedrus, Plato depicts this relationship as a chariot with two horses (Phd. 
254). The horses are the rational and appetitive faculties, often trying to drive the chariot 
in different directions. However, the spirited faculty is the driver that simultaneously 
urges the rational faculty while restraining, sometimes violently, the appetitive faculty. 
The appetitive faculty demands the chariot move, while the rational faculty should 
determine (i.e. think!) its direction. However, if the spirited faculty does not perform its 
proper role, the appetites will obviously drive the chariot far off course and into danger. It 
is important to note, still, that both horses are required to drive the chariot, but the 
appetitive horse is substantially more dangerous than the other because it has no capacity 
to discern or understand the Good.238 It is the spirited faculty which must ultimately help 
the two to work in harmony (a(rmonia).  
Like two hands firing a bow, one pulling, the other pushing, the desiring part of 
the soul and the reasoning part of the soul work together at the will of the person (spirit) 
holding the bow (Rep. 439). In this way, Plato can argue that thirst, for example, as an 
appetitive faculty required to keep the body alive, can be resisted by the rational faculty if 
there is appropriate need. But if the rational faculty is not employed to balance out the 
                                                          
236 Kahn, Plato’s Theory of Desire, pp. 87-92. 
237 Kahn, Plato’s Theory of Desire, pp. 87-92. 
238 Gaca, The Making of Fornication, pp. 32-33, 36; Kahn, Plato’s Theory of Desire, p. 94. 
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 desiring faculty, then that desire can run freely and unrestrained. Thirst, appropriately 
desired for the life of the body, can become drunkenness. Similarly, hunger can become 
gluttony and sex can become licentiousness. The spirited faculty is then required to 
engage the rational faculty so that the Good is acquired and not vice versa. Yet without 
desire, the rational remains immobile. What is more, both the appetitive and rational 
faculties can be trained, and are by no means by their very nature essentially bad.  
With this more balanced view in mind, Plato can, in seeming contradiction to his 
previous dire warnings about sexual desire, argue that erotic love can actually lead one to 
contemplate the Good and love Beauty (Symposium 210-11).239 Essentially, what Plato is 
arguing is that the initial desire of erotic love can be transformed into the desire to love 
Beauty and contemplate the Good. The desire is a necessary part of the soul’s being and 
activity, except in erotic love it is directed towards bodily pleasure. But with the proper 
guidance of the rational part of the soul, which will focus its attention upon the Platonic 
Forms, erotic desire will become desire for the Good and Beauty. For Plato, it is 
homoerotic desire that is best suited for this transformation. Heterosexual desire is 
obviously naturally intended for reproduction (Laws I, 636c) and therefore directed 
towards the body. Homosexual desire, lacking the natural purpose of reproduction, has no 
permanent attachment to the body, and can thus be redirected in its orientation towards 
the metaphysical, namely the Good and Beauty. Hence, Plato’s perfect friendship 
between men could begin as an erotic encounter, but should grow beyond sexual activity 
as desire is reoriented towards the higher principles of reality. 
How can this seeming contradiction be explained? How can Plato’s combination 
of neutral, negative and positive assertions about sexuality be defended? Some scholars 
                                                          
239  See Gaca, The  Making of Fornication, pp. 36-38; Kahn, Plato’s Theory of Desire, p. 93-94. 
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 believe that it simply represents a development of Plato’s thought into a more mature 
form.240 For others, the variety of descriptions for the sexual appetites represents 
different rhetorical strategies employed by Plato. The harsh and intensely negative v
of sexuality are used in Plato’s earlier works to oppose the enlightened hedonisti
atmosphere of fourth century Athens,
iews 
c 
                                                          
241 while the later more deliberative works, 
especially the Republic, represent Plato’s developed social ideals and ethics.242 Other 
solutions try to understand Plato’s comments as unified in thought and understandable as 
a unified system of body and soul.243 All these approaches correctly capture elements of 
Plato’s views, but a more comprehensive approach is needed. The position of this chapter 
is that Plato’s thoughts on sexual desire do form a unified theory of body and soul that is 
consistent through all his works, but that a lack of understanding about the connection 
between Plato’s cosmology and his concepts of body and soul led to isolation of 
particular elements of sexual desire at the expense of others.244 
240 For example, Gosling & Taylor argue that Plato develops his theories on pleasure as he thinks about the 
issues throughout his life and responds to the arguments of other philosophers. Plato begins with no 
theories on pleasure at all as an enlightened hedonist, but when he embraced Pythagorean thought early in 
his career he began to see the need to provide an account for the nature of pleasure. As he developed his 
own theories, the Protagoras and Phaedrus represent his early polemical thought in relation to hedonism.  
The Republic and Gorgias represent a more balanced polemic that sees pleasure as a useful criterion for 
achieving happiness, so long as it does not create distress. Finally the Timaeus, Philebus and Laws 
represent Plato’s fullest development of his theory of Forms, and pleasure and sensation are seen as 
dangerous elements of the body that may create illusion for the soul.  See J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W. 
Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 165-66, 169-92. 
241 Gosling & Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, pp.  83-95. See also J.M. Dillon, “Rejecting the Body, 
Refining the Body: Some Remarks on the Development of Platonist Asceticism” in Asceticism, V.L. 
Wimbush & R. Valantais eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 80-87. 
242 K.L. Gaca, for example, sees Plato as a maverick philosopher with the self-appointed task of patrolling 
the power of sexual desire through all stages of the social and communal development of an individual. See 
Making of Fornication, pp. 41-58. 
243 E.g. C.H. Kahn, Plato’s Theory of Desire.  
244 For example, an unfortunate consequence has been a great deal of confusion about Plato’s attitudes 
towards the body. The “dualism” that is typically attributed to him indicates a general misunderstanding, 
likely created from too much focus on his intense polemical rhetoric directed at physical pleasure in his 
earliest works, that the appetites lie within the body and not the soul.  
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 Typically, a dualism between body and soul has been argued wherein the 
immortal, rational and non-material soul stands in open conflict with the mortal, irrational 
and material body. This is not surprising, considering the intense rhetoric that Plato uses 
in regard to how the physical pleasures are rooted in the tyranny of the appetites. 
Certainly, the physical pleasures need to be located in the body’s organs, but it is an 
undue leap to say that because the pleasure (h(donh) is located in the body that the 
appetite (e)piqumia) is located there as well. This position seems to have mistakenly 
located the appetites within the body, despite the fact that Plato has clearly and repeatedly 
located the appetitive faculty within the soul. As discussed briefly above, both the 
Republic and the Phaedrus describe the desiring appetite (e)piqumia) as one of the 
three elements of the tripartite soul. What, then, is at the heart of both the rhetoric and the 
clear definition of the soul that allows them to stand? 
Plato’s Cosmology of Body and Soul 
The key to the matter lies in how the body and soul relate to one another in Plato’s 
thought. Plato’s concern is not that some irrational element dwelling within the body can 
overtake the rational purposes of the soul, thus placing body and soul in opposition. 
Instead, he is concerned that if the appetitive faculty of the soul has been left unguided by 
the rational faculty, then the soul will be engaged in its being through material reality 
instead of the metaphysical reality of the Forms of Good and Beauty. The dualism so 
commonly appealed to, then, is more properly an existential or transcendental dualism245 
where the direction and focus of the soul, either towards matter or the higher Forms, 
                                                          
245 See G. Reale, A History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume II: Plato and Aristotle (New York, State 
University Press, 1990), pp. 57-60. 
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 determines the health of the person. A passage from the Phaedo (Phaed. 80-82) is quite 
instructive.  
In this dialogue between Socrates and Cebes, the master explains to the student 
the nature of the soul and how that soul is to achieve happiness (eu0daimonia). Plato’s 
cosmology becomes clear as Socrates teaches his pupil that the soul is immortal and 
divine while the body is mortal and perishable, exactly parallel with the metaphysical and 
physical division of the universe (Phaed. 80b-d). Socrates explains that the highest 
happiness is for the soul to escape the body and enter into the blissful realm of the 
“divine and immortal and rational.” (Phaed. 81a) The soul that has not achieved this has 
failed because of a pollution that has occurred due to the soul’s connection to the body 
(Phaed. 81b). That pollution is rooted in the lusts of bodily desires (Phaed. 81b, 81d, 
83a-c) and those who have denied those bodily desires through philosophy have purified 
themselves so that they may ascend to an immortal reality (Phaed. 82b-c).  
So far, this understanding of the dialogue could easily be cited in support of the 
standard body/soul dualism attributed to Plato. However, there are several key moments 
in the dialogue that shift the meaning of this passage toward Plato’s tripartite conception 
of the soul and towards an existential dualism of the soul’s focus. First, at the very 
beginning of this dialogue Socrates says: 
When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and 
govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is 
akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to 
you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that 
which is subject and servant?246  
 
It is clear that for Plato, the soul orders and rules the body. That is, the soul is responsible 
for all the actions of the person and the body is simply the vessel that obeys and serves 
                                                          
246 Phaedo, 80a. 
105 
 the purposes of the soul. There is no indication at this point that the body has any powers 
or capacity of its own, and by nature it is designed simply to respond to the soul’s 
direction. This is not a strict dualism, but a clear hierarchy of the higher soul over the 
lower body. 
 It is important to note at this point that Platonic cosmology is based upon a 
hierarchical structure of reality. Giovonni Reale explains:  
…here we only want instead to call attention not to the basic distinction 
between physical and the superphysical, but rather on the complex 
articulation of this distinction (which we have explained earlier), which 
begins from the first and supreme Principles, on which the sphere of the 
hierarchical structure of Ideas [forms] follows, and then further the sphere of 
the mathematical entities hierarchically structured, and finally, the sphere of 
sensible realities. Each of these spheres is articulated, according to an 
hierarchical structure (with the emergence and particular importance of the 
sphere of Ideas, which is articulated in the ideal Numbers, the more general 
Ideas or Meta-Ideas, specific Ideas), with a structural dependence of the 
lower on the higher (and not vice versa) and in various ways with a 
dependence of all reality at all levels on the primary Principle.247 
 
For Plato, the soul was hierarchically superior to the body, and since the lower 
hierarchies of reality do not, and cannot, affect the higher realities, it would seem 
unlikely that Plato would think that the body could directly affect the soul. A strict 
dualism of body and soul is simply not possible according to his cosmology. Why 
then the language about the soul’s pollution by the body and the rejection of bodily 
pleasures? 
 Here Plato’s Socrates tells Cebes that the soul and the body are connected 
together, the soul “fastened and glued” (Phaed. 82e) to the body, “nailed” and 
“riveted” together (Phaed. 83d) by pain and pleasure. In Plato’s mind, the 
connection of body to soul associated with its coming together in the individual 
                                                          
247 Reale, Volume II, p. 238.  
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 allows for one to affect the other through experience and sensation. The soul’s 
effect over the body, as we have seen, is to be the natural ruler, giving direction and 
order to the body (Phaed. 80a) and this is in full agreement with Plato’s 
hierarchical structure of reality, where the supersensible (the soul) is the causal 
source of the sensible (the body).248 But the body’s effect on the soul creates 
illusion in the soul by mistaking sensation as real representations of truth. Socrates’ 
dialogue with Cebes concludes: 
 Socrates: The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most 
intense, every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be 
then plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of sight. 
Cebes: Very true. 
Socrates: And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the 
body? 
Cebes: How so? 
Socrates: Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails 
and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes 
that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the 
body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and 
haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, 
but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into another body and 
there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of 
the divine and pure and simple. 
Cebes: Most true, Socrates. 
Socrates: And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are 
temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives. 
Cebes: Certainly not.  
                                                          
248 Reale, Volume II, 59. Reale writes “…the dualism of Plato is nothing other than the dualism of anyone 
who admits the existence of a supersensible cause as a reason of being of the sensible itself and maintains 
that the sensible, by reason of its self-contradictory nature, cannot be in its totality its own reason for 
being.” 
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 Socrates: Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; 
she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may 
deliver herself up again to the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only 
to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope’s web. But she will 
calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in the contemplation of her, beholding 
the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence deriving 
nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go 
to her own kindred and to that which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. 
Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has 
had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away 
by the winds and be nowhere and nothing. 
 
The soul “imagines” (83c) that what it experiences in connection with the body has 
the ring of truth and reality and is “enthralled”249 (83c) by the sensible, believing “that to 
be true which the body affirms to be true.”(83d) If allowed to be deceived by its 
connection with the body, the soul will be “infected by the body”, and very likely depart 
from the world in an impure state. (83d) Conversely, the soul that calms passion, dwells 
in reason, and contemplates true and divine realities (83d-e) will, having been delivered 
from enthrallment to pain and pleasure, depart from the world in a pure form.  
What is most fascinating is that Plato believes this illusion of the soul’s perception 
of bodily experience has some real capacity to affect the soul, and that the contemplation 
of true and divine realities has a similar but purifying effect. This view is rooted in an 
often-unwritten Greek philosophical assumption that when a soul contemplates 
something it becomes like the object it contemplates.250 For Plato, the direction of the 
soul’s existential being will create a better or worse condition through the object of its 
contemplation. We know well Plato’s argument that erotic love can be reoriented towards 
the eternal Forms, and thereby transformed into a pure love for the Good and Beauty 
                                                          
249 Fowler’s translation in the Loeb Classical Library uses the word ‘bondage’ here for ‘enthralled’. 
250 See Raphael Woolf’s description of the ‘Affinity Argument’ in his article “The Practice of a 
Philosopher” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 26 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
97-129.  
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 (Symposium 210-11), and his often dire and negative warnings against overindulgence of 
the bodily pleasures is based upon a similar kind of theory. The soul left to contemplate 
only the bodily pleasures will soon become as base and irrational as the pleasures 
themselves. The soul becomes “like the body” (swmatoeidh) and behaves in a similar 
manner, which in turn makes the soul behave irrationally, while simultaneously 
preventing the soul from having “communion of the divine and pure and absolute.”251 In 
reality, the sense perceptions of the body are only illusion in comparison to the 
supersensible realities of the first Principles and Forms, but they have a real and negative 
effect upon the soul because of the direction and subject of the soul’s contemplative 
activity.  
That effect, for Plato, is nothing short of a usurpation of the true nature of the soul. 
Just prior to the portion of dialogue from the Phaedo quoted above, Socrates tells Cebes:  
When the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs to the realm of the 
pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these 
it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and it is not hindered, and 
it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging, 
since it is in communion therewith. (Phaed. 79d)252 
 
Because the soul is akin to the supersensible and is the “likeness of the divine” (80b), its 
goal is the participation in such realities. But the soul, by inappropriately directing its 
contemplative being towards the body, becomes more akin to the body and has engaged 
in a kind of being which is contrary to its nature. Hence, Plato can refer to the bodily 
pleasures with such strong rhetoric. The soul directed towards the body, ironically 
through its own powers of contemplation, has been overtaken, usurped, rebelled against. 
The appetitive faculty of the soul, normally directed towards the body only for the sake of 
                                                          
251 Fowler’s translation here is better, using ‘absolute’ for monoeides instead of ‘simple’ which does not 
capture the clear philosophical connection to Plato’s theory of Form.  
252 Fowler’s translation. 
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 its preservation, now is under the spell of the physical pleasures and drags the rational 
faculty of the soul into their sphere. Like the two horses of the Phaedrus, the one beast 
focused on the body drives the other into the same realm, where they are both out of 
control.  
 The dualism in Plato’s concept of body and soul is not so much between the 
sensible and supersensible but an existential dualism that demands that the soul, 
containing both rational and desiring faculties, be directed towards the higher Forms of 
reality, in opposition to the material body. The body by itself is the hierarchical inferior 
to the soul, and by itself it has no power or effect upon the soul. However, if the soul 
directs its existential energies towards the body, it will be adversely affected by the base 
nature of the body. The higher purpose of the soul will be corrupted, and it will begin to 
behave in ways that are dominated by the bodily pleasures that, in turn, will drive the 
person in the same unthinking and uncontrolled manner that is found among animals. 
Consequently, Plato can see both the negative and positive sides to sexual pleasure. 
Positively, Plato knows that it is a necessary and appropriate part of the body’s need to 
reproduce, and if directed properly towards the immortal Forms, sexual pleasure can be 
transformed into a powerful desire for the Good. Negatively, Plato also sees that both the 
rational and desiring faculties of the soul can be misled if solely directed at sensible 
realities experienced through the body. In strong rhetorical form, Plato can then warn 
against the consequences of a soul under the sway of bodily pleasures as though the body 
had usurped control from the soul, or polluted the soul with some terrible taint. 
Unfortunately, these metaphors have been interpreted as directed towards the body, when 
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 they are ultimately directed towards individuals who have failed to fully grasp the true 
nature of the soul.  
Plato’s Program of Sexual Austerity 
  When it comes to sexual activity (a)frodisia) Plato embraces a program of 
austerity in order to place the proper controls upon the soul’s association with bodily 
pleasures. On the one hand, the appetitive or desiring faculty of the soul must not be over 
exposed to bodily pleasures, lest the soul begin to engage being too much in the physical 
realm. On the other hand, the rational faculty of the soul must be engaged sufficiently so 
as to keep the whole soul directed towards the immortal realm. What is more, both 
faculties are necessary to properly engage in either virtuous activity or philosophical 
contemplation. Without the desiring faculty, the soul would remain immobile towards the 
higher Forms, yet without the rational faculty the soul would ultimately corrupt its own 
perception of physical reality and elevate the sensible to the status of the supersensible 
(i.e. Form, etc.). With this in mind, Plato moves to both restrict the activities involved 
with physical pleasure and re-direct the soul towards the supersensible Forms. 
 The practice of virtue in regard to sexual pleasure is summed up by the term “self-
mastery”(e)gkrateia). In the Republic 430e-431a Plato’s Socrates is speaking about 
the matter: 
 
Temperance (swfrosunh) is a kind of beautiful order and a mastery 
(e)gkrateia) of certain pleasures (h(donh) and appetites (e)piqumia), 
as they say, using the phrase ‘master of himself’ I know not how; and there 
are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that 
not so?” “Most certainly.” “Now the phrase ‘master of himself’ (kreittw 
au(tou) is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would 
also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. 
For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions.” “Of course.” 
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 “But,” said I, “the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to 
be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and 
the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally 
better part. 
 
Similarly, in the Gorgias, Socrates teaches the young Callistos. “What do you mean,” the 
young man asks, “by one who rules (a)rxonta) himself?”.  Socrates replies:
 “Nothing recondite, merely what most people mean – one who is temperate 
(swfosunh) and self-mastering (e)gkrate au)ton ea(utou), ruler of the 
pleasures (h(donh) and desires (e)piqumia) within himself.” (Gor. 491d-e)   
 It is interesting to note that the mastery of the self includes both the physical 
component, “pleasures” (h(donh), and the metaphysical component, “desire” 
(e)piqumia). Both the physical pleasures and the appetitive faculty of the soul must be 
mastered in order to possess temperance (swfrosunh), the first of the four chief virtues. 
In addition, the passage from the Republic indicates that the physical pleasures are curbed 
by the control of the reasoning faculty (i.e. the better part of the soul) over the appetitive 
faculty (i.e. the worse part of the soul). Several paragraphs later in the same dialogue 
Socrates praises “The simple and moderate appetites (e)piqumia) which with the aid 
of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration that you will find in few and 
those the best born and best educated.” (Rep. 431c) There is a chain of command, it 
seems, beginning with the rational faculty of the soul, moving to the appetitive faculty of 
the soul, and lastly to the physical pleasures. To ensure that mastery of the physical 
pleasures occurs, one must master first the appetites of the soul through their rational 
counterpart. With the rational faculty doing its proper job, the appetites are now much 
less threatening, and understood simply to be “simple and moderate.”  
112 
  Practically, this means for Plato that one needs to limit exposure to the physical 
pleasures as the first part of a double-sided set of safeguards. The “simple and moderate” 
appetite of the soul is properly the natural impulse to reproduce. In this case, a limited 
and moderate engagement in sexual activity for the purposes of reproduction and for 
physical health253 is encouraged. Otherwise, the use of sexual activity, purely for the sake 
of experiencing the physical pleasure, is harshly ridiculed, and should be curbed. 
Consequently, homoerotic desire, outside Plato’s concept of the idealized friendship, is 
seen as  “slavery to pleasure (h(donh)” (Laws 636c) and all sexual activity outside of 
the marriage bed is considered an unnecessary indulgence that is contrary to the well 
being of both the individual and the city-state.254 The less sexual activity one engages in, 
the less the soul will be fooled into focusing too much upon the body and, therefore, the 
less the soul will be oriented towards the irrational behaviour of the body.  
 The second half of Plato’s sexual program is to encourage an affirmative 
orientation of the soul towards the immortal. For Plato, the highest goal of philosophy is 
to orient both the rational and appetitive faculties of the soul towards the immortal Forms 
in order to ensure the future immortality of the soul.255 In the passage quoted above from 
the Phaedo, Socrates argues that the liberated and pure soul has not only abstained from 
“all fleshly lusts”, which are the “accomplice of her own captivity” (Phaed. 82e), it has 
                                                          
253 In the Timeaus 82-87 Plato describes a situation where a body that has too much seed is also in danger 
of sickness. An excess of seed brings on a kind of madness that forces a senseless pursuit of sexual activity. 
This is as serious as a lack of control due to over-indulgence. The solution is regular and moderated sexual 
activity to prevent such a build up.  
254 K.L. Gaca is particularly strong in her emphasis on Plato’s need to regulate conflict in the city-state and 
how he saw unrestrained sexual activity as a source for the irrational behaviour that caused violence and 
disruption in the community. See The Making of Fornication, pp. 41-58.  See also P. Brown’s discussion in 
The Body and Society, pp. 28ff.  
255 See Woolf’s discussion for a good exploration of whether the soul is immortal by nature or by its 
ascension into the higher forms. Woolf argues that Plato understands the soul to be immortal by nature and 
that through its association with the body it is fooled into believing that the sense perceptions of the body 
are what is real and will, therefore, be dragged down into another ‘incarnation’. The goal of the philosopher 
is then to escape these ‘incarnations’ and ascend into communion with immortal.  
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 also actively sought out the love of knowledge and become “temperate (swfrosunh) 
and brave” (Phaed. 83d).  By pursuing philosophy, the soul is cleansed and purified of 
the corruption created by perceiving reality through the body. The true philosopher has 
set out on a path to enter into a communion with the divine absolutes of reality, and only 
the true lover of knowledge will be left unscathed at death by the soul’s association with 
the body. Indeed, Plato even believes that the physical pleasures of erotic love can be 
transformed through philosophy into a pure and passionate love for the Good and Beauty. 
(Sym. 210-11, Rep. 586d-e) The telos of happiness (eu0daimonia) that all men seek is 
found in the movement of the soul upwards to communion with the immortal and 
unchanging Forms derived from the first Principles of the universe.  
 Although Plato was certainly not the only influence on Greek attitudes towards 
the body and sexuality, his thought did come to bear considerable weight on the subject. 
Both the self-mastery (e)gkrateia) at the heart of temperance (swfrosunh) and the 
affirmative orientation of the soul towards the immortal Forms of being became a strong 
influence on general attitudes towards sexuality in Greek thought. It is well known that in 
terms of the body, the Greeks and Romans of the ancient world often embraced a well 
organized and strict set of ascetic (a)skhsij) practices. These ascetic practices 
(extensive diets, exercise regimens, social regulations and sexual rules) were primarily 
designed to avoid over-indulgence while simultaneously controlling and hardening the 
natural needs of the body, in order to avoid falling into the irrational behaviour found at 
the heart of the bodily pleasures, a decidedly Platonic concept.256 Similarly, the positive 
role of philosophy for the “purification” of the soul became one of the main streams of 
                                                          
256 Here the classic survey of both the training and vast array of diets, regimens and rules appropriate to 
sexual behaviour in the ancient world is M. Foucault’s History of Sexuality (New York: Vinatge/Random 
House, 1985).  
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 thought, standing alongside an Aristotelian stream, which saw the cultivation of virtue as 
the pursuit of the highest Good. The philosopher or king engaged in contemplation and 
meditation, while simultaneously avoiding the pleasures of the body became the ideal; 
the man who gave in to the pull of sensual pleasure became the epitome of failure and 
weakness.257  
 Much time and effort has been spent here on Plato for two reasons. First, as 
mentioned, he is the main representative of the metaphysical stream of ancient 
philosophy and as such, he bears a great deal of importance for the sexual ethics and 
attitudes of ancient Greeks and Romans. Second, and more importantly, because the 
majority of ancient philosophical thought, even the materialist stream, builds from Plato’s 
vast system of thought, it is appropriate to cover his views more comprehensively. The 
Neo-Platonists and Pythagoreans have a great deal in common with Plato, and Aristotle, 
the Stoics and Epicureans built their systems of thought in contrast to Plato. As such, the 
common language of cosmology, teleology and ethics can be used without further 
reiteration of their source.  
B. Pythagorean Philosophy 
 It is perhaps more appropriate to explore the philosophy of the Pythagoreans prior 
to the direct inheritors of Plato’s thought, the Neo-Platonists. The Neo-Platonists, who 
appeared in the 3rd century C.E., must be examined in the light of Plato and Pythagoras, 
as both thinkers influenced them. It is also must be noted that Pythagorean thought is 
actually older than Plato, and that Plato was certainly influenced by Pythagoras with 
                                                          
257 See for example, Plutarch’s biographies of Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great and his contrast 
between the extremes of Alexander’s self-control and virtue, and Julies Caesar’s lack of self-control and 
resulting vices. Plutarch, Lives: Alexander and Julius Caesar, Vol. VII, Loeb Classical Library, Translation 
B. Perrin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1919). 
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 much of his cosmology (especially portions found in the Timeaus) often credited by 
scholars more to Pythagoras than to Plato.  However, Pythagorean thought, though 
influential, did not achieve the same kind of mainstream authority that Platonic thought 
did. As will be seen, this lack of influence was largely due to the narrow scope of 
Pythagorean metaphysics, and the large mystical and religious element of its practice. 
Still, Pythagorean philosophy and its adherents were a constant if small presence in the 
Mediterranean milieu from the 6th century BCE until the collapse of the Roman Empire, 
and therefore, they must be examined as a possible influence upon Christianity.  
 The dualism of Plato was earlier qualified as an “existential” sort of dualism that 
has more to do with the direction of the soul’s orientation either towards the body or 
towards the higher Forms of reality. For Pythagoreans, though, the cosmological 
foundations of thought are much more simplified, and this results in the kind of stricter 
dualism that is typically assigned to Plato. First, whereas Plato has a well-developed 
hierarchy of causality (e.g. First principles, to Forms, to mathematical realities, to the 
sensible) with the body and soul located upon the cusp between supersensible and 
sensible reality, Pythagoras’ hierarchy of causality is grounded purely in mathematics. In 
the same way that for Plato the Forms are real essences that exist as real things, for 
Pythagoras numbers exists as real things, and are the root cause of all reality.258 The 
Pythagoreans were the first systematic thinkers in the area of mathematics and the 
discovery of numerical ratios, harmonies, cycles and rhythms inspired them to believe 
that there was a causal reality based in numbers which resulted in the ordered existence 
                                                          
258 G. Reale A History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume I: From Origins to Socrates (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 61ff. See also W.K.C. Guthrie’s A History of Greek Philosophy, 
Volume I: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 
pp. 146-340. 
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 of the universe. Consequently, the Pythagorean cosmological structure of the universe is 
based upon mathematics and numbers. Pythagoreans would say that the first principle of 
the universe is the indivisible “One”, followed by the first expression of multiplicity in 
the “Dyad”, which is then followed by a variety of mathematical concepts such as 
magnitude, infinity, shapes, angles, odd-even and so on, which, in turn, are the causal 
forces behind the material universe.259 In particular, it is the concept of harmonia 
(a(rmonia) which is essential for the generation of all things. The various relationships 
between real numbers existing in harmonic balance generate subsequent realities and 
even the material universe. For example, in Pythagorean cosmology, the four basic 
elements of the physical world – earth, air, fire and water – are the result of a balanced 
monadic cube made up of a simpler, more unified, fiery substance.260 However, it was 
the harmonia that ultimately dictated the full goodness and beauty of the universe. A
Guthrie writes, in Pythagorean cosmology: 
s 
                                                          
 … the cosmos owes all these desirable qualities to the fact that it is a 
harmonia and this harmonia is therefore found above all the majestic 
movements on a cosmic scale of the sun, moon, planets and fixed stars. The 
heavens do not declare the glory of God, they are the glory of God; for the 
cosmos is a living god, welded into a single divine unity by the marvelous 
power of mathematical and musical harmony.261 
 
 As can be seen from the quote above, Pythagoreans were also very religious in 
their orientation. In essence, they understood that God and other deities existed, and in 
practice they equated the divine with their mathematical theory. In this regard, God or the 
Divine is the same as the “One”, while the gods and daimons were associated with a 
259 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 240-276. 
260 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 292. 
261 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 308. 
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 variety of numbers or mathematical principles.262 Harmonia, perfection, and unity were 
associated with the Divine, while the irrational, unlimited, and divided were associated 
with evil. Scholars argue that this attitude was derived from the fact that Pythagorean 
thought was more of a lifestyle than a philosophy. The followers of Pythagoras were 
dedicated to living a life of harmony, and the mathematical theories were more of a 
strategy or means of achieving that harmony.263  Pythagoreans, therefore, set goals 
designed to preserve the harmonia of the universe, and often had pious prescripts that 
were quite strange to their contemporaries. For example, Pythagoreans were well known 
for their vegetarian views and, strangely enough, for their prohibition on eating beans.264 
Regardless, what is most important is the recognition of the need for harmonia, and pious 
actions towards the gods were an accepted and undisputed part of their project. 
 Pythagoras’ conception of body and soul is similarly a mixture of philosophical 
theory and religious belief. On the one hand, Pythagoras argued that the soul is divine, 
immortal, and unchanging, and is derived from the same sort of essence as numbers.265 
The soul is also held in a harmonia of its parts266 – reason, desire and spirit267 – and 
                                                          
262 Reale, Volume I, pp. 71-73. This sort of position is difficult to defend philosophically and scholars are 
generally agreed that the Pythagoreans were not successful because of it.  
263 Reale, Volume I, p. 59. 
264 Unfortunately, their reasoning behind such behaviour is not well preserved. But the general idea does 
seem to be preserving the harmony of the body and of the soul.  
265 Reale, Volume I, p. 67; Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 306. 
266 This doctrine is found adopted by Plato. In the Phaedo 86b, Simmias says “Might not a person use the 
same argument about harmony (a(rmonia) and the lyre-might he not say that harmony is a thing 
invisible, incorporeal, fair, divine, abiding in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings 
are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when someone breaks the lyre, or 
cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, 
that the harmony survives and has not perished; for you cannot imagine, as we would say, that the lyre 
without the strings, and the broken strings themselves, remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of 
heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished-and perished too before the mortal. The harmony, 
he would say, certainly exists somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before that decays. For I 
suspect, Socrates, that the notion of the soul which we are all of us inclined to entertain, would also be 
yours, and that you too would conceive the body to be strung up, and held together, by the elements of hot 
and cold, wet and dry, and the like, and that the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of 
them. And, if this is true, the inference clearly is that when the strings of the body are unduly loosened or 
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 bringing the soul’s harmonia into alignment with the harmonia present in the Divine is 
the ultimate goal of the soul. The union with the body, then, is not in conformity with its 
nature, and the two are completely opposed to one another. The body disrupts the 
harmonia of the soul, and the soul is in need of constant purification from that disruption 
through the study of mathematics, geometry and music, which will bring the soul the 
harmonia it has lost.268 Simultaneously, the religious notions of Pythagorean thought 
indicated that the soul was placed in a body as a punishment for offending God(s).269 The 
offending soul is doomed to roam from body to body, transmigrating into the body of 
animals if no human body is available,270 repeating “incarnations” until the soul can 
achieve harmonia with the divine again. In this way, the Pythagoreans were also careful 
to be appropriately pious as well as regarding all life as kindred. Consequently, all 
Pythagoreans were full participants in the religious practices of their day, and their 
practice of vegetarianism was largely engaged in order to avoid killing an animal that 
might possess the soul of another person.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
overstrained through disorder or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of 
music or of the works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material remains of the body may last 
for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. Now if anyone maintained that the soul, 
being the harmony of the elements of the body, first perishes in that which is called death, how shall we 
answer him?”  
267 Iamblichus writes “The Platonists, Archytas, and the other Pythagoreans declare the soul to be tripartite, 
dividing it into reason, spirit and desire. For these [parts] are useful for the constitution of the virtues. But 
they reckoned the powers of the soul to include nature, imagination, sense-perception, opinion, the thought 
that moves bodies, the desire of the fair and the good, and intellections.” A quotation of Iamblichus’ work 
De anima found in Stobeaus, Anthologium I. 369, 9-15.  
268 Reale, Volume I, p. 68; Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 315-318. 
269 Clement of Alexandria quotes the Pythagorean Philolaus “The ancient theological writers and prophets 
also bear witness that the soul is yoked to the body as a punishment, and buried in it as in a tomb.” 
Stromaties, III, 17. 
270 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 186-87. Porphyry, a third century CE Pythagorean, writes 
“What he [Pythagoras] said to his disciples no man can tell for certain, since they preserved such 
exceptional silence. However, the following facts in particular became universally known: first that he held 
the soul to be immortal, next that it migrates into other kinds of animals, further that past events repeat 
themselves in cyclical process and nothing is new in an absolute sense, and finally that one must regard all 
living things as kindred.” Life of Pythagoras 19. 
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  With this in mind, Pythagorean attitudes towards sex (a)frodisia) were 
primarily directed towards the concept of harmonia. Like Plato, Pythagoreans considered 
the natural function of sexual intercourse to be reproduction, and in regard to harmonia 
of the soul, they came to two conclusions. First, sexual intercourse is essentially the 
process of “en-souling” a body, which will directly affect the harmonia of the soul 
subject to that process. In a passage from the Republic that scholars agree is derived from 
Pythagorean thought, Plato’s eugenic breeding program in his ideal society is based upon 
the timing and numeric relationships needed to establish harmonia. 
Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect 
number, and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and 
dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the 
assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all 
things conversable and commensurable with one another, whereof a basal 
four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third 
augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, 
the other of equal length one way but oblong,--one dimension of a hundred 
numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in 
each case, or of the irrational lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred 
cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this 
thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, 
bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably, the offspring will not be 
well born or fortunate. (Rep. 546b-d) 
 
This immensely complicated and esoteric formula for reproduction that best provides the 
harmonia required for rulers of good character is obviously rooted in some number or 
geometric ratio. While the meaning of this elaborate scheme for conception is largely lost 
upon our modern minds, it is still clear that, according to Pythagorean thought, the 
harmonia found in human offspring is a direct result of engaging in sexual intercourse at 
the proper time and in a properly harmonious state. Naturally, then, if sexual intercourse 
is not performed at the proper time or in a properly harmonious state, there is danger that 
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 the children begotten of that union will be of a poor and irrational character.271  If 
intercourse is pursued for reasons other than reproduction (i.e. neither at the proper time 
nor with proper motivation), then the obvious connection to the irrational pleasures will 
create disharmony in the soul of the child produced.272 “Random copulation is 
undesirable,” Gaca comments, “and discordant to the harmonic intervals of the soul being 
embodied.”273 One must protect against that as much as possible, and therefore in 
Pythagorean ethics, sexual intercourse must only be undertaken for the purpose of 
reproduction. 
 Second, due to the general discomfort with the irrational and uncontrolled 
behaviour exhibited during sexual intercourse, Pythagoreans saw sexual intercourse as an 
activity to be avoided for the sake of continued harmonia of the individual soul.274 The 
ethical character of the person is the result of good harmonia within the soul, and the 
pursuit of virtue is centered round achieving and maintaining a balance in the soul 
between reason, desire and spirit.275 A person engaged in sexual intercourse for the sake 
of pleasure, and not reproduction, disrupts that harmony by giving too much weight to the 
power of desire, which in turn leads to other wickedness and corruption.276 Pythagoreans, 
then, argue that “There should be as many impediments as possible on the exercise…of 
                                                          
271 See Gaca, The Making of Fornication, pp. 97-103. 
272 It is important to remember the ancient belief that during sexual intercourse the person was involved in a 
completely irrational behaviour that involved nothing short of a total loss of control, mentally and 
physically.  Brown writes, “Successful intercourse was a convulsive act, little different in its causes and 
physical effects from a sudden burst of rage. It bore a dread resemblance to the failing sickness: orgasm 
was a ‘minor epilepsy.’ Did not the mouth of the epileptic froth with the same bubbling, whitened blood as 
did the penis? We are dealing with gentleman whose gait must be measured, whose gestures were 
controlled, and who were advised by Plutarch in his Advice on Keeping Well…to avoid ‘passionate and 
convulsive vociferations.’” The Body and Society, p.18. 
273 Gaca, The Making of Fornication, p. 101.  
274  Gaca, The Making of Fornication, pp. 105-115. 
275 See D.J. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 70-76. 
276 Gaca, The Making of Fornication, p. 105. 
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 human sexual activity (a)frodisa), which one must practice infrequently.”277 
Whereas Plato was willing to suffer people’s weakness, placing boundaries on a variety 
of sexual behaviours for the sake of social order, Pythagoreans were unwilling to ac
the slightest threat to the harmony of the soul. This meant that all sexual activity outside 
full penetrative heterosexual intercourse for the purpose of having children was forbidden
to the followers of Pythagoras.
cept 
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 It also means that the Pythagoreans are unique among the ancients in their 
affirmation that only sex for the purpose of reproduction within marriage is acceptable. 
“We do not engage in sexual relations for pleasure (h(donh),” says the Pythagorean 
Ocellus, “but for the procreation (genesewj) of children.”279 While the reproduction of 
children is central, and generally thought of as the proper realm of sexual activity in the 
Greco-Roman world, no Greek or Roman would have normally placed such a firm 
boundary on sexual relations. But it is the Pythagorean concern for the harmonia of the 
individual, as well as for the community, that inspired such restrictive view of sexuality. 
It is interesting, then, that long before the emergence of Christianity there was a practice 
of procreationism that seems so familiar to modern ears. However, to equate the two 
practices in terms of the meaning and motivation would be a mistake.  
C. Neo-Platonic Philosophy 
 Neo-Platonism is essentially the re-emergence of the philosophy of Plato, 
reworked primarily by Plotinus (204-70CE) during the third century CE, which became 
the dominant philosophical view of the Roman Empire from the third through the sixth 
277 Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 209-210.  
278 For example, the Pythagorean writing under the pseudonym “Charondas” could write “Each man must 
love his legitimate wife and procreate from her. Into nothing else should he ejaculate the seed of his 
children. He must not waste or abuse that which is honourable in nature and custom. Nature made seed for 
the sake of producing children, not licentiousness.” Preamble to the Laws 62.30-33. 
279 Ocellus, On the Nature of the Universe, 135.11-13. 
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 centuries. Prior to the time of Plotinus, Platonism had actually undergone a loss of 
influence, as the Academy had slowly lost any creative pursuit in regards to Plato’s 
theories, and Aristotelian materialism became the dominant philosophical perspective of 
the period.280 From about the start of the Common Era until the appearance of Plotinus, a 
rediscovery of the incorporeal and transcendent realities of Plato occurred in resistance to 
the purely material schemes of the Stoics.281 This initial stage of re-emergence, of which 
Plutarch is an example, is called Middle Platonism, and is marked primarily by a new 
religious sensibility that creeps into the older Platonic ruminations about the higher 
Forms. Specifically, this meant that the first Principles and higher Forms of Plato’s 
hierarchical cosmology had begun to be associated with “God” as a personalized version 
of the demiurge,282 and matter becomes associated with the source of evil.283 In essence, 
Middle-Platonism is the preparatory stage for the appearance of Plotinus’ full-blown 
systematic account of Platonic thought that is both quasi-religious and strictly dualistic.  
 The quasi-religious nature of Plotinus’ thought derives from the cosmological 
adjustments made to Plato’s hierarchy of Formal causes.284 In Plotinus’ thought, Plato’s 
                                                          
280 Reale, A History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume IV: The Schools of the Imperial Age (NewYork: State 
University of New York Press, 1990), p. 207-09.  
281 Reale, Volume IV, p. 215. 
282 For Plato the existence of the universe is “emanated” by the existential being of higher realities such as 
the first principles and higher Forms. Each hierarchically emanates the next order of existence with the 
material cosmos brought into existence by the will of the Demiurge, the impersonal ordering force 
emanating from the higher Forms. In Middle-Platonism, however, the Demiurge and its higher Forms begin 
to be referred to as God, if in an unclear manner. A divine Mind and Soul begins to be posited as a part of 
the immaterial reality that created the universe, though often in a manner which is difficult to fully 
articulate. For example, the Middle-Platonist Albinus writes “When Plato says that the world is generated, 
he does not mean it in the sense that there was a time when the world did not exist, but that the world is 
always becoming and manifests a more primary principle of its being. And the soul of the world also, 
which is eternal, God did not create even this, but orders it; and it is said that he created it in this sense: 
awakening and moving his mind and himself as from a lethargy and profound sleep, so that they look 
towards the intelligibles of God, grasping the Ideas and the Forms, aiming at thinking them.” (Didaskalos 
14.3) Similarly, a daimonology depicting a hierarchy of supersensible beings created as inferior to God but 
superior to men also appeared. See Reale, Volume IV, pp. 215-227. 
283 Reale, Volume IV, p. 225-26. 
284 For a full discussion of Plotinus’ system see Reale, Volume IV, pp. 325-404. 
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 hierarchy of immaterial and immortal Principles and Forms is preserved, but now 
understood differently in terms of their emanation. For Plato, an “emanation” was a 
necessary by-product of a particular reality’s being. For example, if the being of the first 
Principle was absolute singularity, the by-product of mixture with its opposite, 
multiplicity, generates Numbers. Hence Plato’s first principles of Monad & Dyad 
generate, or “emanate”, the subsequent Forms of numbers. The being of Numbers then 
produces Figures, and so on. However, for Plotinus the being of the first principles lay in 
their ability to relate to themselves, an invention of his own very different from Plato or 
Aristotle.285 In essence, a particular immaterial reality (which he called a hypostasis) is 
able to turn in upon and “contemplate” itself. The contemplation, as the activity of its 
being, then becomes the emanation of a second hypostasis. So Plotinus argues that the 
first Principle of One (Monad) standing in relation to itself generates Mind, which is the 
Monad’s self-contemplation. The being of the Mind, which can turn upon itself and 
consider its own being, is contemplation which generates again the Soul of the universe, 
which is the Mind’s self-contemplation.  For example: 
Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect and, 
in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced the new: 
this product has turned again to its begetter and been filled and has become 
its contemplator and so Mind. That station towards the one [the fact that 
something exists in presence of the One] establishes Being; that vision 
directed upon the One establishes the Mind; standing towards the One to the 
end of vision, it is simultaneously Mind and Being; and, attaining 
resemblance in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One in pouring 
forth a vast power. This second outflow is a Form or Idea representing the 
Mind as the Mind represented its own prior, The One.  This active power 
sprung from essence [from the Mind considered as Being] is Soul.  (Enneads 
5.2.1) 
 
                                                          
285 Reale, Volume IV, pp. 341-42.  
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  The quasi-religious nature of this system comes from Plotinus’ understanding that 
the One is God, and thus the Mind and Soul are the intellectual and essential operations 
of God. Each subsequent generation, then, not only contemplates itself (thus producing 
another hypostasis) but also is directed upwards towards its ultimate source, the One. In 
this way, there are many hypostases that direct their contemplation towards God, a 
development that certainly has the ring of religious devotion. In addition, Plotinus’ 
cosmology places the material world, and thus body and soul as well, into a dualism 
between being and non-being. For Plotinus, both sensible and supersensible hypostases 
are made of “matter”; only the supersensible matter possesses the ability to contemplate 
itself and its source (the One).286 It is important to remember here that the process of 
emanation, as it gets further and further from its source, is slowly draining its potential 
and capacity for being.  Giovanni Reale explains: 
Sensible matter derives its cause as ultimate possibility, as the extreme 
stage of that process in which the impulse to create and the power to 
produce are weakened to the point of complete exhaustion. Sensible 
matter becomes thus the total emptying and hence extreme privation of the 
power of the One and therefore the One itself, or in other words the 
privation of the Good (which is identical with the One.)”287 
 
                                                          
286 Reale, Volume IV, pp. 361-65. The distinction between sensible “matter” and supersensible matter in 
Plotinus’s thought is difficult to follow. Plotinus writes “The Matter even of the Intellectual Realm is 
Indefinite (the undelimited); it must be a thing generated by the undefined nature, the illimitable nature of 
the Eternal Being, the One – an illimitableness, however, not possessing native existence There (not 
inherent) but engendered by the one. But how can Matter be common to both spheres, be here and There? 
Because even indefiniteness has two phases. But what is the difference between phase and phase of 
Indefiniteness? The difference of archetype and image.” (Enneads, 2.4.15) The “matter” of the 
metaphysical world is the archetype with the “matter” of the physical world only being an image of the 
metaphysical. Do not doubt, however, the notion emphasizes that the metaphysical is superior to the 
corporeal in Plotinus’s thought. The use of  “matter”, I think, is simply used to ensure the causal connection 
between the emanation of real hypostases and the spiritual, indefinite, immortal, unchanging nature of the 
metaphysical “matter” is of such a higher status that to say there is any real similarity would be to 
misrepresent Plotinus.  
287 Reale, Volume IV, p. 363. 
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 The result is that matter, as it has become a sensible reality, has lost the capacity for being 
that the supersensible hypostases possess, and in turn, any similarity with its source, the 
One.  
 The practical results of this are two-fold. First, the dualism of Plato, described 
earlier as an existential dualism located within the soul’s orientation towards the sensible 
(illusory) and supersensible (real), is escalated and hardened by Plotinus’ view of sensible 
matter. Because sensible matter is considered the terminus of procession from the One 
and has essentially no capacity for contemplation (self-thought), Plotinus considers it the 
categorical opposite of God and the Good. For example, Plotinus can write: 
Here is another consideration establishing the necessary existence of Evil. 
Given that The Good is not the only existent thing, it is inevitable that, by 
the outgoing from it or, if the phrase be preferred, the continuous down-
going or away-going from it, there should be produced a Last, something 
after which nothing more can be produced: this will be Evil. As 
necessarily as there is Something after the First, so necessarily there is a 
Last: this Last is Matter, the thing which has no residue of good in it: here 
is the necessity of Evil. (Enneads, 1.8.7) 
 
Poised midway between sensible and supersensible reality,288 the soul is not just in 
danger of being misled, but it also comes into contact with the potential for evil. The 
souls driven into the body are not only capable of irrational behaviour; they have been 
driven away from the One, the source of their being, which can be nothing less than the 
greatest evil possible. 
The evil that has overtaken them has its source in self-will, in the entry 
into the sphere of process, and in the primal differentiation with the desire 
for self ownership. They conceived a pleasure in this freedom and largely 
indulged their own motion; thus they were hurried down the wrong path, 
                                                          
288 Plotinus writes “And as to our own Soul we are to hold that it stands, in part, always in the presence of 
The Divine Beings, while in part it is concerned with the things of this sphere and in part occupies a middle 
ground. It is one nature in graded powers; and sometimes the Soul in its entirety is borne along by the 
loftiest in itself and in the Authentic Existent; sometimes, the less noble part is dragged down and 
drags the mid-soul with it, though the law is that the Soul may never succumb entire.” (Enneads, 2.9.2) 
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 and in the end, drifting further and further, they came to lose even the 
thought of their origin in the Divine. A child wrenched young from home 
and brought up during many years at a distance will fail in knowledge of 
its father and of itself: the souls, in the same way, no longer discern either 
the divinity or their own nature; ignorance of their rank brings self-
depreciation; they misplace their respect, honoring everything more than 
themselves; all their awe and admiration is for the alien, and, clinging to 
this, they have broken apart, as far as a soul may, and they make light of 
what they have deserted; their regard for the mundane and their disregard 
of themselves bring about their utter ignoring of the divine. (Enneads  
5.1.1) 
 
The dualism of Plotinus, then, is still a Platonic existential dualism concerning the 
orientation of the faculties of the soul289 but now the outcome of the soul has been lifted 
into a religious conflict between good and evil.  
 The highest good of the soul is to achieve reunion with its source,290 namely the 
absolute One and that reunion is considered a “purification” or “cleansing” from the 
body’s taint. This purification is essentially to escape from the body: 
 But what can be meant by the purification of a Soul that has never 
been stained and by the separation of the Soul from a body to which it is 
essentially a stranger? The purification of the Soul is simply to allow it to 
be alone; it is pure when it keeps no company; when it looks to nothing 
without itself; when it entertains no alien thoughts- be the mode or origin 
of such notions or affections what they may, a subject on which we have 
already touched- when it no longer sees in the world of image, much less 
elaborates images into veritable affections. Is it not a true purification to 
turn away towards the exact contrary of earthly things? 
    Separation, in the same way, is the condition of a soul no longer 
entering into the body to lie at its mercy; it is to stand as a light, set in the 
midst of trouble but unperturbed through all. In the particular case of the 
affective phase of the Soul, purification is its awakening from the baseless 
visions which beset it, the refusal to see them; its separation consists in 
limiting its descent towards the lower and accepting no picture thence, and 
of course in the banning for its part too of all which the higher Soul 
ignores when it has arisen from the trouble storm and is no longer bound 
                                                          
289 Plotinus agrees with the Platonic tripartite division of the soul. See Reale, Volume IV, p. 376. 
290 Plotinus is much clearer than Plato in his system of thought that human souls were initially a part of the 
supersensible realm and subsequently descended into bodies later. The reason for that descent is somewhat 
unclear, though, and usually understood to be a necessary descent as a result of the nature of the emanations 
or as a result of an abuse of freedom while in the supersensible realm. See Reale, Volume IV, pp. 374-75. 
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 to the flesh by the chains of sensuality and of multiplicity but has subdued 
to itself the body and its entire surrounding so that it holds sovereignty, 
tranquilly, over all. (Enneads, 3.6.5) 
 
Once free of the body, the soul is again capable of contemplating its source and once 
again capable of union with the One. With the liberty achieved through purification the 
soul turns itself towards its source and moves “outside the bodily sphere; body-free, 
containing nothing of the body – there where Being is, and Being, and the Divine within 
Divinity.” (Enneads, 4.3.24) In such a place, the soul is able to achieve a kind of hyper-
awareness where the soul is filled with God and stilled perfectly, resting peacefully and 
without the disturbing passions of the body.291 In short, the system of Plotinus is a quasi-
religious dualism where the soul is the true person in need of purification from the body 
in order to return to the God that created it. 
 In terms of sexuality, then, Neo-Platonism is similar to Platonism in that it seeks 
to avoid contact with bodily pleasures as part of the soul’s attempt to avoid being overly 
grounded in the body. The soul’s true nature is grounded in its divine origins and should 
therefore, like the Divine, be “intellective and immune to passion.” (Enneads, 1.2.3) Of 
the soul, Plotinus writes: 
It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary pleasures 
and all the activity of the senses it will employ only for medicament and 
assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it may combat, but, failing the 
cure, it will bear meekly and ease it by refusing assent to it. All passionate 
action it will check: the suppression will be complete if that be possible, 
but at worst the Soul will never itself take fire but will keep the 
involuntary and uncontrolled outside its precincts and rare and weak at 
that. The Soul has nothing to dread though no doubt the involuntary has 
some power here too: fear therefore must cease, except so far as it is 
purely monitory. What desire there may be can never be for the vile; even 
the food and drink necessary for restoration will lie outside of the Soul's 
attention, and not less the sexual appetite: or if such desire there must be, 
it will turn upon the actual needs of the nature and be entirely under 
                                                          
291 Reale, Volume IV, pp. 390-91. 
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 control; or if any uncontrolled motion takes place, it will reach no further 
than the imagination, be no more than a fleeting fancy. (Enneads, 1.2.5) 
 
As can be seen, like Plato, Plotinus sees that there are necessary pleasures required for 
natural and medical reasons, but all other “passionate action” must be checked and 
suppressed completely if possible. Not surprisingly, the imaginations and fancies of the 
mind must also be kept in check, since that would certainly represent the faculties of the 
soul using the body as a referent for reality. What is clear, though, is that despite the 
differences in cosmology, Plotinus is not significantly out of sync with Plato on ethical 
matters concerning sexuality.  
 Where Plato and Plotinus do differ is in the intensity of the dualism between the 
sensible and supersensible. For Plato, matter has not entered into the realm of evil, and 
the soul is not in danger simply through association with it. However, for Plotinus, that is 
precisely the case. Indeed, Plotinus has so firmly placed the soul into the realm of the 
divine that even the tripartite division of the soul has become hierarchical. In his 
discussion on the soul, Plotinus refers to the reasoning faculty as the “higher” nature and 
the desiring faculty as the “lower.” Such is the soul’s proper orientation towards the 
divine that the desiring faculty that responds to the body is clearly inferior to its 
reasoning counterpart. When describing the soul’s resistance to the passions associated 
with the body Plotinus says: 
 The Soul itself will be inviolately free and will be working to set 
the irrational part of the nature above all attack, or if that may not be, then 
at least to preserve it from violent assault, so that any wound it takes may 
be slight and be healed at once by virtue of the Soul's presence, just as a 
man living next door to a Sage would profit by the neighborhood, either in 
becoming wise and good himself or, for sheer shame, never venturing any 
act which the nobler mind would disapprove. 
    There will be no battling in the Soul: the mere intervention of Reason is 
enough: the lower nature will stand in such awe of Reason that for any 
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 slightest movement it has made it will grieve, and censure its own 
weakness, in not having kept low and still in the presence of its lord. 
(Enneads, 1.2.5) 
 
Here the clear superiority of the reasoning faculty is a result of Plotinus’ more intense 
dualism, and he stands apart from Plato in that regard. Plato’s faculties stand in equal 
authority within the soul, requiring the third element, the spirit, to balance the powers of 
the other two. In Plotinus’ case, though acknowledging the tripartite division of the soul 
that Plato uses, the third ruling element largely vanishes in favor of a clear hierarchy of 
the reasoning faculty over the desiring one.292 
 In terms of sexual practices, the true extent of Neo-Platonic practice is difficult to 
pin down due to the appearance of Christianity. On the one hand, pagan Neo-Platonists 
tended to blend their philosophy with Pythagorean thought. For example, Porphyry, who 
has clear leanings towards both Plotinus and Pythagoras, engages in asceticism that 
includes avoiding sexual pleasure, eating meat and a clear encouragement of Pythagorean 
procreationism. On the other hand, by the third century CE, Christians, who had been 
practicing sexual renunciation and procreationism nearly since the first century, began to 
appeal to Neo-Platonic thought in support of their practices. The consequence of this 
picture is that it is extremely difficult to separate a clearly and uniquely Neo-Platonic 
sexual ethic. It would certainly be correct to assume Neo-Platonists embraced a minimum 
of procreationism, considering the strong link to Plato and Pythagoras. But considering 
its strong dualism of body and soul, it would also be difficult to say that Neo-Platonic 
thought would be as indulgent as Platonic thought. Indeed, Porphyry’s example shows 
                                                          
292 Plotinus openly rejects any sense that the soul is a harmony of its parts. The soul is clearly divine and 
therefore essentially Mind. All other functions related to the body are inferior, if necessary, parts of the 
soul. See Enneads 4.1-4.2. 
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 that there must have also been a strong ascetic stream within Neo-Platonism outside of 
Christian thought. 
III. The Materialist Cosmologies 
 A second stream of thought in ancient philosophy can be broadly described as 
“materialist”, though that by no means rules out metaphysical considerations from this 
system of thought. Essentially this means that Plato’s theory of causality based upon the 
first Principles and Forms is rejected in favor of a theory of causes that is based more in 
material reality. Metaphysical realities are still considered as part of cosmology (at least 
for Aristotle), but not in opposition to material reality, and elaborated with alternative 
metaphysical theories that differ from Plato’s Forms. The first major critique of Plato 
was, of course, from his student Aristotle, who had his own metaphysical explanations for 
causality in the universe, and a much greater respect for material and sensible existence. 
As will be seen, this meant that Aristotle’s conception of body and soul was substantially 
different from Plato’s, as were his ethical motivations. Working from this initial critique 
of Plato, other philosophies worked (and re-worked) Aristotle’s theories in pursuit of the 
same telos of ancient philosophy, happiness. The Stoics and Epicureans both worked 
from this materialist premise, though they argued for different means of achieving 
happiness as well as different ethical motivations that accompanied those explorations. 
We will begin with Aristotle. 
A. Aristotelian Sexual Ethics 
Cosmology 
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  Aristotle’s entire project is based upon a frustration with his master’s theory of 
Forms as the basis for causality in the universe.293 In essence, Aristotle found that the 
theory of Forms was contradictory, because it demanded transcendence from the material 
world that made the supersensible realities of the first Principles and Forms both entirely 
unknowable and unsustainable as the ultimate cause of sensible reality. For Aristotle, 
knowledge of something must come from understanding the essence or nature of that 
thing, which exists only in the things themselves. Yet because the human connection with 
the sensible world is so deep, we exist outside of those supersensible realities (i.e. Forms) 
and therefore cannot have any real knowledge of them. In addition, that connection with 
the sensible and material universe makes it impossible to observe causality in the 
supersensible world, and in combination with Plato’s somewhat ambiguous explanation 
of how his series of “generations” worked, Aristotle was led to reject the One Good that 
was at the pinnacle of Plato’s Principles and Forms. Instead, Aristotle then began to 
pursue his famous “scientific” engagement with the universe, fully accepting the material 
reality of our existence and investigating the world systematically, in order to discern the 
nature of existence through observation. It is important to note, however, that Aristotle 
did not reject the notion of the supersensible or metaphysical as a real category, he simply 
disagreed with Plato’s conception of it. With his “scientific” method in hand, Aristotle 
would observe the material world and deduce the nature of causality and the 
supersensible from the bottom (material/sensible) up. 
 Through a systematic categorization of observed phenomena, Aristotle explored 
the nature of causality in the universe. He argued that everything that exists has four 
                                                          
293 See Reale, Volume IV, pp. 254-55. 
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 causes which are necessary for it to come into existence.294 First, everything has a formal 
cause, which is basically the essence, form or group of qualities that make something 
uniquely itself. Second, everything that exists must have some sort of material existence, 
with matter arranged according to the formal cause and making its presence sensible in 
the universe. Third, everything must have an efficient cause, that is, an originator of 
existence which impels it into being. Finally, all things must have a final cause, which is 
simply the goal of existence that includes either a purpose or function that is particular to 
that thing. Thus a chair, for example, has the following causes: 1) its formal cause is the 
form of a chair (shape, use) along with 2) a material cause (wood, plastic, metal) which 
is its material components. In addition, 3) its efficient cause was the labourer who both 
built it or had the idea for it, while 4) the final cause is its function as an item to sit upon 
in order to provide comfort and rest. 
 Two matters in regard to Aristotle’s causality are of great importance. The first is 
that under his observations, only the efficient cause reveals anything of metaphysical 
reality. For him, the three other causes are simply the manipulation and use of material 
substance (ou)sia), but the efficient cause is not. Take away the substance and its form 
and the only thing left is the essential cause. Take away the essential cause, and nothing 
would come into existence, since it lacks the mover that impels it into existence. In his 
terms, substance has potential requiring an act or motion, what he calls an entelechy,295 
which arranges substance according to some form. This entelechy creates a synolon 
(sunolon), or union, of substance (ou)sia) and form (ei)doj), without which the 
                                                          
294 For a more detailed and comprehensive discussion of Aristotle’s views of the Four Causes see Reale, 
Voume. IV, pp. 265-92. 
295 In De Anima I.ii, Aristotle admits he is working from the same assumption as his forbearers, that motion 
is one of two qualities unique to the soul, along with sensation.  
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 final cause, or telos, cannot be fulfilled. What is essential to comprehend, then, is that 
Aristotle came to believe that this motion at the root of the efficient cause is the 
conceptual core of metaphysical reality.  
Here, Aristotle’s logic is that substance (i.e. sensible matter) is corruptible and 
changing, but supersensible realities are not. Within an essential cause is the glimmer of 
incorruptible movement and therefore, if one were to follow the movement through the 
string of causality due to act and motion, one would eventually arrive at the First 
movement. The source of that movement would necessarily have to be immobile (for if it 
was in motion, what moved it?) as well as capable of acting to create the motion from 
which all other realities are derived. For Aristotle, the only essence that is both immobile 
and capable of acting must be similar to the mind’s thought. For in thought, there is an 
immobile and unchanging essence296 that is obviously a self-generated act. Therefore, 
causality traced back through the universe must ultimately end in some eternal, perfect, 
immobile essence of act: the Mind or Absolute Intelligence. Without going into too much 
unnecessary detail, this divine Mind is essentially a “self-knowing knowing”, since 
initially it has only itself to know. Aristotle writes: 
Such, then, is the first principle upon which depend the sensible universe and 
the world of nature. And its life is like the best that we temporarily enjoy. It 
must be in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality is 
also pleasure. (And for this reason waking, sensation and thinking are most 
pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them.) Now 
thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in 
the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best. And thought 
thinks itself through participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an 
object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and 
the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the 
object of thought, i.e. essence, is thought. And it actually functions when it 
                                                          
296 “But thought seems to be an independent substance implanted within us and to be incapable of 
destruction.” De Anima A 4.408b.18. 
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 possesses this object. Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held 
to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is 
that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God 
always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvelous; 
and if it is greater, this is still more marvelous. Nevertheless it is so. 
Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is 
that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. 
We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore 
life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is. 
(Metaphysics 7.1072b) 
For Aristotle, God or Mind or Intelligence, is the first mover that orders all existence, 
including the material world.297 The Mind’s motion of intellection is then able to place 
form upon substance and thereby create an infinite series of synola, which are the 
material realities that are both sensible and intelligible. 
 Second, Aristotle’s conception of form is understood in terms of act and not, as 
seen in Plato, in terms of a universal Form, and the entelechy mentioned above is crucial 
to his understanding of how form orders substance. In Aristotle’s mind, the potential of 
substance must be acted upon in order to have its capacity fulfilled.298 Consequently, for 
Aristotle, form is the guiding principle embedded in the entelechy that brings order to 
substance. When the motion (entelechy) organizes substance (ousia), it must necessarily 
be an act that includes some guiding principle that will give the substance shape and 
purpose. What is important to note, however, is that even though the resulting object is a 
union (synolon) of the form and the substance, the form is not the acting agent and does 
not exist separately if no action had taken place. In fact, the form of a thing can vary 
immensely depending upon the variety of entelechies that have acted in its generation, 
                                                          
297 Unfortunately, Aristotle is not clear on the causal relationship between matter and the divine Mind. 
Scholars have disagreed over how to explain his position with some arguing that Aristotle simply sees the 
material matter of the world as eternally existing in its elemental forms (e.g. earth, air, fire, water, spirit) 
and being order and controlled by the higher incorruptible reality of the divine Mind. Other Scholars have 
tried to argue for something just short of creationism in Aristotle’s thought, seeing the divine Mind, which 
he regularly refers to as God, as the creator of the world. The matter remains unresolved. 
298 Reale, Volume  IV, pp. 284-85. 
135 
 and an object’s form rarely contains a single category of being.299 Instead, the sort of 
action that results in something coming to being is by far the more important concept in 
Aristotle’s thought. Whatever the form of the action is, that will be the guiding principle 
of the form for the object that is created.  
Form is not limited to the physical ordering of matter in a thing and includes the 
factors that determine its own action and being. What something does is as much tied up 
with its form as its physical structure. An example Aristotle uses is vegetation. Plants are 
certainly alive, and have particular shapes and species, but what they do is as much a part 
of their form as the shape. What they do is what he calls a “nutritive faculty”,300 which is 
simply the ability to gather food and continue to live. This limited existence, however, is 
still a part of their form and would be very different from the form of a rock, which has 
no nutritive faculty at all. Animals, too, have the nutritive faculty but also a faculty for 
sensation.301 By sensation, Aristotle is referring to the fact that the being of an animal 
also includes the ability to move and to sense other material reality (sight, smell, touch, 
etc,), to feel the appetites and the capacity to feel pain and pleasure. This form of their 
being then explains their behaviour, and even allows for an element of predictability. The 
actions of both plants and animals are then a part of their form, and in Aristotle’s thought, 
without that form their behaviour would be different or non-existent. He calls these kinds 
                                                          
299 For Aristotle there are primary and derivative categories involved in the concept of form. “Being is 
predicated of all the categories, but not in the same way, since it is said of substance in a primary way and 
of the other categories in a derivative way.” (Metaphysics Z 4.1030a21-23) Thus a primary category might 
be “animal” but a derivative category might be “lion” or “cow”. The form of each has both similar and 
different categories in its guiding principles and no universal essence, such as Cow or Lion, can be posited. 
Indeed, even individuals within the same genus can vary according to their forms and the variety of 
entelechies that acted in their creation.  
300 De Anima, III 414b1-5. 
301 De Anima, III 414b1-15. 
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 of forms of living beings the vegetative soul (plants) and the sentient soul (animals), with 
the form of the sentient soul including the faculties of the vegetative soul.  
Body and Soul 
 With this brief account of Aristotle’s cosmology in hand, we can turn to his ideas 
about the body and soul. As plants and animals are material substance ordered by their 
respective vegetative and sentient forms, so too, human beings are material matter 
organized by the soul. The body must find food (vegetative faculty), and also has the 
capacity to experience sensation of all kinds (sentient faculty), but it also simultaneously 
possesses a third faculty: the ability to think. The human soul is simply the vegetative 
soul and sentient soul combined with a further faculty, one of thought: “That part of the 
soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I mean that part of the soul which thinks and 
forms judgments) has no actual existence until it thinks.”302 More importantly, Aristotle 
believes that the rational soul has a connection with the divine Mind as its source: 
 But thought seems to be an independent substance implanted within us and 
to be incapable of being destroyed. …Thus it is that thinking and reflecting 
decline through the decay of some inward part and are themselves impassible 
(a)paqej). Thinking, loving and hating are affections not of thought, so far 
as it has it. That is why when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; 
they were activities not of thought, but of the composite which has perished; 
thought is, no doubt, something more divine and imperishable.303 
  
Unfortunately, Aristotle says very little about how the rational faculty of the human 
soul gets implanted, or what happens to it once death occurs. For some scholars there is a 
clear tendency to treat the soul as a kind of pure entelchy for the body which disappears 
at death, while others think that because of the soul’s connection with the divine Mind 
                                                          
302 De Anima, III 429a22-25.  
303 De Anima, III 408b19-33. Reale’s translation.  
137 
 Aristotle would have been open to its continuation beyond death.304 Either way, it is clear 
that Aristotle sees the tripartite division of the soul as having vegetative, sentient and 
rational faculties, with the thinking aspect of the soul being the highest and most 
important element to the human form. In short, the soul is the form particular to humans. 
As a form should, the soul provides the structure for the material that makes up the 
human body, but it also provides the essence of human activity, which includes both the 
means to provide for the body (vegetative and sentient faculties) as well as the higher 
purpose of thinking and reasoning (rational faculty).  
Aristotle’s Ethics 
 With this picture of Aristotle’s cosmology and psychology in hand, we now turn 
to his ethical considerations. In the same way that Aristotle disagrees with Plato’s 
conception of metaphysical realities, he also disagrees with Plato’s conception of the 
telos of human existence: Happiness (eu0daimonia). For Plato, complete happiness is 
achieved though a reunion of the soul with the highest Form, the One Good. However, 
since Aristotle rejects Plato’s cosmology of Forms,305 and engages a material cosmology, 
                                                          
304 The crux of the argument seems to lay in the interpretation of one of Aristotle’s statements about the 
soul: “(the soul) is the first entelechy of a natural body (soma physikon) which potentially possesses life 
and which is organikon.” (De Anima II 412b5) Some scholars, represented by M. Pavlopoulos’s article 
“Aristotle’s Natural Teleology and the Metaphysics of Life” (D. Sedley, ed., Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, Vol. 24 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)], pp. 133-181), argue that organikon simply 
mean “physical organs”. In their interpretation Aristotle sees the soul as the sum of activity that is 
surrounded by the functions of a complex unity of the body’s organs. Thought comes from the head or heart 
as its physical source, but once death occurs the functioning of those body parts ceases and so should the 
existence of the soul. Other scholars, represented by A.P. Bos’ article “Aristotle’s Psychology: The 
Traditional Interpretation Refuted” (Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Boston, 1998) argue that 
organikon should be translated as “instruments” which are used by the soul. In this interpretation the soul 
employs the use of the body as an instrument and it is capable of survival beyond the death of the body. The 
advantage of this interpretation, which the current author agrees with, is that statements of Aristotle 
concerning the mind’s divine connection can be accounted for as well as aligned with his general 
cosmology of form and substance united in a synolon. The unfortunate reality is that Aristotle simply did 
not address these issues in enough detail to satisfy our curiosity.  
305 Aristotle writes, “If, in fact, the good were a unity or something predictable in common and existed 
separately by itself, it is evident that it will not be attainable or realizable by man; but what we are 
searching for is instead our own good.” (Nicomachean Ethics A 5.1096b32-35) Notice Aristotle’s insistence 
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 the telos of his philosophy falls in line with his theory of formal causes. As we know 
from the previous discussion, for Aristotle the form of a thing also determines the activity 
or function of its being. For example, the function of the eye is sight and the function of 
the ear is to hear. The highest good, then, is that everything performs its natural function 
to the fullest. In addition, since the form and function of each is derived from the divine 
Mind, it is also to be expected that they perform their functions in accordance with the 
reason and intelligence at the root of their efficient cause.306 
 What is the highest good of man? Simply to perform the function that is peculiar 
to him: to reason, and regulate the activity of the soul in accordance with reason. Aristotle 
explains: 
To say however that the Supreme Good is happiness will probably appear 
a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what constitutes 
happiness.  Perhaps then we may arrive at this by ascertaining what is 
man's function. For the goodness or efficiency of a flute-player or sculptor 
or craftsman of any sort, and in general of anybody who has some function 
or business to perform, is thought to reside in that function; and similarly 
it may be held that the good of man resides in the function of man, if he 
has a function. Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and the 
shoemaker have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man 
as such has none, and is not designed by nature to fulfill any function? 
Must we not rather assume that, just as the eye, the hand, the foot and each 
of the various members of the body manifestly has a certain function of its 
own, so a human being also has a certain function over and above all the 
functions of his particular members? What then precisely can this function 
be? The mere act of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas 
we are looking for the function peculiar to man we must therefore set 
aside the vital activity of nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come 
some form of sentient life; but this too appears to be shared by horses, 
oxen, and animals generally. There remains therefore what may be called 
the practical life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions 
one rational as obedient to principle, the others possessing principle and 
exercising intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us 
assume that we are here concerned with the active exercise of the rational 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the Good as a Platonic Form is unattainable because of its transcendence. The obvious solution is to 
pursue the highest good in the material universe.  
306 Reale, Voume. IV, pp. 318-322. 
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 faculty, since this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. If then 
the function of man is the active exercise of the soul's faculties in 
conformity with rational principle[i.e Mind], or at all events not in 
dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the function of 
an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a 
harpist and a good harpist, and so generally with all classes) to be 
generically the same, the qualification of the latter's superiority in 
excellence being added to the function in his case (I mean that if the 
function of a harpist is to play the harp, that of a good harpist is to play the 
harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the function of man is a 
certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul's 
faculties and activities in association with rational principle, and say that 
the function of a good man is to perform these activities well and rightly, 
and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance 
with its own proper excellence--from these premises it follows that the 
Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with 
excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in 
conformity with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover, to be 
happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, 
nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of 
happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.” 
(Nicomachean Ethics A 7.1097b22-1098a20) 
 
 As can be seen, Aristotle sees the happiness of mankind as the proper and best 
performance of the function most appropriate to the soul. Consequently, the whole 
concept of virtue (a)reth) in Aristotle’s thought is summed up in a search for behaviour 
that is appropriate to the functions of the soul. With three basic faculties in the soul, 
Aristotle also sees three basic functions to man: the vegetative, the sentient, and the 
rational. Man must then find the best path to provide itself with nutrients and food, the 
best path for ordering its movement and experience of the material world and, lastly, the 
best path to perform the rational functions related to the mind. Additionally, Aristotle sees 
virtue as being the middle path between the two vices of excess and defect.307 For 
                                                          
307 Aristotle writes “For example, one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience 
pleasure and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these 
feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the 
right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount--and the best amount is of 
course the mark of virtue. And similarly there can be excess, deficiency, and the due mean in actions. Now 
feelings and actions are the objects with which virtue is concerned; and in feelings and actions excess and 
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 example, the best path for the vegetative faculty of the soul is to neither engage in 
deprivation nor gluttony, since both lead to obvious physical and social problems. 
Likewise, ordering of the sentient faculty should be according to appropriate needs, 
neither depriving the body of sensible experience, nor inflicting excessive amounts of 
pain or pleasure. However, being above sensible reality and unique to humans, the 
rational faculty of the soul should be in line with the rational principle, the divine Mind. 
Thought and contemplation, then, should not be neglected, and they should be 
encouraged with no fear of excess.308 In short, ethical virtue is the mind’s placement of 
reason upon attitudes or actions that, without reason, would tend towards excess.309 
 In terms of sexuality, Aristotle naturally places sexual behaviour under the realm 
of the vegetative and sentient faculties of the soul, where it is observably susceptible to 
excess.310 The task of the person, in regard to virtue, is to keep the natural functions of 
the lower faculties of the soul properly balanced, preventing extremes of avoidance or 
indulgence. For example, Aristotle writes: 
But of the people who are incontinent with respect to bodily enjoyments, with 
which we say the temperate (swfrona) and the self-indulgent 
(a)kolasia) man are concerned, he who pursues the excesses of things 
pleasant and shuns those of things painful, of hunger and thirst and heat and 
cold and all the objects of touch and taste-not by choice but contrary to his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
deficiency are errors, while the mean amount is praised, and constitutes success; and to be praised and to be 
successful are both marks of virtue. Virtue, therefore is a mean state in the sense that it is able to hit the 
mean.” (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b18-28) See also Reale, Volume IV, p. 324. 
308 Friendship, of course, is Aristotle’s middle path for the person trying to engage in the proper function of 
the rational soul. Friendship provides the prefect venue for the performance of virtue, as well as a place for 
the provision of affection and utility for the functions of the mind.  
309  For example, in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle describes the virtue of gentleness as the mean between 
irascibility and lack of feeling, the virtue of courage as the mean between foolhardiness and cowardice, and 
so on. See Reale, Volume IV, p. 325.  
310 Aristotle writes “But the things that give pleasure are of two kinds: some are necessary, others are 
desirable in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary sources of pleasures are those connected with 
the body: I mean such as the functions of nutrition and sex, in fact those bodily functions which we have 
indicated as the sphere of Profligacy and Temperance. The other sources of pleasure are not necessary, but 
are desirable in themselves: I mean for example victory, honor, wealth, and the other good and pleasant 
things of the same sort.” (Nicomachean Ethics 7.1147b) 
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 choice and his judgment, is called incontinent, not with the qualification 'in 
respect of this or that', e.g. of anger, but just simply. (Nicomachean Ethics 
7.1148a3-12) 
 
Consequently, temperance (swfrosunh) is the ideal for Aristotle, and it is 
marked by the person who does not give in to the extremes of excess or deprivation 
(though he admits that finding someone who embraces the extreme of deprivation in 
regards to sexuality is hard to find)311 and who only engages in those activities in the 
proper manner and for appropriate reasons.  “The temperate man (o( swfrwn),” 
Aristotle says, 
keeps a middle course in these matters. He takes no pleasure at all in the 
things that the self-indulgent man (a)kolastoj) enjoys most, on the 
contrary he positively rejects them; nor in general does he find pleasure in 
wrong things, nor excessive pleasure in anything of this sort; nor does he feel 
pain or desire when they are lacking, or only in a moderate degree, not more 
than is right, nor at the wrong time, et cetera. But such pleasures as conduce 
health and fitness he will try to obtain in a moderate and right degree; as also 
other pleasures so far as they are not detrimental to health and fitness, and not 
ignoble, nor beyond his means. Not so the temperate man; he only cares for 
them as right principle enjoins. (Nicomachean Ethics III.1119a12-21) 
 
As can be seen, Aristotle sees the use of bodily pleasure to be a matter of extent, where 
the moderate person who engages in sexual pursuits for the sake of health and fitness, or 
for procreation, is perfectly acceptable, but once it moves into the realm of excess it is 
clearly harmful.  
 While Plato warned against the dangers of a soul overly focused on the body, 
where it is contaminated and led away from its source (i.e. the One Good), Aristotle is 
concerned with the functions of the body and soul being performed properly and 
appropriately. Having eliminated the supersensible from the equation, Aristotle focuses 
                                                          
311 Aristotle writes “Men erring on the side of deficiency as regards pleasures (hedona), and taking less than 
the proper amount of enjoyment in them, scarcely occur; insensibility is not human.” (Nicomachean Ethics 
III 1119a5-7) 
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 upon the material existence of the person and ensures that happiness is achieved in the 
present sensible life. That means that the soul, with its three faculties, needs to find the 
best and most appropriate way of performing its sexual functions. In short, the rational 
faculty of the soul must reason the proper amount of sexual activity that is appropriate for 
good health and fitness, while simultaneously preventing a slide into excess. “The 
incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, while 
the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational 
principle to follow them. (Nicomachean Ethics VII.1145b12-15) For Aristotle, 
temperance is a matter of letting the reasoning faculty of the soul provide proper 
guidance for the lower faculties.  
 Temperance, then, is achieved through the same sort of self-mastery 
(e)gkrateia) that Plato encouraged. Most of Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics is, 
in fact, a discussion of Aristotle’s views on enkrateia, and Aristotle is quite clear that the 
success of a person’s attempts at self-mastery are due to the extent to which they are 
guided by reason. Those guided by reason can easily master the passions of the body, and 
in this way, Aristotle is quite different from Plato. The body has no ability to contaminate 
or delude the rational part of the soul. Instead, an unrestrained person falls into two 
categories: 1) the person who gives in to the passions out of weakness and ignorance, and 
2) those that in their strength and knowledge choose to give in to excess. The first group 
may be weak in their mind’s ability to reason and are simply overpowered by passion, or, 
they may be able to reason, but are not sufficiently attenuated to the mind and do not 
deliberate at all.312 For these, Aristotle has much patience and compassion, but for the 
second group he has only scorn. This second group is able to reason well in their mind 
                                                          
312 Nicomachean Ethics VII.1150b19-28. 
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 and do not lack strength to overcome the bodily passions, yet they choose to continue in 
the excess because of a lack of character.313 These people have moved up into the 
category of vice. Both groups, however, are capable of reformation and indeed, every 
person should from a young age embrace a kind of training that will allow the mind to 
reason well in regards to the bodily pleasures. Good habits can be formed and reformed 
in all, and the mind should be trained by a continued engagement with those things which 
need to be resisted. For example, Aristotle writes: 
But not only are the virtues both generated and fostered on the one hand, and 
destroyed on the other, from and by the same actions, but they will also find 
their full exercise in the same actions. This is clearly the case with the other 
more visible qualities, such as bodily strength: for strength is produced by 
taking much food and undergoing much exertion, while also it is the strong 
man who will be able to eat most food and endure most exertion. The same 
holds good with the virtues. We become temperate by abstaining from 
pleasures, and at the same time we are best able to abstain from pleasures 
when we have become temperate. (Nicomachean Ethics II. 1104a27-35) 
 
In this way, though motivated by a different concept of body and soul, Aristotle is 
very similar to general Greek philosophical patterns of thought about sexuality. Done in 
excess, sexual behaviour is harmful and disruptive to the social order, but if done in 
moderate and appropriate ways, it is a healthy and natural part of life. Each situation must 
be judged upon its own merit. To prevent falling into excess, a person should engage in a 
proper training of both the mind and the body, working hard to find the “just mean.”314 
However, the motivation of his more material-oriented cosmology establishes Aristotle as 
somewhat less concerned by sexuality than the metaphysical stream. The dualism found 
in Plato, Pythagoras, and Plotinus places sexual behaviour in a much more negative light 
                                                          
313 Nicomachean Ethics VII 1151a. 
314 Here the classic survey of both the training and vast array of diets, regimens and rules appropriate to 
sexual behaviour in the ancient world is M. Foucault’s History of Sexuality (New York: Vinatge/Random 
House, 1985).  
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 since it is, directly or indirectly, capable of creating an insurmountable chasm between 
the soul and the One. But Aristotle’s cosmology, by placing sexual behaviour in the 
natural realm of the sentient faculty of the soul, sees it as simply an aspect of life that 
needs to be ordered properly by reason. Hence, the intense rhetoric of Plato is to be found 
nowhere within the even-handed explorations of Aristotle. Instead, Aristotle is able to 
simply state that the nature of a person comes from what they do, and if what a person 
does is ordered by reason, then their nature will be good. All it takes is a lot of hard work: 
 Mark me, my friend, ’tis long-continued training,  
 And training in the end becomes man’s nature. 
      (Aristotle quoting Evenus,  
      Nicomachean Ethics VII.1152a36-37) 
 
B.  Stoicism 
Cosmology 
 The school of thought founded by Zeno and his students, who met under the 
porch (stoa) of the Academy to discuss their philosophy, represents a full rejection of 
Plato’s metaphysics that goes one step beyond Aristotle. Along with the Epicureans, who 
will be discussed next, the Stoics completely rejected the idea that there was any portion 
of reality that was not made up of physical matter. There was no metaphysical reality in 
their thought, no first Principles, Forms or eternal Mind, only material substance. 
Obviously influenced by Heraclitus, Zeno conceived of God and the universe as 
essentially made up of the element of fire.315 God was the impersonal but purely rational 
“body” of fire that permeated and ordered all existence, and all that exists is partly made 
up of this divine fire. Everything that exists, then, is made up of a mixture of the three 
                                                          
315 “The Stoics make God out to be intelligent, a designing fire which methodically proceeds towards 
creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal principles ...” (Aetius, de Placita 1.7.33) See also, 
Reale, Volume III, p. 213.  
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 remaining elements (earth, air, water), which are passive, and the fiery part of its make up 
which is an active, rational part of God that has given it shape and form. As Diogenes 
reports: 
According to the Stoics there are two principles in the universe, the active and 
the passive. The passive principle is a substance without quality, matter; the 
active principle is the reason in matter, that is, God. And God which is eternal 
is the creative craftsman of all things in the extent of matter.” (Diogenes 
Laertius, Philosophoi Bioi, 7.134)  
 
This materialism is essentially the earliest Western expression of pantheism, a reality 
permeated by God and organized according to reason (logos).316 
 In addition, in response to metaphysical opponents, the Stoics argued that the 
rational qualities and ideas that are seemingly present in all things are actually concepts 
of the mind. Since matter cannot exist without form and quality, what are called Ideas in 
Platonic circles are actually just the mind’s recognition of reason (logos) expressed in 
matter’s existence. For example, an extract from a Stoic treatise in Stobeaus reads: 
Concepts are neither substances nor qualities, but mental images similar to 
substances and qualities. They are what the ancients called “Ideas.” In fact we 
can speak of Ideas for each thing offered to us in the form of a concept, as for 
example, men, horses, and in general all animals and all beings of which it is 
said there are ideas. The Ideas do not have their existence in themselves; we 
ourselves participate in the formation of concepts and find the terms of the 
language, the so-called appellatives. (Stobeaus, Anthology, 1.136.21) 
 
It is only the mental images that the mind creates in recognition of qualities and forms 
that made the metaphysical theorist believe that Ideas exist independently. However, the 
Stoic understands that the rational part of the person recognizes the same rational 
workmanship of God, whom Zeno often stylized as a “craftsman” that works out the 
order of the universe, but also knows that should the substance not exist, neither will the 
                                                          
316 Reale, Volume III, p. 214. 
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 form. In short, substance and form are ontologically bound in Zeno’s thought, neither 
existing without the other, and form does not exist as a real metaphysical substance.  
Body and Soul 
 For the Stoics, then, the relationship between body and soul is relatively simple, at 
least compared with the metaphysics of Plato or Aristotle. According to Zeno, since all 
reality is material in existence, so too the soul as well as the body.317 The soul is made up 
of fire and Aristotle’s fifth element, pneuma, the same fire of which God is made.318 
Varro writes, “For Zeno the seed of life is fire, which is soul and intelligence,”319 and 
Diogenes agrees: “Zeno of Citium defines the soul as fiery breath (pneuma).”320 In the 
same way that the fiery substance of God is the active, rational principle that organizes 
the passive matter of the universe, the soul is the fiery substance that is the active, 
rational part of the human being which orders its passive material substance. The soul is 
the intelligent agent that permeates and orders the body, but also thinks, perceives, desires 
and reasons. Moreover, beyond death, the soul may survive for a period of time, possibly 
in a place of punishment or reward,321 until it finally perishes and dissipates into a 
reunion with the fiery matter of God. The first century writer Aetius says: 
The Stoics say that the soul does not die leaving the body but remains in itself 
and by itself for a certain time. But a soul which is weaker (that is, the 
                                                          
317 Theaetetus, in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist, says of the Stoics: “The soul itself, they think, does possess a 
sort of body, but when it comes to wisdom or any of the other things you asked about [i.e. justice, wisdom, 
foolishness], they have not the face either to accept the inference that they have no place among real things 
or to persist in maintaining that they are all bodies.” (246e-247b) Notice that Plato argues that if the soul is 
matter in Stoic thought that other Ideas should be matter as well. However, as was discussed, the Stoics 
would consider issues of justice and wisdom to be mental constructs that are appellative of the rational 
form created by God.  
318 For a full discussion of this element of Stoic conception of the soul see A.A. Long’s article “Soul and 
Body in Stoicism” in Phronesis 27 (1982): 34-57. 
319 Varro, De lingua lat. 5.59. 
320 Diogenes Laertius, Philosophoi Bioi, 7.157. 
321 Lactantius reports, “The Stoic Zeno taught that the infernal regions exist and that the place of good men 
is apart from impious men: the sages live in pleasant peaceful places while others suffer their punishment in 
a dreadful abyss of mud.” (Div.Inst. 7.720). 
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 uneducated one) remains for a short time. On the contrary, the souls of the 
wise men which are more worthwhile remain even until the conflagration.” 
322 (Aetius, de Placita, 4.7.3) 
                                                          
 
Simply put, in Stoic thought the soul is part of the rational fire of the universe, and while 
in the body it provides order and reason to the person, but it will ultimately return to its 
source.  
 Important for this discussion is how the Stoics understand the operations of the 
soul and body. Like all philosophers of the age, the Stoics believed that the purpose of the 
soul was to know the truth, and like Aristotle, the Stoics believed that the soul came to 
knowledge of things via sensible reality (i.e. materialist). As noted above, the Stoics also 
believed that the soul was composed of matter, and the natural result is that Stoics argued 
that the assent to truth lies in the soul’s interaction with sensible reality via the body. The 
Stoic Cleanthes said: 
Alterations and affections are not communicated from corporeal things into 
incorporeal things and vice versa, but the soul suffers together with the body, 
participating in its pain if it is struck, wounded or tortured; the body 
participates with the soul in its sadness if it is afflicted by troubles, anxiety, 
love as it felt a force associated with it, failing of which it shows the shame 
and fear by its blush and its pallor. (Cleanthes quoted by Nemesius, De nat. 
hom., 32) 
 
For the Stoics, the soul and body affected each other directly through their association 
with one another, especially since both were material, corporeal realities. Whatever was 
experienced by one was also experienced by the other; but the body could only 
experience sensation, while the reason of the soul could contemplate the sensation as well 
as experience it. 
322 The Stoics believed that at the completion of time there would be a conflagration where a general 
combustion of all things by God will occur, purifying all things and starting a new cycle of cosmic 
generation. If found to be wise, the soul will survive until that moment and then be drawn back into the 
eternal fire of God. See Reale, Vol. III, pp. 256-57. 
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  What is key for the Stoics is that through the body the soul receives the 
information required to make a judgment about truth. The soul permeates the body and 
receives sensation through the senses,323 and then interprets and makes judgments about 
that information through its connection with the divine Logos (i.e. the fiery reason of 
God). For the Stoics, this sensation has a two-fold movement. First the sensation is 
received by the body and is transmitted in an impression (i.e. motion) to the soul; second, 
the soul receives the impression as a presentation, like wax receiving the impression of a 
seal. The soul is then able to reason the truthfulness of what has been communicated 
through the senses. Diogenes explains: 
The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and 
sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is 
generically a presentation, and again, the theory of assent and that of 
apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart 
from the presentation. For presentation comes first, then thought, which is 
capable of expressing itself, puts it into the form of a proposition that which 
the subject receives from a presentation. (Diogenes Laertius quoting Diocles 
of Magnesia, Philosophoi Bioi, 7.48) 
 
The result of the soul’s consideration of the impression and presentation is essentially an 
impulse to pursue some course of action in response to it. The “assent” of the reasoned 
faculty of the soul to the presentation upon it will create some reciprocal response which 
could include such things as desire, emotion or aversion, which in turn motivates an 
                                                          
323 Aetius gives a good summary: "The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty is the soul's highest part, 
which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses. They also call it the reasoning faculty. 
From the commanding-faculty there are seven parts of the soul which grow out and stretch out into the 
body, like the tentacles of an octopus. Five of these are the senses: sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. ... 
Of the remainder, one is called seed, and this is breath extending from the commanding-faculty to the 
genitals. The other ... which they call utterance, is breath extending from the commanding-faculty to the 
pharynx, tongue, and appropriate organs...." (Aetius, de Placia 4.21.1-4) 
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 intentional action.324 Without that reasoned response to the presentation within the soul, 
there can be no impulse or action, either good or bad, by the person.325 
Ethics 
 Along with all other Greek philosophies, Stoic ethics pursue the goal (telos) of 
happiness (eu0daimonia) through virtue. However, the nature of the soul’s relation to 
the body means that the impulses and actions of the person are the result of the reasoning 
faculty of the soul making a proper judgment concerning what has been communicated to 
it through the senses.326 The happiness of both individual and community then depend 
upon the ability to reason properly in response to the senses. If the rational faculty of the 
soul gives assent to an impression/presentation without proper reasoning, it is possible 
that the impulse generated by that bad judgment would be equally bad. Specifically, when 
assent is given to an impression an emotion is at the heart of the impulse generated. For 
Stoics, desire and pleasure are emotions of less and more intense approval of a thing as 
good; desire is the impulse to achieve that thing and pleasure is elation at its attainment. 
Similarly, fear and pain are less and more intense rejections of a thing as bad, with fear 
being the impulse to avoid the thing, and pain being the suffering we experience should 
the thing occur.327 There is nothing inherently or intrinsically “bad” about any one of 
those emotions. Rather it is the judgment made concerning the emotions produced by 
                                                          
324 See T. Brennan’s article “Stoic Moral Psychology” In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 164-167. 
325 For example, Plutarch comments "What is the subject most argued about by Chrysippus himself and 
Antipater in their disputes with the Academics? The doctrine that without ASSENT there is neither action 
nor impulsion, and that they are talking nonsense and empty assumptions who claim that, when an 
appropriate impulsion occurs, impulsion ensues at once without people first having yielded or given their 
assent."(Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1057a). 
326 M. Schofield rightly points out that it is the “impulse” of human behaviour that is the starting point for 
Stoic ethics, and not a broader conception of good and evil. See his article “Stoic Ethics” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 237-38. 
327 Brennan, Stoic Moral Psycology, pp. 269-70. 
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 sensible impressions that is at the heart of an ethical choice. According to the Stoics, one 
can reason poorly or well in response to any impression, and the value of that reasoning 
is central to moral determination.  
 With the impressions and presentations the soul receives being basically neutral in 
Stoic ethics, there is never any sense that any action is bad in itself. An unethical or 
immoral action depends upon two related issues. First, if the sensations received by the 
soul are inordinately focused upon, they may carry more significance and power than is 
necessary for self preservation, and can produce inordinate impulses that are hard to 
judge rationally. Cicero, for example, writes: 
A living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve 
itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which 
preserve its constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to 
destruction and those things which appear to threaten destruction. (Cicero, De 
finibus, 3.5.16) 
 
This inclination of attachment to oneself, and the things associated with preserving or 
threatening its survival, has a natural power to create emotions and impulses that can 
affect behaviour. To avoid negative behaviours related to such impulses, the Stoics 
recommended their famous appeal to a)diafora, or “indifference.”328 In order to 
avoid being overly influenced by those powers associated with self-attachment, one 
naturally be as little attached to oneself as possible. Therefore, the Stoics encourage a 
detached indifference to the things associated with self-preservation like birth, death, 
food, pain, pleasure, riches, poverty, health and so on. Those things have no moral value 
in themselves, but if one is attached to them, their power to create impressions and 
impulses upon the soul is obviously great. The surest and safest attitude towards them is 
must 
                                                          
328 For a full discussion see Brennan’s “Stoic Moral Psychology”.  
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 consequently a)diafora, or indifference. One should simply not allow those things to 
be too great a concern.  
 Second, along the same lines as Aristotle, the Stoics argued that the good of a 
thing lay in being “according to its nature.” Thus the Stoic not only cultivates 
a)diafora in response to his natural attachments but he also strives to live according 
to nature.329 What, then, is the nature of humanity in Stoic thought? Seneca repeats the 
ancient Stoic doctrine: 
What quality is best in man? It is reason; by virtue of reason he surpasses the 
animals, and is surpassed only by the gods. Perfect reason is therefore the 
particular good of man; all other qualities he shares in some degree with 
animals and plants…Hence, if everything is praiseworthy and has arrived at 
the end intended by its nature, when it has brought its peculiar good to 
perfection, and if man’s peculiar good is reason, then if a man has brought his 
reason to perfection, he is praiseworthy and has reached the end suited to his 
nature. (Seneca, Epistles, 76.9) 
 
Reason becomes the highest good man can perform, and the Stoics revere rational 
behaviour as the exclusive good and irrational behaviour exclusively as evil.330 For in 
Stoic thought, anything that aids in the perfection of nature is “good”, while anything that 
damages or diminishes it is “evil.” The result is a tripartite moral system with “goods”, 
“evils” and “indifferents”. Stobaeus records: 
 “Things are divided into goods, evils and indifferents. Good things are 
intelligence, temperance, justice, fortitude, and whatever is virtue or 
participates in virtue [i.e. the perfection of nature]. Bad things are stupidity, 
dissoluteness, injustice, cowardice, and whatever is vice or participates in 
vice [i.e. the destruction of nature]. Indifferent things are life and death, being 
well-known and being obscure, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, 
infirmity and good health, and similars.” (Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.57.19) 
 
Stoic ethics become a matter of being a)diafora towards the “indifferents”, and being 
positively aggressive in the pursuit of logic and rational behaviour.  
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  The language of self-mastery (e)gkrateia) is also used by the Stoics, only it 
has lost any sense of the conflict found in Plato, and definitely embraces Aristotle’s sense 
of the hard work needed to achieve virtue.331 The rational function of the soul can be 
trained and exercised until it is able to effortlessly give assent only to those things which 
perfect human nature. The Stoic sage must work constantly to order the factors that 
determine assent, becoming self-sufficient in regards to the indifferents, and wise in 
regards to virtue. Moreover, this wisdom and virtue is achieved through the exercise of 
logic and rational thought, in essence, a science: 
Wisdom is the science of what we need to do, of what we do not need and 
what is not either in one or in the other condition, or the science of good and 
evil and things naturally indifferent for the man living in community… . 
Temperance (swfrosunh) is the science of what is desirable, of what is to 
be avoided and what is neither one or the other; justice is the science of 
giving to each person what is his due; fortitude is the science of what is 
fearful and what is not as well as what belongs to neither category; silliness is 
the ignorance of good and evil and of indifferent things; intemperance is 
ignorance of things to choose or avoid and whatever is neither to be chosen 
nor avoided; injustice is the ignorance which is not capable of giving each 
person what is his due; cowardice is ignorance of what to fear and not to fear, 
of what is neither fearful nor to be feared. (Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.59.4) 
  
Virtue is simply the practice of good science, the use of proper knowledge; vice is 
ignorance of what is the best course of action to take. Vice is always manageable, since it 
is only a matter of education in order to encourage rational and reasonable behaviour. In 
fact, there is no fixed ethical or moral value to any particular behaviour, only a proper use 
that can be deemed ethical or unethical depending upon its relation to a reasoned impulse. 
For the Stoics, morality is the science of good and evil, and wisdom is a reasoned choice. 
Sexual Ethics 
                                                          
331 See K. Campbell’s “Self-Mastery and Stoic Ethics” in Philosophy 60 (1985): 327-340. 
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  Recently, scholars have been rectifying an overgeneralization about Stoic sexual 
ethics prevalent in earlier research. The generalization made by scholars was an 
ahistorical one, where Stoic sexual ethics were represented as uniform across the 
centuries from the time of Zeno until the collapse of the Roman Empire.332 The tendency 
was to assume that the sexual ethics of later Stoics such as Seneca, Musonius and 
Epictetus were representative of all Stoic sexual ethics from Zeno on down. However, it 
has been shown that the sexual ethics of early Stoics, though having obvious similarities 
to later views, were less conservative. Therefore it is necessary to examine both early and 
later Stoic views of sexuality. However, before we look at the specific areas of difference 
between early and later Stoic views of sexuality, we will begin with an examination of the 
general reasoning behind both views. K. Gaca summarizes the Stoic view nicely: 
All Stoics, be they early or later, agree that people should choose to refrain 
from eros and sexual activity to the extent that eros is a passion, for passions 
in the technical Stoic sense are undesirable on several grounds. Passions, as 
‘excessive and unnatural soul impulses’, are contrary to right evaluative 
reasoning, lead to uncontrolled and unreflective actions, damage one’s well 
being, and conflict with human nature. They thereby preclude the attainment 
of right reasoning, which is the one virtue recognized by Stoicism.333 
 
 As noted above, the Stoics viewed ethical matters as the rational course of action 
judged to be appropriate in response to an impulse created by the body’s senses. Rational 
actions were judged to be good, while irrational ones were judged to be evil, and some 
actions, mostly having to do with self-preservation, were judged to be indifferent. In 
Stoic thought, the passions associated with sexuality were an indifferent, since they 
                                                          
332 See K.L. Gaca, “Early Stoic Eros: The Sexual Ethics of Zeno and Chrysippus and their Evaluation of the 
Greek Erotic Tradition.” in Aperion 33 (2000): 207-238, and G. Boys-Stones, “Eros in Government: Zeno 
and the Virtuous City” in Classical Quarterly 48/1 (1998): 168-174. 
333 Gaca, Early Stoic Eros, pp. 208-09. 
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 pertained to the preservation of the body and the species,334 but were also dangerous 
because the force that they could generate upon the soul could be inordinate, and lead the 
soul to make irrational (i.e. evil or bad) decisions. For example: 
 “Passion….according to Zeno is either a movement of the soul, irrational 
and contrary to nature, or an excessive impulse.” (Diogenes Laertius, 
Philosophoi Bioi, 7.110) 
 
 And likewise: 
 “Zeno defines passion thus: passion – what is called pathos (paqoj) – is an 
emotion which is separate from reason and contrary to nature that is produced 
in the soul.”(Cicero, Tusc. Disp., 4.5.11) 
 
The impulse created by the body’s sensation of physical arousal in turn creates an 
“excessive” impulse, one that is contrary to the nature of the soul (i.e. irrational). The 
excessive nature of the impulse can then have the potential to mislead the rational 
mechanisms of the soul. Note here that the Stoics are similar to Platonists in that the 
impulses of the passions do not overpower the soul but create a false judgment by the soul 
about what is real and true.335 
 As an indifferent with the potential for creating false judgments, the passions are 
handled with care by the Stoics, but not with the same level of concern as one finds in the 
metaphysical circles. An appropriate level of a)diafora is required of the Stoic sage, 
placing an acceptable distance between the soul and the impulses of the body. In this 
regard, it is a matter of judging the right time and amount of sexual activity in order that 
passionate impulses do not create false judgments that might lead a person into vice, or 
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 worse, into an evil action.336 Engaging in sexual activity is not inherently right or wrong 
depending upon the action, but can be right or wrong depending upon the judgment made 
by the soul. If the soul has falsely judged an activity as good, then it is obviously to be 
avoided. In addition, for the Stoics the soul can be trained to be more rational and to 
reason better concerning the impulses of the senses.337 For the Stoic, the rational nature 
of the soul was infinitely superior to the impulses of the senses, and with the proper 
training anyone could achieve a level of self-mastery (e)gkrateia) that could eve
judge rightly concerning the passions. Consequently, the Stoic never completely avoids 
sexual activity, but refrains from it to a degree that will ensure that the soul is capable 
the appropriate adiafora required to keep the passions in chec
n 
of 
k. 
                                                          
 The difference between earlier and later Stoic views of sexuality is basically 
political. In the view of earlier Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus, the political 
organization of the ideal city-state was represented as an association of virtuous (i.e. 
rational) citizens who lived in mutual friendship and benefit. What is unique about the 
Stoic City is that Zeno envisioned it as a place where marriage did not exist, and 
indicated that the patron deity of the city was Eros. Athenaeus reports: 
Pontianus said that Zeno of Citium took Eros to be the god of love and 
freedom, and even the provider of concord, but nothing else. This is why he 
said in his Republic that Eros was the god who contributed to the safety of 
the city. (Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, 561d) 
 
It seems that the early Stoics viewed Eros not as a god of passion but as a cosmological 
deity that was rich in fire, reason and harmony.338 The harmony of the city-state was in 
336 For an excellent survey of the more technical aspects of Stoic logic on achieving the appropriate 
“indifference” to the passions see M. Nussbaum’s article “The Stoics and the Extirpation of the Passions” 
in Apieron 20 (1987): 129-177. 
337 See K. Campbell’s “Self-Mastery and Stoic Ethics” in Philosophy 60 (1985): 327-340. 
338 Boys-Stones explains that there were two separate traditions concerning the identity of Eros, one 
cosmological and the other the more popular conception of Eros as a god of uncontrolled passions. The 
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 the hands of Eros, whose nature was the fire of the cosmos, and similarly rational and 
beautiful. In addition, Plutarch tells us “Zeno, among others, reckoned that the happiness 
of the whole city, like the happiness in the life of a single man, comes from virtue and 
harmony with itself.” (Lycurgus 31, 59A) If a man is virtuous by living in freedom 
according to nature, then so too must the city-state. As such, the inhabitants of the Stoic 
City would be guided by reason and live in a harmony with themselves. They must live in 
a state where the freedom of their reason is never thwarted or threatened, while 
encouraging the harmony of friendship and mutual benefit. 
 Practically, this meant that the early Stoics were able to eliminate marriage as the 
only proper moral realm for sexual activity. The jealousies and passions aroused by the 
possessive nature of marriage relationships would be harmful to the city-state, and the 
rational members of the Stoic Republic would freely engage in intercourse for the 
purpose of reproduction, without forming couple relationships. Diogenes reports: 
It is also their doctrine that amongst the wise there should be a community of 
wives with free choice of partners, as Zeno says in his Republic and 
Chrysippus in his treatise On Government (and not only they, but also 
Diogenes the Cynic and Plato). Under such circumstances we shall feel 
paternal affection for all children alike, and there will be an end of the 
jealousies arising from adultery.” (Diogenes Laertius, Philosophoi Bioi, 
7.131) 
 
In addition, like Plato, Zeno and the Stoics saw homoerotic relationships between older 
and younger males (as well as females) in a pedagogical light.339 However, unlike the 
ideal relationships of Plato, those of the Stoics were supposed to be devoid of sexual 
passion and focused upon the freedom found in beauty as a first step toward teaching the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
early Stoics obviously considered the cosmological tradition more accurate and felt that Eros was 
representative of the fire that bound the cosmos together. As such, he would be the ideal deity for the Stoic 
city; his beauty, fire and reason would be the inspiration for the behaviour of the inhabitants and it is easy 
to see why Zeno would suggest the safety of the city was in Eros’ hands. See Eros in Government, pp. 170-
72. 
339 Boys-Stones, Eros in Government, p.169. 
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 citizens of the Stoic state the rudiments of harmony and friendship. For the early Stoics, 
then, sexual relations were appropriate in a much wider scope, so long as those actions 
were pursued for reproduction or as a means to solidify harmony and friendship. 
 Later Stoics, however, tend to be much more conservative in their sexual ethics. 
Any sense of the earlier ideal freedom of the Stoic City has disappeared altogether. By 
the time of the Caesars, the only concern remained the general Stoic avoidance of passion 
and the single proper realm for sexual activity was within marriage. The shift probably 
occurred because most of the later Stoics were Romans, and being Roman, they were 
influenced by the Roman spirit which was both practical and open to a syncretistic 
approach to philosophy and politics.340 As such, Roman ethical concerns, as well as the 
views of Plato and Aristotle, influenced Stoic views of sexuality, and a shift occurred 
wherein human nature was no longer viewed as communal, but adapted to live in pairs.341 
Hierocles writes, “Nature has made us not only gregarious but also disposed to live in 
pairs.”342 Musonius, too, writes “For what other reason [than marriage] did the demiurge 
cut apart our race and make two sets of genitals, male and female, and instill a strong 
desire and longing for association and common relationship with one another?”343 In 
short, the great Stoic value of living according to nature had been blended with the more 
Roman ideal of family and marriage as the bastion of the city-state. 
 In practice, this meant that later Stoic sexual ethics condemned sexual activity 
outside of marriage, because it was contrary to the nature of man to form community in 
pairs. Moreover, it stressed the formation of a marriage bond as the ideal form of 
                                                          
340 Reale, Volume  IV, p. 54.  
341 Gaca, Making of Fornication, pp. 82-83. 
342 Stobeaus, Anthology, 4.502.15-19. 
343 Musonius, Treatises and Fragments, 92.8-17. Notice the assimilation of Plato’s explanation of how the 
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 friendship, and proclaimed marriage as a key stage in the formation of virtue in the 
individual.344 Now, it was the unmarried male who was a danger to the community, for he 
had neither achieved personal virtue, nor participated in the preservation of the city-state. 
He had failed to reason properly, and had failed to do his duty, endangering the very 
survival of city and race. Musonius writes, “The man who does away with the human 
institution of marriage does away with the home, does away with the city, and does away 
with the entire human race.”345 Although Stoics such as Epictetus and Seneca were 
willing to say that, on rare occasions, a single individual might rise above even the 
passions of marriage to be single,346 this concern for the well-being of the state 
dominated later Stoic thought on sexual behaviour. To engage in sexual behaviour outside 
of marriage was both irrational and contrary to the nature of man.  
 Stoic sexual ethics, then, are marked by an avoidance of or indifference to 
(a)diafora) the passionate impulses of the senses. The soul’s ability to judge wisely 
(i.e. rationally) concerning those impulses determines the appropriateness of a particular 
sexual action. In early Stoic values, if sexual activity was performed in the pursuit of 
either a harmonious friendship or a pedagogical relationship, that activity was considered 
appropriate and good. Only when that activity had crossed into a false understanding of 
the passions as good would sexual intercourse then need to be avoided. Later Stoic views 
take on Roman, Aristotelian and Platonic values and restrict the natural functions of 
sexual activity to marriage.  Indeed, wisdom in regard to sex is the reasoned acceptance 
of duty for the sake of the city-state, where all individuals were expected to pair off and 
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345 Musonius, Treatises and Fragments, 92.35-36. 
346 Epictetus argues that the miseries associated with having a family, such as sickness, disagreements, 
death, and so on, should also be avoided by the Stoic sage. See Epictetus, Discourses I, xi.  
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 reproduce. All other sexual activity in later Stoic thought was contrary to human nature 
and the good of the community. 
C. Epicurean Philosophy 
 Along with the Stoics, the other main materialist school of thought in the ancient 
academy was the Epicureans. Founded upon the thought of Epicurus (341-270 BCE), this 
school is famous for its “hedonistic” outlook on life, and equally as famous for the great 
scorn levelled at it by contemporaries.347 That scorn, although expressed in slanderous 
accounts of Epicurus’ “hedonism”, is actually based upon the fact that Epicurean 
philosophy is founded upon a reversal of ontological method, and upon the rejection of 
the polis oriented social ethos of the period. In essence, Epicurus’ philosophy is an 
individualist system of thought, and his ethical concerns are similar to the “situational 
ethics” one might find in the modern era. 
Epistemology 
 It is well known that prior to becoming a philosopher Epicurus’ life was marked 
by difficult health, family financial difficulties and social alienation.348 Due to financial 
hard times, his family had been forced to take on the status of colonial settlers on the 
island of Samos, an Athenian colony. The resulting “outsettler” status meant a 
considerable decrease in citizen rights, as well as additional social stigma that lowered 
the social status of a once important Athenian family. In addition, upon the defeat of 
Athens at the hands of the Macedonians, he and his family were forced into a refugee-like 
state of exile, with Athens offering no help to its “second class” citizens. The former 
                                                          
347 In his biography of Epicurus, Diogenes Laertius reports that many had slandered Epicurus as a sensual 
man with a penchant for over-indulgence. In general, there seemed to be no middle ground concerning 
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Philosophoi Bio., X.  
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 democracy, which existed under Athenian tutelage, now became a Macedonian oligarchy, 
where Epicurus’ few rights had now been obliterated. This series of unfortunate events 
led the young Epicurus to dismiss the polis-oriented ethos of politics and ethics as 
obviously unsuccessful and unjust. Also influenced by a seemingly unending series of 
health issues, Epicurus abandoned the ethical systems of his contemporaries that focused 
on virtue as a means to protect and preserve the polis in favour of an ethical system that 
would be more just in alleviating his suffering as an individual. 
 That being said, ethics becomes the starting place of Epicurean thought.349 
Happiness (eu0daimonia), the goal reached in other views through living in 
accordance with nature, and described differently according to cosmology, is essentially 
for Epicurus the avoidance of pain. Epicurus experienced the sensation of pain, both 
physical and mental, and from that sensation Epicurus draws an epistemological 
conclusion, which, in turn, leads him down cosmological and ontological paths as a 
secondary result. In his view, the sensations of the body give the truest knowledge of 
reality: 
Every sensation, he [Epicurus]) says, is a rational and does not participate in 
memory; it is not produced from itself, nor is it produced from some other 
thing, nor is it capable of adding or subtracting anything from. Nor is there 
anything which can refute sensation: an homogenous sensation can not be 
refuted by another, because both have the same validity; nor can a 
heterogeneous one, because the objects judged are not the same; nor again 
can reason refute them, because all reasoning depends on sensation; nor 
finally can one sensation refute another, because we attend to all equally. It is 
only the fact that sensations are something existent which guarantees the 
veracity of the senses. It is a real fact that we see and hear, just as is the 
reality of feeling pain. (Diogenes Laertius, Philosoph. Biol., X. 31ff.) 
 
Indeed, all philosophy should be driven, at least in his mind, by the ethical concern of 
achieving eu0daimonia and bent upon avoiding pain. “Vain is the word of a 
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 philosopher,” Epicurus writes, “that does not heal any human suffering; for just as there is 
no benefit in medicine if it does not expel diseases from the body, so there is no benefit in 
philosophy if it does not expel suffering from the soul.”350 With this epistemological leap 
taken, Epicurus proceeds to build his cosmology and ontology from the inside out. 
Cosmology 
 If the sensible is the epistemological starting point for Epicurus, it is a logical step 
for him to say that only what is sensible is real. And if only what is sensible is real, then 
there can be nothing real that cannot be sensed. Hence, like the Stoics, Epicurus rejects 
completely any notion of the metaphysical; everything that is real is matter, and the 
supersensible realities of Plato’s Forms, the Pythagorean One, and Aristotle’s Mind are 
categorically rejected. However, the starting point of Epicurus’ physics is not Heraclitus 
(as with the Stoics), but Democritus and Parmenides, who were pre-Socratic Atomists.  
The Atomist position was that physical reality was made up of indivisible units (atoms) 
that could vary in shape, size and weight, but were only visible in conglomerates and 
compounds that were the sensible building blocks of the universe. Epicurus adopted a 
similar position, with only a slight alteration of allowing void to exist, as well as 
atoms.351 For him, everything that was real was made up of atoms that could be sensed 
through the body and interpreted by the soul, which was material as well. In this respe
there is definitely a cross over with Stoic thought, though the two schools tende
vehemently opposed to one another. 
ct, 
d to be 
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as ontologically superior to the rational interpretation of the mind. Whereas the Stoics 
350 Epicurus, Fragments, Frag. 221. 
351 Reale, Volume III, pp. 140-41. 
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 saw sensation as a source of impulses that needed to be judged by the mind, Epicurus 
argues that the very nature of a sensation’s pleasure or pain is the truest indication of its 
veracity and appropriateness.  For Epicurus, feelings of pain and pleasure were simply 
sensations that were in accordance with nature (pleasure) or against it (pain): 
We say that pleasure is a principle and goal of living happily. We consider it 
in fact as a primary good which is connatural to us, and from it we move in 
the taking of any position of choice or of its rejection, and to it we return 
again judging every good on the basis of the criterion of affection. (Epicurus, 
Letter to Menoeceus, 128ff.) 
 
The Stoics found such claims to be illogical and, indeed, Epicurus was very dogmatic in 
his assertions concerning the veracity of sensation. He would only admit that a false 
judgment occurs because of a false opinion (i.e. claiming knowledge without sensation), 
poor reasoning concerning multiple experiences of the same sensation, or simply that the 
atoms which had originated352 from an object had been altered in their motion towards 
the sensing being. To Epicurus, sensations are always, every one of them, true without 
exception. Cicero comments: “To such a point does Epicurus reach that, he says, if one 
sensation for one time in a lifetime were to induce error, there would be no possibility of 
giving credence to any sensation.”353 
 For Epicurus the soul is material, but a blend of rational and irrational ellements. 
It is made up of fiery, windy and gaseous kinds of atoms that are the irrational 
(a)logoj) part of the soul, as well as an unnamed, unspecified sort of atom which 
makes up the rational part.  
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 Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings, we must recognize 
generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles 
(atoms), dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an 
admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in some respects like heat. But 
again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in fineness of its 
particles and thereby keeps closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is 
shown by the metal faculties and feelings, by ease with which the mind 
moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes 
death. (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 63) 
 
Like the Stoics, Epicurus has adopted a tripartite psychology of the soul, but he has 
further made the rational atoms of the soul an indescribable sort of unit that is 
unfortunately never explained clearly, and naturally incurs a variety of criticisms from 
opponents.354 However, Epicurus is quite clear that upon death this unnamed substance, 
along with all the atoms that make up the irrational and framing parts of the soul, are 
dispersed, to be reformed later into a new substance. Hence, this is one more element of 
Epicurus’ thought – the mortality of the soul – that leads his ethical stance to be 
concerned with the present existence of the person. With the breakdown of the body and 
soul into its constituent atoms, and the corresponding dissolution of the consciousness of 
the person, there is simply nothing to worry about beyond death. “Death is nothing for 
us,” he writes, “for what has dissolved has no sensation, what has no sensation is nothing 
to us.”355 
Epicurean Ethics 
 As stated earlier, the core of Epicurean thought is a concern for ethics rooted in 
the experience of the individual. Unlike other philosophies, Epicurean thought does not 
take its ethical cues from its cosmology, but forms its cosmology from its ethics. 
                                                          
354 Plutarch notes with scorn that “The part with which the soul judges, remembers, loves, hates, in general 
the thinking part or reason, [the Epicureans] say in fact is composed of a substance without a name. And we 
know this nameless substance is nothing other except a confession of shameless ignorance, based on the 
fact that it does not know how to name what it does not succeed in comprehending.” (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 
20.1118d) 
355 Epicurus, Kuriai Doxaii, II. 
164 
 Consequently, for Epicurus and his followers, the material and atomistic nature of reality 
did not inspire its ethics. Rather, it was the conviction that sensations are the clearest 
indicator of truth that led to Epicurus’ famous hedonistic ethics. As touched on above, to 
Epicurus the pain or pleasure a person senses is an indication of whether or not that 
person is living in accordance with nature. Cicero comments on Epicurus: 
This he [Epicurus] sets out to prove as follows: every animal, as soon as it 
is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the chief good, while it 
recoils from pain as the chief evil and so far as possible avoids it. This it 
does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of nature’s own 
unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any 
necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and 
pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as 
that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things which need 
to be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention 
to them…. Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows 
that nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or 
contrary to nature. What does nature perceive or what does judge of, 
besides pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and avoidance? 
(Cicero, De finibus, 1.9.30) 
 
If someone experiences pain, which includes all aspects of mental or emotional pain as 
well as the physical, that person is not living according to nature. If that same person 
experiences pleasure, again mentally and emotionally in addition to the physical, that 
person is living according to nature, and in tune with the way they ought to be. The 
concerns of Epicurean ethics, then, are centered on the avoidance of pain, which is evil, 
and the attainment of pleasure, which is good and the means to happiness 
(eu0daimonia). 
 At first glance, this sort of approach would seem to be an indulgent rationalization 
of sensuality, and Epicurus’ opponents certainly worked hard to portray him in that light; 
but Epicurus’ conception of “pleasure” is far from a concern for the pursuit of sensual 
delight. For Epicurus, pleasure (h(donh) is actually a term denoting the absence of pain 
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 and the general sense of satisfaction one experiences when the natural needs of body and 
soul are filled. Epicurus explains in his Letter to Menoeceus: 
 
Whenever we say, then, that pleasure is the telos, we do not mean the 
pleasures of profligates and those consisting in sensual enjoyment, as is 
supposed by some who are ignorant of our teachings or who disagree or 
misinterpret them, but by pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the 
body and of disturbance in the soul. (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 131) 
 
 Or again: 
He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct 
every preference and aversion towards securing health of body and 
tranquility of mind, seeing that this is the end of a blessed life. For the end 
of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and when once we have 
attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living 
creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to 
look for anything else by which the good of the body and the soul will be 
fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, 
and only then, do we feel the need for pleasure. (Epicurus, Letter to 
Menoeceus, 128) 
 
Epicurus, then, argues that ethics are a matter of avoiding things which cause pain and 
doing what is appropriate in order to achieve the “pleasure” of having one’s natural needs 
filled, and anything beyond need is simply excess.  
 Epicurus’ first concern, then, lies in the avoidance of pain (a)ponia). Most 
importantly, the mental and emotional pains of life are more disturbing to the soul than 
the physical ones. For Epicurus, the fears and negative emotions associated with life are 
to be avoided, and a state of autarcheia (au)tarkeia) - “untroubledness” or 
“tranquility” - is the goal of that avoidance. As such, Epicurus was opposed to, for 
example, the popular conceptions of the gods or fate, which instilled great fear and 
anxiety in people.356 Similarly, in Epicurus’ view any element of life that caused pain 
should be eliminated, especially life within the polis, for political life was entirely 
                                                          
356 Reale, Volume III, pp. 154-55. 
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 unnatural.357 Instead of preserving happiness (eu0daimonia), political life causes 
immense suffering through violence, stress, economic deprivation and war. In addition, 
men of the polis seek fame, power and honour, which are not necessary items for natural 
existence. The result of all this is that Epicureans placed more value upon the individual 
life and they sought to “live hidden” as Epicurus encouraged: “We must release ourselves 
in good time from the prison of our daily concerns and politics.”358 He also states, “The 
time when you should most of all withdraw into yourself is when you are forced to be in 
a crowd.”359 On the whole, Epicureans sought to live individually, freeing their life from 
all sources of pain (a)ponia) and suffering to achieve a state of autarcheia. 
 The other element to Epicurus’ search for happiness (eu0daimonia) was the 
embrace of pleasure as the provision of an individual’s natural needs. As such, he divided 
all things into three categories: 1) Things that are both natural and necessary, 2) Things 
that are natural, but unnecessary, and 3) Things that are both unnatural and unnecessary. 
Into the first category Epicurus placed only those things that are necessary to the body, 
such as food, drink and sleep. Into the second category he placed things that a person 
might do naturally, but are not necessary for survival, such as sexual intercourse, friendly 
associations, or a natural action whose extent was unnecessary (i.e. eating nice foods, or 
having beautiful clothing). Finally, into the third category he placed such things as 
wealth, honour, power and all vain instances of human pursuits. Basically, Epicurus felt 
that only the pursuit of what was natural was needed, and unnecessary things (if they are 
natural) should be pursued only if they do not cause more pain in the pursuit of them. The 
natural result of this was a situation where Epicureans would seek only to pursue 
                                                          
357 Reale, Volume III, pp. 176-77. 
358 Epicurus, Sententiae Vaticanae, 58. 
359 Seneca quoting Epicurus. Seneca, Epistles, 25.6. 
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 activities that were natural and unharmful. “My body exalts,” Epicurus writes, “in living 
delicately on bread and water and it rejects the pleasures of luxury, not in themselves, but 
in the trouble that follows upon them.”360 
 Moreover, Epicurus believed that pleasure had a finite limit; the needs of an 
individual could not be filled more than what was needed, and neither time nor quantity 
could increase pleasure beyond the feeling of general satisfaction at satiation of need.361 
In addition, how could pleasure be increased once pain had ceased? For Epicurus, this 
means that there is no rational reason why a person might pursue the sensual appetites 
since once the natural need is satiated, no more happiness can be achieved through 
excess. To those who would argue that his hedonistic theory provides opportunity for 
debauchery, Epicurus would reply: 
We must not violate nature, but obey her; and we shall obey her if we 
fulfill the necessary desires and also the physical, if they bring no harm to 
us, but sternly reject the harmful. (Epicurus, Principle Doctrines, 24) 
 
An action is only valid if it fulfills a natural need, and does not produce further pain and 
suffering. For example, Epicurus says “No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, 
and it is well if he be not the worse!”362It is clear that for Epicurus, many actions may be 
natural, but if pursued in excess they will cause more harm than good.  
 The main concern for Epicurean ethics, then, is basically prudence. All ethical 
behaviour is essentially the process of discernment wherein the individual reasons 
whether a particular action is both natural and unharmful. “It is,” Epicurus says, 
by measuring against another, and by looking at conveniences and 
inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat 
                                                          
360 Epicurus quoted in Stobeaus, Anthology, 3.17.33. 
361 Reale, Volume III, pp.171-72. 
362 Diogenes Laertius, Philosoph. Bioi, X.118. 
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 the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as good. (Epicurus, 
Letter to Menoeceus, 130) 
 
Prudence is simply the virtue of having made an appropriate decision, and only actions of 
Epicurus’ third category of pleasures (i.e. vain and unnatural ones) are inherently evil. 
Thus, a person’s pursuit of a natural action could be either good or bad depending upon 
the perceived results of the action. G.K. Strodach describes this ethical stance in action: 
A young couple, deeply in love, are unable to marry because of financial 
obstacles. They decide nevertheless to enjoy premarital intercourse for the 
two or three-year period before they marry. Is this act moral or immoral 
[according to Epicurus]? Again, there are alternatives: a) The couple may 
wish to enjoy each other sexually but be severely inhibited by feelings of 
guilt traceable in the one case to a frigid mother and in the other to a 
tyrannical father. Their pleasure has a deep overlay of pain, and the act is 
consequently immoral. b) The couple may have no feelings of guilt, and 
their sex pleasure may be unadulterated; furthermore, their tensions are 
successfully relieved by this periodic indulgence. They later marry and 
live happily ever after. In this case the act is clearly moral. c) If this couple 
does not marry, because they tire of each other after two years, their later 
sex life may be rendered unstable and promiscuous, with the result that 
each may have two marriages and two divorces. These later painful 
consequences may be traceable to the early affair. Once again, the long 
term effects must be viewed before any ethical judgment can be arrived 
at.363  
 
In short, Epicurean ethics are similar to modern situational ethics where the result of the 
action is the foundation of a moral judgment. This allowed Epicureans to judge each 
action according to the standards of pain and pleasure instead of on the basis of other 
cosmological considerations. For Epicurus, wisdom (fronhsij) is strictly instrumental. 
 In regard to sexual conduct, Epicureans tended to be practical but not constrained 
by societal boundaries. As mentioned above, Epicurus writes “No one was ever the better 
for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse!”  This clearly shows that 
Epicureans saw the inherent dangers of sexual overindulgence and accordingly rejected it 
                                                          
363 G.K. Strodach, The Philosophy of Epicurus (Chicago: Northwestern University press, 1963), pp. 74-75. 
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 as harmful, though obviously natural. However, since Epicureans had rejected the polis-
oriented ethos of their contemporaries, they felt much freer to engage in sexual activities 
outside of marriage, so long as it was not harmful. Thus, the Garden364 was known to 
have had periodic symposia where married and unmarried partners among the inner circle 
were swapped in free intercourse.365 The logic behind this was that if no one took 
offense, there was no harm, and therefore the act was not immoral. While this produ
fits among other schools of philosophy, especially the Stoics, Epicureans found this to 
perfectly acceptable behaviour, and would only avoid it if someone in their own circle 
was harmed or offended.  
ced 
be 
                                                          
 The picture of sexual ethics amongst the Epicureans, then, is one of practical 
autarcheia. Sexual intercourse is natural, but not necessary, and should therefore be 
engaged in according to the rule of aponia, or avoidance of pain. Could a sexual act be 
performed without the obvious troubles of over-indulgence or pain of broken 
relationship? If it was, it was moral. If there was over-indulgence or harm done, then it 
was clearly immoral. In this regard, other than having little respect for acceptable social 
boundaries, Epicureans were indulgent, but not too indulgent. They freely engaged in 
casual sexual intercourse and it obviously did not carry the same sort of stigma for them 
that it did in other philosophical circles. Ultimately, Epicurean views,366 which showed 
364 The Garden was the nickname given to the Epicurean school of philosophy, as well as the literal location 
where the followers of Epicurus gathered in Athens. When Epicurus settled in Athens, he experienced some 
difficulty in finding a location to teach and live out his individualistic lifestyle. Seeking a place of isolation 
and quiet he settled upon a garden in a remote area in the city, where his followers soon began to gather in 
order to learn and form a community.  
365 See Bryant, Moral Codes, p. 411. 
366 It is important to note here that Epicurean views of sex were remarkably uniform with Epicurus himself 
through to the end of the Empire. For a survey of Lucretius’ strict adherence to Epicurean views see B. 
Arkins article “Beyond Obsession and Lust: Lucretius’ Geneology of Love”Apeiron 22 (1989), 1-59. 
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 no concern for procreation or metaphysical reality, were free to approach sexuality from a 
very simplified and practical point of view of prudence in all things, including sex. 
IV. Conclusion 
 It is clear that the philosophical outlook on sexuality in the Roman period was 
well-reasoned and stood in continuity with the Hellenistic systems of previous 
generations. Both the metaphysical and materialist schools had elaborate and well- 
reasoned ethical motivations that were strongly linked to the cosmological and 
teleological perspectives of their philosophies. On the one hand, the metaphysical schools 
of the Platonists, Pythagoreans and Neo-Platonists show a clear concern for harmony and 
union with the higher metaphysical realities that are at the core of the universe. For them, 
the natural desire found in the soul can be misled, and not only fool a person into 
irrational and harmful behaviour in the present existence, but can also derail the soul’s 
ascent back to its metaphysical source, which is its truest happiness (eu0daimonia). 
Sexual activity must, then, be curbed under firm restrictions that limit exposure primarily 
to the natural function of reproduction within the bonds of marriage. The extent to which 
it was limited varied depending upon the ontological status granted to the material world 
(e.g. a distraction vs. an evil), but the metaphysical schools all converge in that they 
tended to exhibit a more intense rhetoric of sexual austerity that generated fervent moral 
condemnation upon those who overindulged.  
 On the other hand, the materialist schools of Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean 
thought rejected the notion of metaphysical causality in the universe. By embracing a 
materialist orientation to the universe, they argued that the happiness (eu0daimonia) 
of both individual and community lay in living according to nature. For Aristotle and the 
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 Stoics, life according to nature was living according to rational principles, while for 
Epicureans, life according to nature meant living free of pain and suffering. In all three 
cases, the emphasis was upon happiness in the present existence with the rational faculty 
of the soul being superior to the desiring faculty. Reason and rationality, when properly 
trained, would then free the individual to make proper decisions regarding sexual activity. 
In general, Aristotelians and Stoics would argue for communally oriented ethics, where 
sexual activity was possibly a danger to the individual’s pursuit of virtue and the harmony 
of the community. Consequently, for them, sexual activity should be limited to the natural 
function of reproduction, and clearly kept within the bounds of marriage. The Epicureans, 
too, resisted the notion of overindulgence, but were driven by their individualist 
hedonistic epistemology that freed them from the conventional social boundary of 
marriage. Although they would never encourage overindulgence because of its inherent 
pain-generating potential, they were nonetheless free to engage in casual sexual 
intercourse, and judge all sexual actions on a situational basis. 
 On the whole, then, the philosophical views of the Roman world were primarily 
concerned with over-indulgence. All schools saw the inherent danger of sexual desire and 
placed precautionary boundaries, varying in degree depending upon cosmological 
outlook, in order to prevent any harm from befalling the individual or community. 
However, it is also clear, despite the regular use of strong rhetoric, that sexual desire was 
not inherently wrong or immoral. It was, instead, a dangerous thing that needed to be 
monitored and controlled for the sake of the soul’s health, as it had the potential to deflect 
the soul from the ultimate goal of happiness (eu0daimonia). To keep that danger from 
becoming real, the general rule of the philosophers was to limit sexual activity to the 
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 realm of its natural function, again in varying degrees. Practically this meant, with a few 
well-reasoned exceptions (e.g. Platonic/Early Stoic ideal city-states or pedagogical erotic 
relations), sexual intercourse was limited ideally to marriage, but never completely 
avoided for the sake of one’s health. It was really only in the extent to which a school 
might be lenient that we find any real disagreement. Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists and 
later Stoics would be firm in their marriage-oriented procreationist stance, while 
Platonists, Aristotelians, early Stoics and Epicureans would allow more room, if still 
highly controlled, for erotic activity outside of marriage, and for the sake of enjoyment.  
 It remains, then, for the next chapter of this thesis to compare the rationale of 
sexual ethics in Greco-Roman philosophy with the early Christian rationale behind their 
engagement in celibacy. It will be important in that study to ensure that both the 
cosmological and teleological views of Christianity be examined in relation to their views 
of sexual desire. For despite the obvious use of similar philosophical terms and language 
(e)piqumia, h(donh, swfrosunh, e)gkrateia, au)tarkeia) by 
Christian thinkers of the third, fourth and fifth centuries, it must be recognized that the 
cosmological and teleological considerations of Christian theology will influence their 
use in the same way that those considerations did for the individual schools of Greco-
Roman philosophy. In order to answer why it is that Greek and Roman Christians (who 
would likely have agreed with philosophical warning against over-indulgence) would 
shift in their views of sexual desire to the point where complete (or nearly complete) 
renunciation becomes the ideal, we must take seriously the apparent fact that something 
about Christian thought uniquely altered the cultural view of sexuality. In this respect, the 
next task will be to contrast Christian reasoning with the reasoning of ancient philosophy. 
173 
 The differences, I think, will highlight the sources and motivations of Christianity more 
distinctly.  
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 Chapter Four - The Transformation of Human Nature: Theological Motives for 
Early Christian Celibacy 
I.  Introduction 
 Now that the extent of celibacy prior to the middle of the third century has been 
demonstrated and the cultural perspectives on sexuality in the Greco-Roman world have 
been explored, we can now turn to an exploration of the motivations behind early 
Christian celibacy.  Essentially, the key to understanding the motivations behind the 
earliest Christian celibacy is to be found, not in viewing celibacy through the theoretical 
lenses of social theory, but in comparing it to the broader theological and philosophical 
perspectives of both the early Christian community and the culture in which it existed.  
As was explored in chapter one, for many recent scholars, the crux of the issue of 
asceticism in the early church seems to rest in understanding the extent to which early 
Christianity either resisted or depended upon the broader culture in the development of its 
identity.  In that regard, some scholars see in early Christian celibacy resistance to Roman 
culture and social structures, while others see early Christianity adapting the 
philosophical and moral perspectives of the broader culture.  However, though giving 
insight into possible social consequences of ascetic practice, and showing the 
interdependence ascetic practice often has with culture, both theories have inherent 
weaknesses that prevent a better understanding of asceticism’s motivations.  In both 
cases, the weak link lies in a false assumption that connects correlation and compatibility 
with causality. 
 Social theory, for example, assumes the need for agents of social resistance and 
change, but incorrectly assumes that asceticism’s compatibility as an agent of social 
change is its defining characteristic.  However, many practices and institutions are 
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 compatible with forces which redistribute social power, but that does not by definition 
establish the capability of effecting social change as the motivation behind ascetic 
behaviour.  Similarly, some scholars, who argue that early Christian asceticism shows 
dependence upon philosophical or medical models of the Greco Roman culture, assume 
that the compatibility of early Christian celibacy with the broader cultural perspectives on 
sexuality indicates a borrowing of ideals from that culture as a source of its motivation.  
However, simple compatibility with ideals of the culture does not indicate historical 
dependency, or attempt a more sensitive understanding of how early Christian celibacy 
was related to Greco-Roman sexuality.  In contrast to such views, the goal of this chapter 
is to demonstrate how early Christian celibacy relates to Greco-Roman sexuality without 
placing it under the constraints of social theory or arguing for an indemonstrable or 
oversimplified dependency.  In addition, assuming the redefinition of asceticism as an 
elite practice within a given religious tradition, this chapter will attempt to understand the 
ideal of early Christian celibacy as it relates to broader early Christian perspectives on 
sexuality. 
 To begin, it must be noted that if early Christian celibacy and Greco-Roman 
philosophical perspectives on sexuality are compared, an immediate difference can be 
detected.  As was demonstrated in chapter three, Greco-Roman perspectives on sexuality 
regarded sexual intercourse as a natural but dangerous activity due to the possibility of 
the soul being misled or overcome by its connection with the body.  Consequently, 
depending upon how their cosmological views understood human nature (e.g. material or 
metaphysical), the majority of ancient philosophical schools encouraged sexual austerity 
as a virtue, and largely recommended sexual intercourse only for the sake of reproduction 
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 while placing strict controls on sexual behaviour engaged in for other purposes (i.e. 
pleasure).  However, despite the fact that early Christianity and Greco-Roman philosophy 
shared the view that sex was intended for procreation, and that both placed strict controls 
upon sexual intercourse, with few exceptions,367 the Greco-Roman world did not 
encourage abstinence as a viable solution to the dangers of sexual activity.  Indeed, only 
if medical concerns dictated should a person avoid sex completely,368 and, if not 
medically necessary, only the most mature and wise of philosophers were capable of 
successfully disengaging their sexual drives for the sake of achieving the virtue of true 
philosophy.369  Desire (epithumia) was part of the natural functions built into the body 
and soul, and for both the materialist and metaphysical schools of thought, to avoid desire 
and sexual activity altogether was to engage in a very unnatural existence.  Sexual 
intercourse, and its accompanying desires, could only be controlled and the responsible 
                                                          
367 For example, the first century Pythagorean philosopher Apollonius of Tyana was said to have been one 
of the few who had mastered his passions completely. The author of his biography, Philostratus, records 
“And as Pythagoras was commended for his saying that "a man should have no intercourse except with his 
own wife," he [Apollonius] declared that this was intended by Pythagoras for others than himself, for that 
he was resolved never to wed nor have any connexion whatever with women. In laying such restraint on 
himself he surpassed Sophocles, who only said that in reaching old age he had escaped from a mad and 
cruel master; but Apollonius by dint of virtue and temperance never even in his youth was so overcome. 
While still a mere stripling, in full enjoyment of his bodily vigour, he mastered and gained control of the 
maddening passion.” Life of Apollonius, I. 13. In addition, a number of Olympian athletes were known to 
have abstained from sexual intercourse as part of their training. Their aim, it seems, was to keep their vital 
energies contained in the body, and sexual intercourse would have been a waste of such energy. See Plato, 
Republic, IX, 591c-d.  
368 According to ancient Greek medical knowledge, both over-indulgence and under-indulgence of sexual 
intercourse could cause physical illnesses of all sorts. In the case of under-indulgence, the danger was 
rooted in the unrelieved build up of “heats” or “vital energies” in the body that then caused forms of 
madness or physical problems. Plato, for example, notes that according to doctors of his age, too much heat 
brought on fever, too much air resulted in bubbles forming in the blood, which in turn formed phlegm and 
bile, too little water, of course, results in acidic and saline phlegm. (Timaeus, 82-87). In these cases, a 
harmless “venting” was suggested through some appropriate form of intercourse. Other diseases, however, 
such as problems with the gall bladder or blood circulation sometimes required short periods of abstinence 
in order to let the body regain its balance of energies. For a fuller discussion see M. Foucault, The History 
of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, Vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 97-139.   
369 For example, the Socrates of Plato’s Symposium was one of the few well known for his self-control, 
which was so extreme that he even turned down the propositions of the handsome Alcibiades (Symposium 
217a-219e) and remained sexually abstinent except to bear children.  
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 individual accepted the duty to place firm boundaries upon body and soul, both for the 
sake of individual virtue and for social benefit. 
 Yet, in early Christian practice, there was a similar point of view that produced a 
significantly different ideal in regard to sexual intercourse.  Indeed, early Christians also 
viewed sex as a natural function for the purpose of procreation, and placed strict controls 
on sexual behaviour rooted in pleasure.  Early Christians also felt the need to place 
controls on sexual behaviour for the sake of individual virtue, and for the sake of social 
responsibility.  Why, then, did early Christianity idealize celibacy within a culture that 
already idealized austerity, and while the majority of Christians already engaged in sexual 
austerity as well?  And why did early Christianity produce people who felt that celibacy 
could be achieved in a culture that considered it an almost completely unattainable and 
unnecessary goal? 
 First, the confusion is rooted partly in the obvious similarities between the early 
Christian position and the Greco-Roman one, and, second, in early Christianity’s 
employment of Greco-Roman sources and wisdom to justify their position.  If it is not 
assumed that correlation necessarily indicates causality, then the similarities between 
early Christian sexual concerns and those of the broader culture can be examined to 
discern a more complex relationship between them.  Consequently, when early Christians 
occasionally appealed to contemporary philosophical wisdom or cultural knowledge it 
cannot be assumed to be a wholesale adoption of Greco-Roman perspectives.  Otherwise, 
would not early Christians have simply accepted and engaged in the sexual austerity of 
their cultural counterparts, and indeed, did not the majority of early Christians do just 
that?  Rather, because some early Christians embraced sexual renunciation as an ideal 
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 practice, it would be more accurate to think that there would have been some distinctly 
Christian motivation for their embrace of celibacy.  The key to understanding that 
motivation, and how early Christians justified that shift, should be apparent from both 
early Christian speculation on celibacy and how they employed the wisdom of the culture 
to defend it.  In that respect, it would be more proper to say that early Christians did not 
adopt, but adapted, cultural perspectives according to their theological and teleological 
views. 
 Therefore, the crux of the issue is to be found in the extent to which early 
Christians adapted the broader cultural perspectives to their own.  That is, what did early 
Christians assimilate and accept from the culture? And what, and how much, did they 
change according to their own views?  And, how did they manage to adapt their views to 
each other, and with what success?  Moreover, assuming that asceticism primarily reflects 
the internal dialogues of a religious community, how did ascetics and celibates differ 
from other early Christians in their perspectives? 
II.  The Early Christian World View 
 To begin, the early Christian worldview must be examined as a starting point for 
understanding the motivations for celibacy.  In the same way that chapter three examined 
the relationship between Greco-Roman cosmological and teleological speculation, and 
how those speculations determined anthropological models and ethical considerations, 
the early Christian understanding of the origins of the universe and how they informed 
early Christian ethics must be surveyed briefly.  In particular, how much of the early 
Christian worldview was an adaptation of the Greco-Roman worldview will be explored, 
and we will attempt to discover what concepts can be considered sui generis of early 
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 Christianity.  With this in hand, early Christian perspectives on sexuality can then be 
examined more closely in preparation for looking at the motives behind celibacy.  To be 
sure, this survey must be brief out of necessity, but it will still examine the broader early 
Christian worldview as represented by the same texts that were examined in chapter two.  
As such, this survey will examine the perspectives of the New Testament, the Apostolic 
Fathers, Justin Martyr and the apologists, Irenaeus, and Clement of Alexandria.  In 
addition, this survey will highlight the minor differences in these early Christian 
perspectives, which should both show some of the diversity of thought in the early 
church, and, more importantly, give insight into some of the key issues that were at the 
heart of the ascetic motivations for the practice of celibacy. 
 Beginning with cosmology, the New Testament understanding of the origins of 
the universe is firmly rooted in its Jewish heritage.  While the Greco-Roman schools of 
philosophy saw the origins of the universe initiated by the first movement of the 
Demiurge (material schools), or as the emanations of the One true reality (metaphysical 
schools), the New Testament Christians viewed the universe, like their Jewish 
predecessors, as the creation of a divine being.  In that regard, the early Christians had a 
good deal more in common with the broader culture that did not have a systematic 
explanation for the origins of the universe but still linked the existence of the world to the 
actions and manifestations of divine beings.370 However, early Christians, of course, 
                                                          
370 However, as will be shown in this chapter, the apologists of the second century made great efforts to 
distinguish the God of early Christianity from the divine beings found in Greco-Roman mythology. The 
goal of the apologists was to preserve the notion that a divine being had created the world, but that the God 
of early Christianity was nothing like the foolish and lustful gods of the Greco-Roman world. In addition to 
joining in with the philosophers in their mockery of the gods, the apologists distance God and Christ from 
the pagan gods primarily through an association of Christ with the logos, thus personalizing the rational 
principle of the universe in Christ and providing God’s character with rational and reasonable qualities.  
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 adhered to the Jewish position of monotheism371 and considered the entirety of the 
universe, both material and metaphysical realities, to have been created by a single good 
divine being who was alone the God of the universe and separate from his creation. 
 Interestingly, in contrast to the Greeks, Judaism’s perception of the origins of the 
universe during the Second Temple period did not include much ontological speculation.  
Rather, as Lester Graabe points out, the issue of greatest concern for Judaism during the 
period when Christianity appeared was its adherence to monotheism in the polytheistic 
context of the Greek and Roman empires.372  The only innovations of cosmological 
significance in Judaism during this period were the development of a spirit world of 
intermediaries between God and the world,373 and appearance of the figure of wisdom 
(Sophia or logos)374 as a personification of God’s activity in the world.  On the one hand, 
the angelic figures of the Old Testament, who were primarily messengers and helpers of 
God, expanded their role to that of those who are responsible for the workings of the 
cosmos and performing divine tasks in the human sphere.375  In addition, these angelic 
figures took on moral traits, being portrayed as good in their obedience to God or evil in 
their rebellion against him.376  On the other hand, under what appears to be the influence 
of Hellenization, a stream of thought in Jewish cosmology emphasized the figure of 
                                                          
371 In referring to “monotheism” it is, of course, an oversimplification of the reality of Yahweh worship in 
the history of the Hebrew and Jewish people. As is clear from the Old Testament, the ability and 
determination of the Israelites and their descendents to remain totally monotheistic was less than 
exemplary, and as will be discussed shortly, the wisdom tradition of the Second Temple period often 
blurred the lines of a purely monotheistic conception of the divine at work in the cosmos. 
372 See L.Graabe, Judaic Religion in the Second Temple Period: Belief and Practice from the Exile to the 
Yavneh (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 212-15. 
373 Graabe, Judaic Religion, pp. 219-25. 
374 Graabe, Judaic Religion, pp. 225-30.  
375 Graabe, Judaic Religion, p. 224. 
376 For example, in the book of Tobit, it is the wicked spirit Asmodeus who is the source of all of Tobit’s 
problems as he kills the men Tobit has betrothed to his daughter (Tobit 3:8), while the angel Raphael is sent 
to Tobit and his daughter to heal them after their appeal to God for help (Tobit 3:16-17), and to provide a 
solution for them to defeat Asmodeus (6:16-18; 8:2-3). 
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 wisdom active in the cosmos.  The wisdom tradition found in Old Testament texts such as 
Proverbs and Job was picked up by a number of the pseudographical works and 
personified into “Lady Wisdom”, who speaks with God’s voice as a personal messenger 
from God.  Likewise, Philo’s obviously Hellenized speculations adapted the logos 
tradition from Greco-Roman philosophy and applied it to the Old Testament tradition of 
“the word of Yahweh” being given to his people.377  For Philo, the logos was the reason 
or mind of God that ordered the universe and actually bridged the gap between his 
limited creation and his unknowable nature.378  However, beyond those speculations,379 
the broader cosmological concerns of Judaism were to remain monotheistic in faith and 
worship. 
 New Testament Christianity, then, adopts similar perspectives on the origins of the 
universe, and the New Testament assumes the broader Jewish monotheistic perspective of 
a single good creator God separate from his creation.  What is more interesting is that the 
New Testament also gives indication that early Christians also accepted the cosmological 
speculations of Second Temple Judaism.  First, the presence of the spirit world is 
prevalent, with good and evil beings involved in the cosmos and human affairs.  For 
example, good angels bring the message of the messiah’s birth to Mary and others 
(Matthew and Luke) or inform the apostles of Jesus’ resurrection (Luke), or help set Peter 
free from prison (Acts).  Similarly, evil spirits possess people in the gospels and are cast 
                                                          
377 Graabe, Judaic Religion, p. 228. 
378 Graabe, Judaic Religion, p. 229. Graabe explains that for Philo, God’s people is able to know him 
through the logos, which is the first emanation from God. Philo explains that the logos then divides into 
two powers, an active power that creates the universe, and a passive royal power that communicates God’s 
glory. Thus the logos makes God known through creation and by appearing in glory, two Old Testament 
themes now adapted to middle platonic speculation.  
379 For a more in depth discussion of Second Temple Jewish speculation on divine agents in the spirit world 
and the personification of divine wisdom, see L. Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion 
and Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988). 
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 out by Jesus and his disciples, the most evil opponent of God and his people is the fallen 
angel, Satan, (Matthew), and Paul refers to Jesus’ victory over heavenly, earthly and 
subterranean beings (Phil. 2:10), or evil powers and authorities in the heavens (Col. 2:10, 
Eph. 6:12).  Second, the New Testament writers also picked up the personification of God 
working in the world through divine wisdom or logos.  The best known example, of 
course, is the gospel of John’s appropriation of the term logos in the opening chapter to 
describe the incarnation and work of Christ.  In addition, Jesus himself refers to wisdom 
personified in his sayings (Matt.11:19, Lk.11:49) with many scholars even detecting 
linguistic parallels in the gospels that are meant to echo that wisdom was now personified 
in Jesus.380  Regardless, it is clear to see that primitive Christianity adopted the broader 
monotheistic position of Judaism, as well as the innovations of Second Temple Judaism.  
 A similar situation appears to have been the case in regard to Jewish and New 
Testament concepts of human anthropology.  The origins, goals and nature of humankind 
were, of course, found in Genesis 1-3, and both ancient Israelite religion and Second 
Temple Judaism showed continued interest in those narratives. In their view, humankind 
was created “in the image of God” and placed in the world to both serve God in 
obedience and receive his blessings. In addition, when tempted to disobedience by the 
serpent, humanity rebelled against its creator and was subsequently expelled from the 
garden. Therefore, humanity was left to seek salvation through obedience to God and to 
hope for a restoration of their honoured place in creation through worship of God alone. 
In that regard, while Greeks and Romans sought the telos of happiness (eudaimonia) in 
their present existence as the most appropriate function of human nature as it had been 
                                                          
380 See G.E. Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, Revised Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), p. 
51, and B. Witherington III, Paul’s Narrative Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph, 
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 1994), p. 166. 
183 
 manifest by the universe, Jews and Christians sought to fulfill their created purpose of 
obedience and service to God.  More importantly, in the Old Testament narratives the 
telos of human existence included only a limited connection between human 
anthropology and the sin of disobedience, and as a result the nature of body and soul, and 
how they related to the cosmos, remained largely undeveloped. 
 In particular, the Jewish (and subsequent early Christian) worldview differed from 
Greco-Roman philosophical speculation in that although having an extensive narrative 
cosmology, it did not engage in much additional ontological exploration. The difference I 
wish to emphasize here is that a cosmology is a theory of the universe as a whole, its 
parts and its laws, possibly being expressed in any number of forms (e.g. philosophical 
speculation, narrative, mythology), while an ontology describes the specific existential 
nature of a thing and the causal links that are associated with that nature in regard to the 
broader cosmology. Thus a cosmology could be philosophically speculative or an 
aetiological narrative, but subsumed into each might be a whole series of ontologies 
describing the specific nature of things and how they are causally related to certain 
actions or occurrences within the cosmology. What is important to note is that Jewish 
cosmology is primarily a narrative describing human rebellion against their creator, and 
contains little ontological speculation about human nature and its relationship to human 
actions. Instead, in Jewish thought the telos of human existence is focused on simply 
aligning one’s behaviour with obedience to God, and the concepts of body and soul are 
only narrowly and imprecisely developed as limited secondary concerns of a worldview 
dominated by issues of proper worship and moral behaviour defined in relation to God. 
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  Indeed, as Graabe points out, the Old Testament does not envisage an afterlife of 
any sort, nor explain the relationship between body and soul, or develop any concept of 
material and metaphysical realities.381  There is simply God and everything else he has 
created, both earthly and heavenly, and no explanation is ever given to the nature of how 
those beings exist ontologically.  There is some minor recognition of a spirit or soul 
living within a body, and that the spirit may continue to exist in some limited form after 
the death of the body in a shadowy existence known as sheol. But far more important for 
the Old Testament was a cosmic eschatology that anticipates the “day of Yahweh” where 
individuals and peoples will be judged, and then rewarded for their obedience or 
punished for their sin.  Otherwise, the Old Testament speaks little of whether that day of 
judgement will be for an individual soul and/or body, and largely speaks in terms of the 
salvation of Israel as a unified, obedient people under the full reign of God. Graabe also 
explains that it was actually only in the post-exilic and Second Temple period of Judaism 
that the concept of an immortal soul first appears, but the many and ambiguous varieties 
of expression for this concept make it difficult to speak of a unified “Jewish” concept of 
the body and soul.382  During this period, Graabe shows, some Jewish texts refer to the 
resurrection of the body alone, some of the soul alone and some of both together.  
Likewise, some refer to resurrection into a new earthly paradise, or into a heavenly one.  
Some even refer to an “eternal” life granted to the righteous, but without any reference to 
a resurrection, and a destruction of the wicked without any mention of body or soul.  
Even texts under the influence of Hellenistic thought, such as Philo or the Wisdom of 
Solomon, simply adapt middle-platonic concepts that see death itself as a punishment 
                                                          
381 Graabe, Judaic Religion, pp. 258-59. 
382 Graabe, Judaic Religion, pp. 259-68. 
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 executed through the body to separate the soul from God and the Cosmos.  Josephus, 
surprisingly, believes in the transmigration of souls,383 with good souls being rewarded 
and evil ones punished following the final eschatological day of judgement.  So, by the 
end of the Second Temple period, Judaism did have an ambiguous concept of body and 
soul, but largely continued to emphasize obedience to God for salvation without 
ontologically linking ethics to body and soul as the Greeks did. 
 New Testament Christians, as well, generally adopted the views of Second 
Temple Judaism in regard to anthropology and teleology, though now obviously 
reworked through their understanding of Christ.  There clearly is an adoption of the 
concept of body and soul, with both being ultimately saved through faith and 
resurrection.  Similar to contemporary Jewish precepts, the New Testament is somewhat 
ambiguous with its terminology, using psyche (soul) and pneuma (spirit) for the “inner” 
portion of a human being, and soma (body) and sarx (flesh) to describe the “outer” 
physical portion.384  In addition, the relationship between the two is often unclear, and the 
terms are used interchangeably to describe concepts from the simple constitution of the 
human being (i.e. what we would understand together as body and soul) to an expression 
of the conflict between the forces of God and the forces of the world (flesh versus spirit), 
and how individual existence is caught up in that conflict.385  The goal of human 
                                                          
383 Graabe explains that Josephus felt the soul was released from the body at death and then reborn into a 
new body, with the process repeating itself until the day of judgement (a cosmic end to the age where Rome 
would be destroyed by divine intervention) when God would reward good souls and punish evil ones. See 
Graabe, Judaic Religion, p. 263.  
384 Ladd, New Testament Theology, pp. 499-520.  
385 See Ladd’s discussion of the different interpretations of the flesh vs. Spirit element of Pauline thought. 
New Testament Theology, pp. 509-17. Ladd shows that the “ethical” use of the term flesh (sarx) has been 
interpreted generally as the force in the world and within the individual that is opposed to God and lives in 
opposition to the Spirit, which is God’s agent working in the world. In terms of understanding human 
nature, Ladd summarizes four positions: 1) flesh and spirit represent a dualism between sinful human 
nature and the sanctified human nature under the guidance of the Holy Spirit (e.g. H.W. Robinson, Davies), 
2) a duality within human nature where the higher (spirit) principles are constantly at war with the lower 
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 existence, too, is found also in obedience to God, but now through Christ, and eternal life 
can be granted to both body and soul through resurrection and union with Christ,386 with 
wrath and divine destruction for those who remain disobedient through their rejection of 
Christ.387 
III. Early Christian Sexual Ethics: The New Testament 
 In regard to sexual behaviour, Second Temple Judaism both inherited Old 
Testament Law, and produced innovations that responded to contemporary pressures of 
Hellenization.  More importantly, their attitudes towards sexuality reflected the same 
focus upon obedience that was apparent in their cosmological, anthropological and 
teleological perspectives, and the same absence of ontological concern in regard to body 
and soul as well.  In this way, it was obedience to God that directed Jewish sexual 
attitudes, and from the Old Testament came both positive and negative commands in 
regard to sexual behaviour.  As Anderson demonstrates, marriage and sexual intercourse 
were seen as a positive part of humanity fulfilling their covenant with God and obeying 
the command to be fruitful and multiply (Genesis 1:28), and the midrash, targums and 
pseudoprographa dating from this era depict marriage and children as a blessing and joy 
from God. 388  Indeed, in the right context of a marriage and the fulfillment of God’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(flesh) principles, requiring a progressive sanctification of human nature where the higher spirit rules over 
the lower flesh (Beyschlag, Stevens), 3) an existential dualism where human nature, both body and soul, is 
in conflict over the focus of its attention, either towards the transitory/earthly (flesh) or the 
transcendent/eternal (spirit), and lives in either power or weakness depending on the object of influence 
(Bultmann, J.A.T. Robinson, Conzelmann), and 4) an eschatological dualism which broadens the dualism 
beyond the individual, and represents a contrast between unregenerate humanity opposed to God prior to 
Christ and the sanctified, regenerated humanity following the coming of the Holy Spirit. (Ladd) More 
recently, one could add G. Fee and B. Witherington to supporters of option number four. See G. Fee, Paul, 
the Spirit and the People of God (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996), and B. Witherington III, Paul’s Narrative 
Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph, (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1994). 
386 Romans 5-8. 
387 I Thessalonians 1:10, 4:16. 
388 See G. Anderson, “Celibacy or Consummation in the Garden? Reflections on Early Jewish and 
Christian Interpretations of the Garden of Eden.” Harvard Theological Review 82.2 (1989): 121-48. 
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 covenant duties, sexuality was never considered a sin but a commandment from God.389  
Negatively, the Torah also demanded obedience in regard to ritual purity and the 
avoidance of idolatry.  Indeed, there were laws to order sexual behaviour in regard to 
nearly every area of life, from marriage to worship to family relations.  Again, it must be 
noted that these rules are not based on ontological considerations, but upon the need for 
obedience to God.390 
 In addition, during the Second Temple period the pressures of Hellenization led to 
an intensified emphasis on the need for obedience that Judaism had inherited from the 
literature of the Old Testament.  As Brown convincingly demonstrates, despite its 
appropriate power for procreation, Jews of that era were leery of sexual indulgence 
because of its capability of deflecting the individual from a single-minded devotion to 
God.391  Within the unknown and hidden areas of the heart was the danger of a will bent 
to disobedience to God, and if prompted into activity by indulgent sexual behaviour, it 
could lead to strife between family and community, or worse, a blurring of the person’s 
distinct identity as a part of God’s chosen people.392  K. Gaca, as well, has demonstrated 
that the Septuagint, which was used by most Diaspora Jews during this period, showed a 
great concern for remaining pure and obedient amidst the Gentile culture, as well as a 
                                                          
389 Anderson, “Celibacy or Consummation”, p. 122.  
390 We must, of course, allow for the possibility that some of those rules were strongly affected by social 
discourses, and as a means of social control. Graabe points out that while the oversimplified model of 
“oppressor and oppressed” is a caricature that does not grasp the subtleties and nuances of sexual rules in a 
predominantly patriarchal society, there is simply too much clear evidence to not recognize that many 
sexual rules were influenced by the advantageous position of males in ancient society. (See Graabe, Judaic 
Religion, pp. 300-304). However, as was argued in chapter one, the primary motivation for such rules is 
more likely to be found in the ritual or moral requirements of the religious belief system, though also 
clearly being susceptible to secondary social consequences or goals.  
391 P. Brown,  The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity(New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1988),  pp. 33-44. 
392 Brown, Body and Society, p. 40. 
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 concern to continue avoiding idolatry caused by contact with pagan worship.393 In 
particular, Gaca shows that the Septuagint intensifies the language of prohibition in 
regard to any sexual activity that threatens strict devotion and honour to God, and does so 
through the classification of such behaviour as porneia.394  Thus if a sexual activity 
brings an individual into contact with pagan worship through inter-marriage, or through 
sexual contact with those involved in pagan worship (i.e. temple prostitutes), then the act 
was considered porneia.  In addition, any sexual act that was not devoted strictly to 
reproduction and obedience to God was also classified as porneia, thus casting doubt 
upon sexual indulgence as well.  In short, any sexual act that did not show honour to God, 
who is to be worshipped exclusively, was condemned, but no ontological connection was 
made between sexual sin and human nature. 
 The New Testament adopts similar prohibitions, and continues to generally 
disregard any ontological speculation about the body, the soul and sexuality.  In 
particular, the New Testament contains strong warnings against porneia (Rom.1:29, I 
Cor. 6:9, Gal. 5:19, Eph. 5:3-5, Col. 3:5, I Thes. 4:3, Jude 7), usually translated as 
                                                          
393 See K. Gaca, The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Sexuality and 
Early Christianity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 119-217.  
394 See Gaca, The Making of Fornication, pp. 122-131. Gaca distinguishes between, 1) sexual acts that 
involved idolatry, thus breaking the first commandment to worship God alone, and 2) sexual acts that are 
defiling in the eyes of God, or an “abomination” (gk. bdelygma). In regard to idolatry, the Septuagint is 
largely concerned with intermarriage and participation in pagan cultic rituals that involved sexual 
intercourse. In regard to defiling sexual acts, the Septuagint does not clearly outline the criteria by which a 
sexual act is classified as an abomination, but Gaca convincingly argues that the kinds of acts found in this 
category can largely be described as those that reflect a rebellious attitude towards God. The Septuagint, 
she argues, classifies any sexual act that is not done out of obedience and devotion to God as porneia, and 
the offenders are considered “defiled” in the eyes of God and clearly associated with the rebellion of 
polytheistic ritual and worship. Thus adultery, homosexual behaviour, incest, and the like are all considered 
a kind of rebellion against God because they reflect the kind of activities only found among Gentiles, who 
by definition are in rebellion against God. As Gaca puts it, the Septuagint demands, “The people must 
relinquish in perpetuity the ability to act on their own cognizance religiously and sexually, for in order to 
have no other gods but God, they must make love, reproduce, and raise children for the Lord alone.” (p. 
128) Thus any sexual activity linked to idolatry, or one that reflects rebelliousness against God, is 
considered porneia, though aside from associating those behaviours with the Gentiles it is still a puzzle as 
to why they are perceived to be prohibited by God initially.   
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 “fornication”, and continues to refer to prohibited sexual acts on the same terms as the 
Septuagint.  Indeed, the references to porneia in the New Testament show a similar 
pattern of usage as found in the Septuagint, describing either a direct violation of the 
commandment not to worship other gods, or used to describe any sexual act that clearly 
dishonours God, his people or the self, which should belong solely to God.  On the one 
hand, in the New Testament, porneia clearly refers to any sexual activity done in honour 
of gods other than the one God of Israel, or coming into contact with anyone who has 
done a sexual act connected to idolatry.  For example, the porneia of Christians having 
intercourse with temple prostitutes in Corinth (I Cor 6:12-20) drew Paul’s rebuke, as did 
attendance of Christians at pagan worship, where sexual activity was part of the 
idolatrous ritual (I Cor 10:8).395  In addition, Paul’s association of homosexual desire 
with Gentile idolatry in Romans 1396 culminates in verses 28-29 with Paul arguing that 
God had turned the Gentiles over to immoral behaviour (porneia) as a result of t
idolatry.
heir 
                                                          
397 In addition, the association of porneia with idolatry also was employed by 
395 For a fuller discussion of the issues around the Corinthians attending pagan cultic rituals that involved 
both eating food sacrificed to idols and sexual intercourse that was part of the post-meal ritual see G. Fee, I 
Corinthians(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), pp. 455-56. 
396 See Romans 1:18-32. Paul’s argument is that despite the fact that God’s power and nature are visible in 
creation, the gentiles have rebelliously turned away from their creator and begun to worship idols. As a 
consequence, God has turned them over to their desire (epithumia), which has resulted in unnatural 
homosexual passions among both men and women, thus making them the Gentiles guilty of porneia as well 
as idolatry.  
397 There is a textual concern in this passage that bears upon this discussion. The UBS textual apparatus 
indicates that the inclusion of porneia in the text of Rom. 1:29 contains a considerable degree of doubt, so 
much so that most modern English translations (NIV, NRSV) omit porneia from the text. The earliest 
manuscripts (a, A, B, C, D) all lack porneia in the list of sins found in the text, while the vast majority of 
later texts (a revision of D, G, L, y, 88, a majority of minuscules), as well as the Syriac texts and the 
majority of Byzantine Lectionaries, include it. The difficulty lies in the attestation of the church Fathers, 
which have both forms of the text being used by Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Therodoret, and other Fathers 
using only either of the two (e.g. Origen omits it, Euthalius includes it). In his Textual Commentary on the 
Greek New Testament (New York: United Bible Societies, 1971) Metzger argues that although porneia 
could have accidentally fallen out in transcription, he thinks it more likely that porneia was added 
accidentally when poneria, ponhria, (“wickedness”) was erroneously transcribed as porneia, porneia, 
“fornication”, or deliberately added by scribes who noted its presence in some of the older forms of the 
text. In addition, he comments “The fact, however, that Paul argues (verses 24-25) that such vices as listed 
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 other New Testament writers.  For example, the author of Acts records that at the 
Jerusalem Council in Acts 15, where it was decreed that Gentile Christians were not be 
burdened with the full adherence to the Law, early Christians still maintained the Old 
Testament strictures against idolatry.  In particular, this included avoiding meat sacrificed 
to idols and the avoidance of porneia, or sexual idolatry, associated with pagan worship 
(Acts 15:29).  Also, Revelation’s letters to Pergamum and Thyatira rebuke these churches 
for engaging in porneia, along with the consumption of food sacrificed to idols (Rev. 
2:14, 20-21).  The clear implication of many New Testament passages, then, is that like 
Second Temple Jewish ideals, the concept of porneia included any sexual activity that led 
to idolatry. 
 On the other hand, the term porneia could be used by the New Testament writers 
to refer to any kind of sexual behaviour that was not worthy of their status as God’s 
people.  In the same way that the Septuagint emphasized sexual acts that were by nature 
rebellious to God (without necessarily including idolatry) as porneia, the New Testament 
also classified certain sexual behaviours clearly rebellious to God as porneia, and as the 
kinds of activities one only finds among the Gentiles.  Paul is the most vocal of the New 
                                                                                                                                                                             
here issue from the licentious practices of idolatry, makes it unlikely that he would have included 
porneia within the list itself.” (p. 506) Considering the recent studies on the connection between porneia 
and idolatry (see Gaca, et. al.), Metzger’s comment seems prematurely mistaken. Indeed, his argument that 
porneia was added accidentally when poneria was misread is unconvincing, since if it had been misread 
one would expect to find texts with only porneia. However, the Textus Receptus and the majority of texts 
have both porneia and ponhria, and the early texts that lack porneia still have ponhria. In 
addition, it is difficult to argue that the inversion of “hr” would also include the transformation of the Eta 
(h) into an Epsilon (e). This more likely indicates a kind of error where the scribe’s eye, beginning one 
word (porneia), looked away to write, looked back and continued the word only now having skipped 
ahead (ponhria) after relocating the visual cue (po) incorrectly. The insertion of porneia in the later 
manuscripts is then easily explained as the correction of a previous mistake in the manuscript tradition, and 
it is only an insertion of porneia and not the replacement of ponhria because both were likely in the 
original. Moreover, the fact that several of the church fathers cite both manuscript traditions indicates that 
porneia was likely dropped accidentally in some manuscript families but retained in others, likely the 
eastern families. Finally, Metzger’s comment that Paul would not have included porneia in a list of vices 
related to idolatry is simply mistaken. In fact, it makes more sense that porneia should be included because 
Paul is making the link between idolatry and immoral sexual conduct. Thus, I argue that Romans 1:29 is 
another New Testament example of the use of porneia in connection with idolatry. 
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 Testament writers on this subject.  Not only does he include porneia in the sense of 
“sexual immorality” among the lists of vices that prevent inheritance of God’s kingdom 
(II Cor 12:21, Gal 5:19, Eph 5:3, Col 3:5, I Tim 1:10), and considers it a word to describe 
any sexual behaviour that dishonours God, he also uses porneia as a term to describe the 
sexual immorality of the Gentiles, which should be left behind by Gentile Christians who 
are now part of God’s people.  In I Thess 4:1-5, as well, Paul urges his congregation to 
resist the lustful passions (epithumia) which mark the Gentiles who are rebellious to God, 
and to abstain from porneia as a kind of sexual immorality that does not please their 
Lord.  Indeed, in I Cor 5, Paul criticizes the church in Corinth for allowing a man to live 
with his father’s wife, an action that amounts to nothing short of incest, and sarcastically 
points out that this is a sexual practice of such clear immorality that it is not even found 
among the Gentiles! (I Cor. 5:1-2).  Other New Testament writers, as well, pick up the 
use of porneia for sexual immorality unbecoming of God’s people.  The author of John’s 
gospel, for example, has the Jews protesting Jesus’ disregard for their claim to a spiritual 
heritage through Abraham by asserting the fact that they were not born “from 
fornication” (e)k porneia, John 8:41), as he was.398  Jude 7 warns of the punishment 
that awaits Sodom and Gomorrah for their porneia, and as the NRSV puts it, their pursuit 
of “unnatural lusts.”  Finally, Revelation 21:8 lists those who engage in sexual 
immorality (pornois), along with idolaters and murderers as those who will burn in the 
                                                          
398 D.A. Carson points out that many scholars argue that this protest by the Jews misses Jesus’ point that 
their conduct has disqualified them from Abraham’s inheritance. Rather, the Jews continue to assert their 
claims to inherited election based upon the purity of their birth while pointing to the irregularities 
connected with Jesus’ birth in order to undermine his authority. In addition Carson thinks it possible that 
v.41 anticipates v.48 where Jesus is charged with being a “Samaritan”. In that way, Carson argues, when the 
Jews assert they have not been born “from fornication” they may be pointing to the fact that they have no 
intermarriage with Gentiles in their lineage (i.e. no porneia), unlike the Samaritans and other Diaspora 
Jews. It is then possible that it could be interpreted as a slight against Jesus for siding with the Samaritans. 
See D.A. Carson, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 352. 
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 lake of fire, and 22:15 lists those who engage in porneia as those who cannot enter the 
heavenly city. 
 It is clear, then, that the New Testament generally adopted the Jewish sexual 
prohibitions of the Second Temple period and conceived of porneia as both sexual 
activities that involved one in idolatrous practices, and as the sexually rebellious 
activities of those whose actions dishonoured God and themselves as God’s people.  In 
many ways, however, early Christian adoption of Jewish views of sexuality was a limited 
and complex adoption, and two issues also strongly influenced early Christian attitudes 
about sexuality.  While certainly retaining the monotheistic worldview and clear concerns 
for sexual morality as a key element in obedience to God, early Christianity found itself 
developing as a religion with its own theological perspectives and doing so in an 
atmosphere that was increasingly Greco-Roman and less Jewish in context.  Although the 
churches of the New Testament period were obviously steeped in the Jewish narrative 
thought world, the numbers of Gentiles in the churches began to quickly outnumber those 
of Jewish heritage,399 and the issues over adherence to the Torah soon led to a sharp 
break where Christianity left Judaism behind to develop an identity of its own.  As F
correctly points out, by the turn of the first century, many Jews saw Christians who 
remained within the sphere of Judaism as a despised minority who had abandoned the 
inconvenient parts of the Law, while growing numbers of Gentile Christians, who still 
admired Jewish monotheism and ethics, found many aspects of the Jewish Law to be 
absurd and distasteful.
rend 
                                                          
400  Consequently, by the turn of the first century, many early 
399 See H. Conzelmann and A. Lindemann, Interpreting the New Testament: An Introduction to the 
Principles and Methods of N.T. Exegesis, translated by S. S. Schatzmann from the 8th rev. German Edition  
(Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1988), pp. 373-75. 
400 W.H.C. Frend, The Early Church (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), pp. 35-36. 
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 Christians had not only developed a distinctively Christian worldview (albeit still in the 
process of long refinement on the basis of contextual realities), but had largely moved out 
from under Judaism’s sphere of influence.401 
 This historical movement is actually one of the keys to understanding the 
emergence of the early Christian world view, as well as celibacy, as it was a turning point 
when early Christianity was adapting inherited Jewish perspectives to its own developing 
Christian theology, while simultaneously expanding beyond the sphere of Jewish cultural 
and theological perspectives.  Simply put, what Jewish cosmological and anthropological 
speculation did exist was being adapted to Christian theology, and where Jewish and 
Christian speculation did not provide answers, the early Christians turned to the 
commonly acknowledged wisdom of the broader culture to fill in the gaps.  Indeed, in 
                                                          
401 In recent years the matter of the continuing relationship between Judaism and early Christianity is much 
debated. Currently, many scholars blur the lines between early Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism, arguing 
that Christians were not a distinctly identifiable group separate from Judaism until well into the third 
century, possibly even the fourth. See for example D. Boyarin, “Semantic Differences; or, 
‘Judaism’/‘Christianity’” in The Ways that Never Parted. Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the 
Early Middle Ages, A. Becker and A. Yoshiko Reed, eds. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 65-85, or 
his Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999). See also P. Fredriksen, “What ‘Parting of the Ways’? Jews, Gentiles and the Ancient 
Mediterranean City.” in The Ways that Never Parted. Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages, A. Becker and A. Yoshiko Reed, eds. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 35-63, and R. R. 
Ruether, “Judaism and Christianity: Two Fourth-Century Religions.” SR 2 (1972): 1-10. The result has been 
a debate over the semantics of identity where the terminology used to label early Christianity and Judaism 
has been repeatedly redefined in an attempt to justify relocating the date for the “parting of ways” between 
Christianity and Judaism. In particular, it is argued that the there is a difference between the image of self-
identity created by a social group and the reality of its true social position. It has been argued, then, that 
early Christian self-presentation, which identified Christians as distinct from both Jews and “pagans,” was 
really only an image that was fostered for the sake of encouraging group solidarity, when the reality was 
that Christians could not be differentiated from Jews. Consequently, the tendency among these scholars is 
to argue that early Christianity did not develop as a distinct social force until the third century. For a good 
survey and critique of this trend see T.A. Robinson’s upcoming book Ignatius and the Way that Parted: The 
Formation of Early Christian Identity (Forthcoming, 2007). Robinson correctly points out that despite 
emphasizing appropriate cautions against portraying early Christianity and Judaism in monolithic terms, 
these scholars have ignored or dismissed the earliest historical data that unquestionably demonstrates that 
early Christianity portrayed itself and Judaism as two distinct groups. Using the letters of Ignatius, 
Robinson convincingly shows that by the early part of the first century, early Christians and Jews, 
regardless of the obvious continuity between them, still had clearly defined identity boundaries and did not 
consider themselves to be part of the same group. This thesis obviously takes the position that the break 
between Judaism and early Christianity was early, and no later than the first quarter of the second century. 
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 comparison to the philosophical speculations of the Greeks and Romans, Jewish and 
Christian speculations were rudimentary, primarily focussing upon the relationship 
between the Creator and his Creation, and including little consideration of ontological 
matters in regard to body, soul and ethics.  As Frend points out, with the revitalization of 
Judaism from the council of Jamnia (ca.90CE)402 on into the second century, the fluidity 
between Judaism and Christianity came to an end.403  Early Christian claims to being the 
“new Israel”, which Frend argues were tenaciously clung to between ca. 65-100 CE, had 
                                                          
402 This is the council where the infamous “curse” against the minim was added to the Shemoneh Esrei 
(Benediction of Eighteen Prayers), assumed to be in response to heightened tensions between the early 
Christians and Jews. According to the Jewish Encyclopaedia, the term min is likely rooted in the Hebrew 
term for “species,” and came to mean Jewish sectaries (not non-Jews).  Rabbinic sources indicate that at the 
time of the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, there were no fewer than twenty four kinds of minim, 
including Christians, Nazarenes, Sadducees and Samaritans. It was at the request of Gamaliel II that the 
twelfth benediction changed the curse from being against Nazarenes alone, to being against the broader 
minim, or sectaries, because early Christians had protested the Jewish label of all Christians being 
Nazarenes. The conservative response, then, was to broaden the category to be more inclusive of those that 
did not agree with rabbinic orthodoxy. The ostracism that came with the curse was severe, as the Jewish 
Encyclopaedia describes: “It was forbidden to partake of meat, bread, and wine with the min. Scrolls of the 
Law, tefillin, and mezuzot written by a min were burned (Giṭ. 45b; Yer. Shab. 14b; 'Ab. Zarah 40b; Shul’an 
'Aruk, Oraḥ ‘ayyim, 39, 1; ib. Yoreh De'ah, 281, 1). An animal slaughtered by a min was forbidden food 
(Ḥul. 13a). The relatives of the min were not permitted to observe the laws of mourning after his death, but 
were required to assume festive garments and rejoice (Sem. ii. 10; Yoreh De'ah, 345). The testimony of the 
min was not admitted in evidence in Jewish courts (Shulḥan 'Aruk, Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, 34, 22); and an 
Israelite who found anything belonging to one who was a min was forbidden to return it to him (see Ḥoshen 
Mishpaṭ, 266, 2).” See “Min” in The Jewish Encyclopaedia: A descriptive Record of the History, Religion 
Literature, and Customs of the Jewish People from the Earliest Times, Vol. VIII (New York: Ktav 
Publishing House, 1906), pp. 594-95. More recent studies on the curse focus on the extent to which it 
reflected a division between Judaism and Christianity at that point in history. For example, many scholars 
such as G. Bornkamm, J.P. Meier and K. Stendahl have accepted the traditional interpretation of Jamnia’s 
curse as a reflection of an early conflict and split between Jews and Christians, even suggesting that the 
Gospel of Matthew may have been published in reaction to Jamnia. See A. Finkel’s summary of the 
argument in “Yavneh’s Liturgy and Early Christianity” Journal of Ecclesiastical Studies 18.2 (1981): 231-
50. Others, however, argue that the curse does not reflect a split so much as tension between two groups 
within the same community. For example, Finkel’s article “Yahneh’s Liturgy and Early Christianity” argues 
that the evidence which describes animosity between the groups, and characterizes the curse as an 
“excommunication” of sorts, dates from later Rabbinic materials that reflect the later conflict between the 
two. Another example is S. Katz’s article “Issues in the Separation of Judaism and Christianity after 70 
C.E.: A Reconsideration” Journal of Biblical Literature 103.1 (1984): 43-76. Katz argues that the kind of 
“ban” (he identifies it as herem) that encompassed “excommunication” did not exist until after 200 C.E., 
but a less severe “ban” of thirty days of non-participation in synagogue worship (he identifies it as niddui) 
did exist, and it “was a means of communal discipline used to support and defend halakic decisions against 
recalcitrant members.” (p. 48) As such, Katz argues that the curse of Javnia represents a disciplinary action 
taken against Jewish Christians who had become recalcitrant with issues of the Law, but was by no means 
an excommunication from the Jewish community.  
403 W.H.C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 120-126. 
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 been largely abandoned as allegorical by the time of Ignatius (ca. 110 CE), and the 
“Christian synagogue” vanished as the larger proportion of early Christians were 
ethnically non-Jewish and began to compete with Jews for converts across the empire.404   
With the influence of Judaism waning, then, and with Christians developing their 
own theological concerns, early Christianity also moved into the sphere of Greco-Roman 
perspectives, which they often relied upon when their own perspectives, either inherited 
or sui generis, had not yet developed answers to ontological questions. By this it is not 
meant that because the majority of Christians were now Gentiles that early Christianity 
completely lost any connection to Jewish theology. On the contrary, their use of the 
Jewish scriptures continued to steep them in Jewish thought, as did the use of their own 
developing canon of texts, which also was rooted in a shared Jewish theological 
perspective. However, sensitivity is needed to discern the extent to which uniquely 
Christian theological perspectives were interpreted through Jewish theology or Greco-
Roman philosophical speculation, and in detecting which interpretive matrix carried more 
weight in regard to various issues.  Indeed, as will be shown, there was a spectrum across 
the early Christian communities that reflected a variety of positions that showed different 
degrees of integration of new Christian theology, older Jewish theology and Greco-
Roman philosophical perspectives. The broader pattern, I think, shows a concern for the 
primacy of Christian theology, which is in turn interpreted and developed through a 
recognized continuity with Jewish theology, but where Jewish speculation was rejected or 
lacking, Greco-Roman philosophical concepts could be employed to further justify or 
interpret Christian theology. However, in regard to specific issues that were being 
                                                          
404 Frend, The Rise of Christianity, pp. 124-25. 
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 considered, a variety of outcomes could have been possible depending upon which 
interpretive worldview was granted the most authority.  
 With this in mind, the development of the early Christian worldview can also be 
seen as having a certain level of flexibility as it evolved into the second century.  When 
looking at the early Christian texts of the first and second century, a pattern can be 
detected wherein the early Christians adapted the Jewish worldview in continuity with 
their own theological perspectives, while rejecting elements of Judaism, such as certain 
requirements of the Law that were not compatible with their beliefs about Christ.  
Similarly, where early Christianity came into contact with the Greco-Roman culture, 
early Christians considered the broader philosophical perspectives of the empire in the 
light of their faith.  The key for this study is to recognize that early Christians were able 
to adopt and adapt those perspectives of the broader culture that did not conflict with 
their theological perspectives, while feeling free to reject what did conflict. Since the 
majority of early Christians were Greco-Romans with a greater interest in ontological 
speculation than what could be found in the Jewish heritage of early Christianity, it would 
have been natural for early Christians to default to the ontological speculation of the 
culture to answer questions the scriptures did not. More importantly, the variety of 
speculation within the Greco-Roman world meant that a number of ontological views 
would have been available to early Christians during the growth and expansion of their 
worldview.  Thus, though having core theological and cosmological views, early 
Christians would have had many perspectives from Greco-Roman philosophy open to 
them for use in their speculations, and would therefore have also naturally had 
opportunity to argue and disagree. 
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  Broadly speaking, then, the contribution of early Christian theology to 
cosmological speculation was to be found in its developing understanding of Christ and 
the Holy Spirit in relation to the divine.  Although the early church was not to develop a 
full-blown “Trinitarian” theology until the fourth century, it is still obvious that from the 
New Testament period onward the early Christians considered both Christ and the Holy 
Spirit to be manifestations of God in the processes of salvation and redemption of his 
people.  While the relationship between Christ, the Spirit and God was not speculated 
upon in much detail philosophically until into the third century, it is clear from the 
documents of the early Church that both Christ and the Holy Spirit were perceived to 
relate to the believer in the process of salvation, and that they were responsible in many 
ways for effecting the work of God in both the individual and the church. What is 
important for this study is to recognize the role that Christ and the Spirit played in the 
expanding early Christian cosmology, anthropology, and teleology. In addition, it must be 
noted elements of early Christian theology remained open to interpretation through 
Greco-Roman paradigms as early Christianity broke away from Judaism. 
 Beginning again with cosmology, the early Christian theological adaptation of the 
Jewish narrative was to involve Christ and the Holy Spirit in the process of creation and 
salvation.405  The gospel of John’s well known introduction associates Christ with the 
logos “through” which the world has been made, and Paul, too, mentions Christ as the 
agent of Creation who works for God, for whose glory it was created (I Cor. 6:8, Col. 
                                                          
405 Although early Christian speculation on the role of the Holy Spirit in salvation is quite significant, the 
role of the Holy Spirit in creation seems to develop slowly as an element in early Christian theology. The 
Spirit’s role seems to be primarily be linked to the “breath of life” given to humankind in the Garden 
(Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.1.3), and limited to an acknowledgement of its participation in creation by 
association as a part of the Godhead (see Basil of Caesarea, On the Holy Spirit). In early Christianity, the 
Holy Spirit is far more important in its eschatological work as a sanctifier of human beings in the new 
eschatological age, and as the “founder” of the Church. Otherwise, it is early Christian association of Christ 
with the logos that plays the largest role in terms of the creation of the universe. 
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 1:15-17).  Moreover, for Paul and the Gospels there is an eschatological component to 
cosmology, one where Christ and the Spirit stand at an interval between the two ages, this 
“present” age and the “age to come”.406  Thus, the Gospels present the coming of Jesus as 
the inauguration of a new age of faith that replaces an older age where Israel continually 
failed to be obedient.  Paul, as well, speaks of the present age dominated by sin and death 
(Eph. 1:21, Gal. 1:4) where the world itself is affected by the sin of humanity, leaving it 
in futility and corruption (Rom 8:20-21). Paul’s eschatological hope, then, was obviously 
found in Christ who will deliver humankind and creation from sin (Rom. 8:19-24, I Cor. 
15:20-28) and destroy everything that exists in opposition to God.  The book of 
Revelation, as well, shows most clearly the eschatological perspective of the New 
Testament churches, which see their salvation occurring simultaneously with the end of 
the present sinful age and the destruction of evil, followed by a new age where God’s 
Kingdom reigns supremely with redeemed humanity granted access to the heavenly 
city.407 
 This broad cosmological and eschatological perspective continues to be central to 
early Christian texts in the centuries to follow, but since space is limited, it best serves the 
purposes of this study to move on to the early Christian conception of human nature.  In 
essence, for early Christians the creation, redemption and salvation of humanity through 
Christ and the Holy Spirit as God’s agents informed their understanding of human nature.  
In that regard, human anthropology, Christian teleology and Christian sexual ethics were 
an interrelated series of speculations that formed during the New Testament period and 
continued through well into the fourth century when monasticism appeared.  As noted 
                                                          
406 Ladd, New Testament Theology, p. 402. 
407 For a good survey of the eschatological perspective of Revelation see R. Bauckham, The Theology of the 
Book of Revelation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
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 earlier, the early Christians had adopted the perspectives of their Jewish heritage where 
humankind was created by God in his image, had subsequently rebelled and had needed 
to be obedient to God in order to avoid his wrath.  It is clear that early Christian sexual 
ethics also adopted the Jewish concern for avoiding idolatry and behaviour dishonouring 
of God.  However, unlike its Jewish heritage, early Christian theological speculation did 
in fact create an ontological link between sin, human nature, redemption and morality, 
largely because of the roles attributed to Christ and the Holy Spirit. It was through their 
activity that sin was overcome, and their presence in the individual was the mark of 
God’s image restored in humanity. 
 In particular, Paul’s connection of sin with human nature both stands in continuity 
with the ancient Jewish narrative of Genesis and also employs the philosophical language 
of Greco-Roman morality.  On the one hand, he clearly links sin with the fall of Adam in 
Genesis, and the continuation of sin in the present era with the reign of sin within the 
individual.  In both Romans 5 and I Corinthians 15, Paul argues that sin, in the sense of 
an inherent tendency that rebels against God,408 found its origins in Adam’s rebellion in 
the Garden and spread to all of humanity through their heritage with the first human.  
Again, though, in typical Jewish fashion, Paul does not include any ontological 
speculation about how sin is spread through humanity or how it exercises power over the 
individual.  It is clear, too, that Paul conceives of the human individual as an 
amalgamation of an inner spiritual component and an outer physical component (I Cor. 
7:34, II Cor. 7:1, Rom 8:10-11), and that salvation through Christ occurs in regard to both 
                                                          
408 Christian theologians and secular scholars have endlessly debated the nature of this inherent sinful 
tendency, but the fact is that Paul does not elaborate on it enough to establish a clear definition, or even to 
understand what Paul understood it to be. For a good survey of the nature of sin in Paul’s letters see B.N. 
Fisk, “PORNEUEIN AS body Violation: The Unique Nature of Sexual Sin in 1 Corinthians 6.18”, New 
Testament Studies 42 (1996): 540-58.    
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 body and soul.  However, the crux of the issue for Paul is the eschatological delay that 
has occurred in the process of salvation and redemption.  In essence, Christ’s death and 
resurrection overcame the sin (and its consequences) that exists within the body (Rom. 
8:1-4, I Cor. 15:42-49), and the coming of the Holy Spirit to the individual has solved the 
problem of sin’s existence within the soul (Rom. 8:5-8, I Cor. 6:19, I Cor 15:45) by 
providing a union with Christ’s spirit.  Yet despite the fact that the human spirit has been 
renewed by its union with Christ through faith (Gal. 2:20, Rom. 8:9-11), the physical 
resurrection of the believer’s body is still to come at the day of Judgement (I Cor. 15:50-
52).  For Paul, this means that the transformation of the human soul is immanent and 
present, while the transformation of the body is yet to come with the future resurrection 
guaranteed by Christ’s resurrection (I Cor. 15:12-19). 
 While this survey of Paul’s theology may have seemed superfluous, it is actually 
very important to the present study.  For in reminding ourselves of Paul’s eschatological 
delay for the salvation of the body we can see the root of how sin and the body become 
connected ontologically in Paul’s thought.  While the Holy Spirit has provided for the 
redemption and sanctification of the soul, the body still remains a dangerous component 
of the human person that has yet to be fully sanctified.409  Sin still remains in the body, 
though again, unexplained in any comprehensive way by Paul, and he requires that the 
body be controlled in order to prevent that sin from regaining sovereignty over the 
individual.  For example, in Romans 6, after associating the believer’s baptism with the 
death of Christ, Paul argues that there is still a danger for sin to return to “exercise 
dominion in your mortal bodies” (Rom. 6:12) because the believer has yet to attain the 
final bodily resurrection of Christ. Further, in trying to come to terms with the sinful 
                                                          
409 Witherington, Tapestry, p. 25. 
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 impulses of the believer, and how those impulses relate to the Law, Paul describes the 
powerful force of sin within himself (Rom 7:14-25) that exists primarily in his body 
(soma) and flesh (sarx).410  The body, then, must be considered “dead” with Christ and be 
submitted to the Holy Spirit in order to produce righteousness (Rom 8: 9-13).  Similarly, 
in I Corinthians, Paul also argues that the freedom that Christ and the Spirit have 
provided to the soul by no means liberates the body to be abused or licentious,411 and the 
body must be recognized as the “temple of the Holy Spirit” (6:19) and duly “offered” in 
honour of God lest the sin that still dwells there prevents the inheritance of God’s 
kingdom (6:9).  In Galatians, as well, Paul warns against using the freedom found in 
Christ for the soul as an opportunity for self-indulgence (5:13).  Rather, the believer 
should submit the whole person, body and soul, to the Holy Spirit, which still competes 
with the sin that yet dwells in the body before resurrection (Gal. 5:16-26). 
 What is of great interest to our study is that in his warnings against the sin that 
continues to remain in the body prior to final resurrection, Paul’s language emphasizes 
the danger of the body and flesh.  For example, here is a list of Pauline texts, which make 
clear reference to sin, and its connection with the body: 
                                                          
410 There are a variety of interpretations of this passage, with scholars being primarily concerned with 
identifying the “I” to which Paul refers. Does the “I” refer to an autobiographical expression of Paul? Does 
it refer to pre-conversion existence or post-conversion existence? Does it refer to existence under the Law 
or after the gift of the Holy Spirit? Does it refer to Jews or Christians? For a survey of the many solutions 
to this question see J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1993), pp. 469-72, or 
J. Lambrecht, The Wretched “I” and its Liberation: Paul in Romans 7 and 8 (Louvain: Peeters, 1992). 
What is important for this study is that, whether referring to an “unregenerate” or “regenrate” experience, 
Paul makes an ontological connection between sin and the body. If interpreted as “I” under the Law (prior 
to faith in Christ), sin dwelling in the body was aroused by the Law (7:5,17), and if the “I” is in Christ 
(under the power of the Spirit) one should not submit to the sin that still exists in the body (8:13). In either 
interpretation it is still clear that Paul sees sin as an element of human anthropology that affects the body. 
411 In I Corinthians 6:12-13 Paul writes: “ ‘All things are lawful for me,’ but not all things are beneficial. 
‘All things are lawful for me,’ but I will not be dominated by anything. ‘Food is meant for the stomach and 
the stomach for food,’ and God will destroy both one and the other. The body is meant not for fornication 
(porneia) but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. 
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 We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin 
might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin. For whoever 
has died is freed from sin. But if we have died with Christ, we believe that we 
will also live with him.  We know that Christ, being raised from the dead, will 
never die again; death no longer has dominion over him. The death he died, 
he died to sin, once for all; but the life he lives, he lives to God.  So you also 
must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus. 
Therefore, do not let sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make 
you obey their passions.  (Romans 6:6-12, NRSV) 
  
While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, 
were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now we are 
discharged from the law, dead to that which held us captive, so that we are 
slaves not under the old written code but in the new life of the Spirit. What 
then should we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been 
for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not have known what it is to 
covet if the law had not said, "You shall not covet."  But sin, seizing an 
opportunity in the commandment, produced in me all kinds of covetousness. 
Apart from the law sin lies dead. I was once alive apart from the law, but 
when the commandment came, sin revived and I died, and the very 
commandment that promised life proved to be death to me.  For sin, seizing 
an opportunity in the commandment deceived me and through it killed me.  
So the law is holy, and the commandment is holy and just and good. Did what 
is good, then, bring death to me? By no means! It was sin, working death in 
me through what is good, in order that sin might be shown to be sin, and 
through the commandment might become sinful beyond measure. For we 
know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under 
sin. (Romans 7:5-14, NRSV)412  
 
For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: by 
sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and to deal with sin, he 
condemned sin in the flesh, so that the just requirement of the law might be 
fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. 
For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the 
flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things 
of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the 
Spirit is life and peace. For this reason the mind that is set on the flesh is 
hostile to God; it does not submit to God's law-- indeed it cannot, and those 
who are in the flesh cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh; you are 
in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. Anyone who does not have 
the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.  But if Christ is in you, though the 
body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness.  If the 
Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised 
Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his 
Spirit that dwells in you.  So then, brothers and sisters, we are debtors, not to 
                                                          
412 See n. 413. 
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 the flesh, to live according to the flesh - for if you live according to the flesh, 
you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you 
will live. (Romans 8:3-13, NRSV) 
 
"All things are lawful for me," but not all things are beneficial. "All things are 
lawful for me," but I will not be dominated by anything. "Food is meant for 
the stomach and the stomach for food," and God will destroy both one and the 
other. The body is meant not for fornication but for the Lord, and the Lord for 
the body.  And God raised the Lord and will also raise us by his power.  Do 
you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Should I therefore take 
the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never!  Do 
you not know that whoever is united to a prostitute becomes one body with 
her? For it is said, "The two shall be one flesh."  But anyone united to the 
Lord becomes one spirit with him. Shun fornication! Every sin that a person 
commits is outside the body; but the fornicator sins against the body itself.  
Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, 
which you have from God, and that you are not your own?  For you were 
bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body. (I Corinthians 6:12-
20, NRSV)  
 
What I am saying, brothers and sisters, is this: flesh and blood cannot inherit 
the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable.  Listen, 
I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be changed, in a 
moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will 
sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed. For 
this perishable body must put on imperishability, and this mortal body must 
put on immortality. (I Corinthians 15:50-53, NRSV)  
 
If, however, you bite and devour one another, take care that you are not 
consumed by one another.  Live by the Spirit, I say, and do not gratify the 
desires of the flesh.  For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and 
what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh; for these are opposed to each 
other, to prevent you from doing what you want. But if you are led by the 
Spirit, you are not subject to the law. Now the works of the flesh are obvious: 
fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, 
jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing, 
and things like these. I am warning you, as I warned you before: those who 
do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God. (Galatians 5:15-21, 
NRSV)  
 
 Finally, brothers and sisters, we ask and urge you in the Lord Jesus that, as 
you learned from us how you ought to live and to please God (as, in fact, you 
are doing), you should do so more and more.  For you know what instructions 
we gave you through the Lord Jesus.  For this is the will of God, your 
sanctification: that you abstain from fornication; that each one of you know 
how to control your own body in holiness and honor, not with lustful passion, 
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 like the Gentiles who do not know God; that no one wrong or exploit a 
brother or sister in this matter, because the Lord is an avenger in all these 
things, just as we have already told you beforehand and solemnly warned 
you. For God did not call us to impurity but in holiness. (I Thessalonians 4:1-
5, NRSV) 
 
 This by no means indicates that Paul considered the body alone to be the locus of 
sin in the individual; he also considered the soul or spirit of the person to have had sin 
dwelling in it and in need of redemption (e.g. Rom. 7:22-23, 8:10; II Cor. 5:6-8).  
However, due to the delay of the eschatological salvation of the body, it is clear for Paul 
that the body remains a place of danger for sin to reassert its sovereignty in the present.  
In Paul’s mind, one must submit to the work of the Holy Spirit to make one’s union with 
Christ complete, both in body and soul, and moreover, to give in to bodily desire is to 
give into the sin that still remains in the body.  
 The most fascinating aspect of Pauline theology is that while retaining a uniquely 
Christian interpretation of Jewish salvation, and without extensive cosmological and 
ontological speculation similar to that which the Greco-Roman world engaged in, Paul 
has presented the body as a location of danger.  In addition, Paul does not create a 
systematic ontology of the relationship between the body and soul, nor give a 
philosophical explanation of human nature.  What he does do is present a unique 
interpretation of the Jewish worldview as it is now understood in light of the salvation of 
Christ and the operation of the Holy Spirit.  For Paul, the sin of disobedience found in the 
Garden of Eden becomes the key element of human existence that Christ overcomes, and 
it has existed in humankind since the Fall.  Salvation, then, includes the Jewish notions of 
avoiding God’s wrath and re-establishing human obedience to God, but it also includes 
the transformation of human nature through union with Christ and responsiveness to the 
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 presence of the Holy Spirit.  That transformation, then, is both imminent and delayed, as 
the soul is transformed in the present, but the body must wait until resurrection for its 
transformation into a “spiritual body” (I Cor.15: 43-44).413 In terms of sexual behaviour, 
then, Paul thinks that those who live outside of God’s salvation in Christ and the Spirit, 
such as the Gentiles, continue to live under the sovereignty of sin and their sexual 
behaviour reflects their obviously immoral nature.  Thus, as has been discussed, porneia, 
or behaviour such as incest, adultery, homosexual behaviour, visitation of prostitutes and 
licentiousness in general, is a reflection of the domination of sin found within the body 
and soul. 
It is ironic, then, that early Christianity developed an ethic of sexual austerity 
alongside their Greco-Roman counterparts, but based upon an entirely different set of 
cosmological, anthropological and teleological speculations.  While the Greco-Roman 
world developed highly speculative systems of philosophy to determine the nature of the 
universe and, therefore, how to live compatibly in it to achieve happiness (eudaimonia), 
the early Christians saw the Christ event and the appearance of the Holy Spirit in 
continuity with the Jewish narrative where humanity and the world attempted to live 
faithfully to their Creator.  Indeed, during the middle of the second century, it is precisely 
over this narrative that the Gnostic controversy occurred, with many early Christians 
attempting to blend the philosophical speculation of the Greco-Roman world with the 
early Christian narrative of salvation.  Regardless, early Christianity generally continued 
to appeal to the New Testament’s perspectives on the nature of the universe, humankind 
                                                          
413 The term “spiritual body” (swma pneumatikon) is intended to represent the physical body that has 
been resurrected without the sinful tendency to rebellion, and which is now ruled by the Holy Spirit. See 
Fee, I Corinthians, p.787-88.  
206 
 and God’s plans for salvation, and in addition, early Christianity through into the end of 
the third century continued to adhere to an austere sexual ethic as a whole. 
IV. The Sexual Ethics of Early Christianity: The Apostolic Fathers  
 It has been mentioned several times thus far that early Christianity in the New 
Testament period did not possess an elaborate or extensive ontology of body and soul that 
linked anthropology to sexual ethics. The ambiguous nature of the New Testament’s 
speculation on body and soul, as well, though obviously locating a tendency for sinful 
disobedience somewhere in human nature, only suggested to early Christians that until 
the body achieved full resurrection, sin still lay active within the body and needed to be 
subject to the soul, which had been redeemed by the work of Christ and lived in the 
present empowered by the Holy Spirit. Otherwise, early Christians were left to simply 
assume their sexual conduct should reflect obedience to God, as well as the physical and 
spiritual transformation of their nature that, to some extent, still had sinful tendencies due 
to its unfulfilled eschatological state.  What is striking, as well, is the similarity of early 
Christian sexual ethics to the Greco-Roman positions on sexuality.  For Greeks and 
Romans, too, the body should be controlled by the soul, but instead of being inspired by 
the need for obedience to God, their goal was to direct the individual towards a rational 
virtue as opposed to an irrational complex of vice.  For many scholars this similarity 
indicates a dependence of early Christianity upon the culture for its sexual norms.  But as 
has now been demonstrated in this chapter, though arriving at similar position on 
sexuality, early Christians did so via a completely different avenue of adapting the Jewish 
narratives about a monotheistic worldview to their theological considerations about 
Christ and the Spirit instead of ontological and cosmological speculation. 
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  Moreover, the fact that early Christians often used Greco-Roman wisdom to 
defend, explain or justify their beliefs and practices does not imply a causal relationship, 
but a relationship of convenience.  First, out of the necessities of communication, early 
Christians needed to find a commonly understood language in order to communicate their 
message.  In that regard, since early Christianity happened to be steeped in Jewish 
narratives and not Greco-Roman philosophical speculation, it would have been necessary 
to adopt a certain amount of common Hellenistic symbolic language in order to be 
understood by those outside their group.  Second, in a culture where a group is facing 
persecution, or simply needing to gain credibility, it would be advantageous to 
demonstrate the compatibility of their worldview with the accepted philosophical wisdom 
of the broader culture.  In that respect, for example, if early Christians can speak of their 
own faith and practices in the terms of, say Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy, then those 
Christian beliefs would seem to agree with the wisdom of the culture, or at the very least, 
seem less alien to observers and increase Christian credibility and authority.  In the case 
of early Christianity, considering its quick spread into non-Jewish areas of the culture and 
assuming its relatively quick break from Judaism by the early part of the second century, 
it is reasonable to argue that early Christians used Greco-Roman language as a cross-
cultural tool to gain converts, as a means of adapting early Christian theology to a non-
Jewish context and as a tool to defend itself from attacks upon its credibility.  The 
difficulty early Christianity faced, then, was in working out just how much of the Greco-
Roman worldview could be adapted without compromising its identity found in its 
Jewish heritage and its developing theological perspectives on Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
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  Consequently, when it comes to the early Christian perspectives on sexuality 
during the first three centuries of the Common Era, the similarities with Greco-Roman 
perspectives continued to remain present.  Both argued for restraint, both argued that the 
purpose of sexual intercourse was for procreation, both appealed to the need for personal 
virtue and both appealed to the need for sexual responsibility in the community.   More 
importantly, the early Christian texts also show a concern for preserving the uniquely 
Christian perspective on sexuality while incorporating the language of the Greco-Roman 
world in order to give their view authority.  In particular, while simultaneously urging the 
Judeo-Christian restraint to avoid porneia, the early Christian texts appealing for sexual 
restraint also began to echo the Greco-Roman terminology that located the root of 
irrational behaviour in the desire (epithumia) linked to the natural functions of the body, 
and the temperance (sophrosune) that results from self control.  For example, the Didache 
explains that the “Way of Life” includes abstinence from “fleshly and bodily lusts” 
(tw=n sarkikw=n kai\ swmatikw=n e0piqumiw=n),414 something easily 
understood by Greeks and Romans, but also includes among a list of prohibited 
behaviours the porneia associated with idolatrous sexual behaviour.415  Moreover, the 
Didache even connects the two, stating “be not lustful for lust leads to fornication” (mh 
ginou e0piqumhthj, o9dhgei= ga\r h9 e0piqumia pro\j th\n 
porneian), obviously including the New Testament’s use of porneia for sexual conduct 
that dishonours God.  Clement of Rome, too, points to desire (epithumia) as the root of 
wickedness and locates the achievement of temperance (sophrosune) in the soul’s 
mastery of the flesh:   
                                                          
414 Didache 1.4. 
415 Didicache II.2. 
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  May God, who sees all things, and who is the Ruler of all spirits and the 
Lord of all flesh — who chose our Lord Jesus Christ and us through Him to 
be a peculiar people — grant to every soul that calls upon His glorious and 
holy Name, faith, fear, peace, patience, long-suffering, self-control 
(e)gkrateian), purity (a(gneian)), and sobriety (swfrosunh), to the 
well-pleasing of His Name, through our High Priest and Protector, Jesus 
Christ, by whom be to Him glory, and majesty, and power, and honor, both 
now and for evermore. Amen.416 
 
He also sees sexual immorality rooted in youthful lust (epithumia) which can be 
overcome through meekness of spirit and continence (enkrateia), though here enkrateia 
clearly does not refer to celibacy.417 
 Polycarp’s letter to the Philippians, which is one of the earliest indications of the 
presence of celibacy, also sees virtue as partly rooted in self control (enkrateia) and 
Ploycarp’s encouragements for sexual purity for virgins also included an exhortation to 
young men to be blameless by avoiding desire (epithumia), since it wars against the Spirit 
to produce porneia:   
 In like manner, let the young men also be blameless in all things, being 
especially careful to preserve purity, and keeping themselves in, as with a 
bridle, from every kind of evil. For it is well that they should be cut off from 
the lusts that are in the world, since every lust (epithumia) wars against the 
Spirit; “ and “neither fornicators (pornoi), nor effeminate, nor abusers of 
themselves with mankind, shall inherit the kingdom of God,” nor those who 
do things inconsistent and unbecoming. Wherefore, it is needful to abstain 
from all these things, being subject to the presbyters and deacons, as unto 
God and Christ. The virgins also must walk in a blameless and pure 
conscience.418 
 
Clearly Polycarp is picking up Paul’s language in Galatians, as well as Paul’s concern for 
moral purity that avoids both idolatry and sexual behaviour that dishonours God.  Indeed, 
one could even argue that this passage is ambiguous in its reference to celibacy, as 
“virgins” in this case could be taken straightforwardly as simply unmarried girls who 
                                                          
416 I Clem. III.4. 
417 I Clem. XXX. Clement uses the term enkrateia for both sexual restraint and for celibate continence.  
418 Polycarp, To the Philippians, 5.  
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 must also avoid disobedience to God and the violation of their sanctity.  Still, one cannot 
help notice the adoption of the Greco-Roman language of virtue and self-mastery 
(enkrateia) in regard to sexual ethics. 
 Looking to the apologists in the second century, it can be seen that the early 
Christians were appealing to their sexual austerity to demonstrate the credibility of their 
faith amidst persecution and ridicule. The apology of Justin Martyr has already been 
examined for its witness to the presence of celibates,419 but it also bears witness to the 
continuing sexual austerity found among the early Christians.  In particular, he appeals to 
the early Christian rejection of lust (epithumia) as being similar to the philosophical 
standards of the culture, and superior to the mythological standards of the popular 
traditions of the people.  For example, in his First Apology Justin appeals to the high 
standards set by Jesus, where even looking upon a woman with lust (epithumia) is 
adultery. In addition, he also points to how many formerly immoral pagans had converted 
to Christianity and now been able to reform their intemperate sexual habits.420 In his 
Discourse to the Greeks, as well, he asserts that Christ, the divine logos, is the means to 
fulfill the highest calling of philosophy where the passions and desires of the body are 
overcome, the soul purified, and the desire (epithumia) that is at the root of every evil is 
banished, leaving the soul at peace and serene.421  In addition, Justin is quick to point out 
                                                          
419 See Chapter Two, p. 66. 
420 Justin Martyr, First Apology, XV also mentions celibates. “And many, both men and women, who have 
been Christ’s disciples from childhood, remain pure at the age of sixty or seventy years; and I boast that I 
could produce such from every race of men. For what shall I say, too, of the countless multitude of those 
who have reformed intemperate habits, and learned these things? For Christ called not the just nor the 
chaste to repentance, but the ungodly, and the licentious, and the unjust; His words being, ‘I came not to 
call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.’”   
421 Justin Martyr, Discourse to the Greeks 5, “Come, be taught; become as I am, for I, too, was as you are. 
These have conquered me — the divinity of the instruction, and the power of the Word: for as a skilled 
serpent-charmer lures the terrible reptile from his den and causes it to flee, so the Word drives the fearful 
passions of our sensual nature from the very recesses of the soul; first driving forth lust, through which 
every ill is begotten — hatreds, strife, envy, emulations, anger, and such like. Lust being once banished, the 
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 the superiority of Christian sexual morality over against the broader culture.  He refutes 
the pagan mockery of the virgin birth by arguing that the virginity of Mary insured that 
the incarnation of Christ was not founded upon lust (epithumia), whereas the divine 
children of Jupiter could make no such claim.422  Moreover, the Greeks and Romans had 
been enslaved to lustful passions by fallen angels, whom early Christians now considered 
demons the Greeks worshipped as gods.423  Even the epics of Homer are not spared by 
Justin, and he lists the numerous lusts of the epic heroes that led to war and immorality; 
“of such virtue,” he comments, “I am not covetous”. 424 In short, Justin attempted to 
prove that early Christian sexual morals were equal to those of the culture’s best thinkers, 
and far superior to the realities of the popular culture. 
 Justin Martyr is typical of the kinds of comments found among the apologists.  
Athenagoras (ca. 170 CE), for example, in his Plea for the Christians, argues that the 
stories and myths of the gods are absurd because anything truly divine would not engage 
in the lustful activities one finds among the gods, or be found with attributes such as 
anger, appetite or sexual desire.425  The apologist Theophilus, as well, condemns Saturn 
                                                                                                                                                                             
soul becomes calm and serene. And being set free from the ills in which it was sunk up to the neck, it 
returns to Him who made it. For it is fit that it be restored to that state whence it departed, whence every 
soul was or is.”  
422 Justin Martyr, First Apology, XXXIII. 
423 Justin Martyr, Second Apology, V. “But the angels transgressed this appointment, and were captivated 
by love of women, and begat children who are those that are called demons; and besides, they afterwards 
subdued the human race to themselves, partly by magical writings, and partly by fears and punishments 
they occasioned, and partly by teaching them to offer sacrifices, and incense, and libations, of which things 
they stood in need after they were enslaved by lustful passions; and among men they sowed murders, wars, 
adulteries, intemperate deeds, and all wickedness. Whence also the poets and mythologists, not knowing 
that it was the angels and those demons who had been begotten by them that did these things to men, and 
women, and cities, and nations, which they related, ascribed them to God himself, and to those who were 
accounted to be his very offspring, and to the offspring of those who were called his brothers, Neptune and 
Pluto, and to the children again of these their offspring. For whatever name each of the angels had given to 
himself and his children, by that name they called them.” 
424 Justin Martyr, Discourse to the Greeks, I. 
425 Athenagoras, Plea for the Christians, XXI. Athenagoras presents an extensive set of quotes from 
Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey demonstrating the sexual immorality of the gods.  
212 
 and Jupiter for their incest, lust and adultery,426 and mocks Greek creation stories for 
their speculation that the world had come into existence as the by-product of the sex
exploits of the gods.
ual 
                                                          
427  Athenagoras also defends the Christians against the charges of 
sexual immorality by reminding Marcus Aurelius that the Christians are in agreement 
with the philosophers of his age who mock the promiscuity of the gods and the broader 
populace of the empire.428  As Justin Martyr did, both Athenagoras and Theophilus also 
appeal to the superior standards of Christian sexual ethics, asserting that even lust with 
the heart is a violation,429 and, interestingly, Athengoras mentions an early Christian 
prohibition that condemns any who perform the “holy kiss” a second time as one who has 
sinned under the influence of desire and pleasure.430  Finally, he even makes it clear that 
Christians placed boundaries on their sexual appetites by allowing intercourse only for 
the purpose of procreation,431 which was undoubtedly familiar to Marcus Aurelius who 
was known for his philosophical knowledge and activities.   
426 Theophilus, Letter to Autolycus, 1.9. 
427 Theophilus, Letter to Autolycus, 2.12. Here Theophilus mentions Erebus, the son of Choas, who in turn 
fathered a series of other primordial gods that emerged as metaphysical manifestations of the universe, and 
that the God of the Christians would never have stooped to use pleasure or desire as a means of creating the 
world. 
428 Athenagoras, Plea for the Christians, XXXIV. 
429 For example, Theophilus, Letter to Autolycus III.13, “And concerning chastity, the holy word teaches us 
not only not to sin in act, but not even in thought, not even in the heart to think of any evil, nor look on 
another man’s wife with our eyes to lust after her.” Also III. 15, “But far be it from Christians to conceive 
any such deeds; for with them temperance dwells, self-restraint is practiced, monogamy is observed, 
chastity is guarded, iniquity exterminated, sin extirpated, righteousness exercised, law administered, 
worship performed, God acknowledged: truth governs, grace guards, peace screens them; the holy word 
guides, wisdom teaches, life directs, God reigns.” 
430 In defending against accusations of incest, Athenagoras writes “On behalf of those, then, to whom we 
apply the names of brothers and sisters, and other designations of relationship, we exercise the greatest care 
that their bodies should remain undefiled and uncorrupted; for the Logos again says to us, “If any one kiss a 
second time because it has given him pleasure, [he sins];” adding, “Therefore the kiss, or rather the 
salutation, should be given with the greatest care, since, if there be mixed with it the least defilement of 
thought, it excludes us from eternal life.” Plea for the Christians, 32. 
431 Athenagoras, Plea for the Christians, XXXIII. “Therefore, having the hope of eternal life, we despise 
the things of this life, even to the pleasures of the soul, each of us reckoning her his wife whom he has 
married according to the laws laid down by us, and that only for the purpose of having children. For as the 
husbandman throwing the seed into the ground awaits the harvest, not sowing more upon it, so to us the 
procreation of children is the measure of our indulgence in appetite.” 
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  There is little need beyond this point to demonstrate the austerity of the early 
Christian sexual ethic. The importance of this discussion, however, is two-fold.  First, it 
demonstrated that while very compatible with the Greco-Roman sexual ideals, the early 
Christian sexual ethic was motivated by its own theological adaptation of the Jewish 
concern for avoiding idolatry and behaving with conduct that does not dishonour God.  In 
addition, it was the belief in the sanctification of body and soul through union with Christ 
and empowerment by the Holy Spirit that not only led the early Christians to feel the 
need to avoid idolatry and behaviour dishonouring to God, but also to feel that their 
behaviours should reflect the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit in the transformation of 
their own nature.  The adaptation of the Greco-Roman language pertaining to sexuality 
was not born out of an adoption of Greco-Roman philosophical speculation, but out of a 
need to communicate cross culturally with credibility.  With this in mind, it is difficult to 
agree with scholars, such as Brown or Shaw,432 who see the origins of Christian sexual 
sensibilities as a simple adoption of the broader Greco-Roman perspectives.  Second, this 
discussion also should have demonstrated that social theories that define ascetic 
behaviour as resistance to cultural norms, or as forces for change within a given power 
structure, are not supported by the historical data, at least in terms of early Christianity.  
Rather than resisting the Greco-Roman norms of sexual austerity and advocacy of sex for 
procreation, early Christianity, through a process of its own, engaged in a set of norms 
that were not only in complete agreement with the culture, but in some cases even more 
strict in their enforcement of those norms.  There was simply no challenge by early 
Christians to the sexual sensibilities found in the philosophical writings of the culture.  
Working from the redefinition of asceticism developed in chapter one, it must also be 
                                                          
432 See Chapter One, pp. 28-29. 
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 remember that ascetics make up only a minority of the population within a given religious 
group.  If that is the case, then, the engagement of celibacy by that minority of early 
Christians did not challenge either the broader sexual ethic of early Christianity or the 
broader sexual ethics of the Roman Empire.  Rather, as will be demonstrated, the 
asceticism of early Christianity embraced the sexual austerity of the early Christian 
church, and attempted to make the reality of the transformation of human nature in Christ 
a present and immanent reality through the acetic discipline of body and soul. 
V. Theological Motivations for Early Christian Celibacy 
 In searching for the motives of early Christian celibacy it is critical to focus the 
examination of the early Christian texts upon the distinction between sexual morality that 
would be expected of all early Christians and the ideal of celibacy associated with ascetic 
discipline and effort.  Recalling the redefinition of asceticism offered in chapter one, it 
must be remembered that the negative renunciation of a permissible natural act is one of 
the central elements of ascetic behaviour.  In the case of early Christian celibacy, the key 
question is to ask what would motivate an early Christian to renounce sexual intercourse 
when it was a permissible (within the proper bounds of marriage) and expected part of 
fulfilling God’s command to procreate?  If it were possible, as early Christian texts seem 
to argue, for every Christian to avoid sexual activity that was connected with idolatry, or 
a clear dishonour to God, why would sexual activity be renounced altogether?  And, if the 
dangers of sin associated with the pre-resurrection body could be overcome through one’s 
union with Christ and submission to the Holy Spirit, why would some early Christians 
still feel it necessary to be celibate as well?  In short, if sexual intercourse would be 
safely conducted within the proper boundaries set by theology and devotion to God, why 
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 give it up completely?  The answer to these questions can be found by a review of the 
texts that were examined in chapter two, but now they are to be examined in the light of 
the proper early Christian context where the ambiguities of the texts can be gleaned for 
the early Christian motivation for celibacy. 
A. The New Testament Texts and the Apostolic Fathers 
 The first group of texts examined were those from the New Testament and from 
the period of the Apostolic Fathers.  Knowing that these texts worked from an assumed 
sexual austerity rooted in the avoidance of idolatry and dishonourable conduct, and from 
a distinctly Christian expectation that human nature could be transformed through Christ 
and the Holy Spirit, we can see that for early Christians living before the mid-second 
century, sexual abstinence was embraced as part of the broader Christian expectation of 
sexual purity or as a choice in the hopes of making the sanctification of their human 
nature, both physical and spiritual, a more imminent reality in the present.  For example, 
in I Cor. 7, all Christians were expected to abstain from improper intercourse out of the 
obligation to avoid porneia, including young people who had not married, those who had 
married but now remained abstinent or had divorced, and widowed individuals as well.433  
Yet there was another group who had chosen to embrace celibacy unnecessarily, and had 
either divorced over the matter and had attempted to convince others to do the same or go 
unmarried, apparently defending their actions on the basis that “it is well for a man not to 
                                                          
433 In this instance, Paul is using enkrateia to simply refer to sexual control, and not celibacy. For example, 
in I Cor. 7:8-9, Paul encourages the unmarried and widows who cannot exercise enkrateia to marry. At this 
point, Paul does not (intentionally, I think) make a distinction between sexual renunciation as an ascetic 
practice and avoiding sexual intercourse as moral expectation of all members of the church in order to 
prevent porneia. Ultimately, he sees advantages for celibacy in its ability to allow undistracted devotion 
and sanctification in Christ, but self-control (enkrateia) is expected of everyone in the church. In that 
respect, Paul does but does not think that abstinence is required for sanctification of the body to happen, 
and the use of the term enkrateia by the celibates in Corinth to mean complete sexual renunciation is 
“allowed” by Paul so long as they do not attempt to enforce it unnecessarily upon others.  
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 touch a woman”(I Cor. 7:1). Paul’s apparent lack of response is puzzling, as he simply 
agrees that it is better to be unmarried, since to be unmarried leaves the individual free 
from “anxiety” about “the affairs of the Lord” (7:32-35).  However, Gordon Fee argues 
that Paul’s statement is made in continuity with 7:29-31 and its clear presentation of 
eschatological immanence, and, therefore, the “anxiety about the affairs of the Lord (ta 
tou kuriou) more properly reflects a concern over their new eschatological existence 
in Christ.434  Under this interpretation, it could be said that those who chose celibacy 
were concerned for the state of their eschatological existence, and felt that only the 
unmarried were free to be completely “holy in body and spirit” (v.34), while attempting 
to enforce celibacy on those who could not, or did not, want to be celibate. Still, the 
celibates in Corinth, it seems, felt the need to abstain from intercourse in order to achieve 
more fully the sanctification of body and soul in the present prior to the return of Christ. 
 I Timothy, as well, reflects a similar situation.  There were widows who obviously 
no longer needed to be sexually active for procreation, and therefore were required to 
avoid sexual conduct to prevent porneia, as any Christian should.  But, there also seemed 
to be young women choosing celibacy and wishing to be enrolled in the class of widows, 
likely in order to receive the same charity that the widows did since they did not have 
families of their own.  The author of I Timothy shows a clear concern that a young girl or 
widow might still be under the influence of “sensual desire,”435 which would lead her to 
an alienation from Christ.  Assuming a similar eschatological interpretation as the one 
used for I Cor. 7, and knowing that I Tim. 4:3 indicates that eschatological fervour had 
                                                          
434 Fee, I Corinthians, p. 343. 
435 The Greek term here for “sensual desire” is katastrhniaswsin, from strhniaw, which according 
to Bauer’s Greek-English Lexicon and Liddel & Scott was a rare word used to convey the image of  
“running riot” or “wanton sensuality.”  
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 also led some to reject marriage,436 it makes sense to argue that in Asia Minor also some 
Christians had chosen to renounce sexual intercourse in order to aid in the sanctification 
of their nature.  In this case, though, the author of I Timothy seems sceptical that the 
desires and sin of the body have lost their potency until age and maturity in Christ have 
proven it.437 
 The passage in Revelation 14, as well, though not indicating any concern for the 
broader sexual norms of the early Christian communities, does indicate that the practice 
of sexual renunciation was meant to be an aid to the transformation of body and soul.  
The one hundred and forty four thousand that had remained faithful in John’s apocalyptic 
vision were described as those “who have not defiled themselves with women, for they 
are virgins” (Rev. 14:4).  While the argument made earlier was that though this reference 
is clearly not historical in nature, it does reflect the honour granted to celibates, in that 
“virgins” were included in a literary representation of God’s redeemed people. The 
passage also gives support to the thesis that celibacy was thought to aid in the 
transformation of the individual into the eschatologically redeemed person in Christ.  The 
full description of these “virgins” in Rev. 14:13 follows:  “they have been redeemed from 
humankind as the first fruits for God and the Lamb, and in their mouth was no lie found; 
they are blameless.”  This description, in fact, is classic early Christian language of the 
results of God’s transformation of his people through Christ.  They are the first fruits of a 
                                                          
436 I Tim. 4:1-3 reads “Now the Spirit expressly says that in later times some will renounce the faith by 
paying attention to deceitful spirits and teachings of demons, through the hypocrisy of liars whose 
consciences are seared with a hot iron.  They forbid marriage and demand abstinence from foods, which 
God created to be received with thanksgiving by those who believe and know the truth.” 
437 I Tim 5: 9-10: “Let a widow be put on the list if she is not less than sixty years old and has been married 
only once; she must be well attested for her good works, as one who has brought up children, shown 
hospitality, washed the saints' feet, helped the afflicted, and devoted herself to doing good in every way.” 
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 new creation438 and their nature has been transformed to the point where there is no guile 
in them whatsoever and they are considered pure as one who is blameless.  Again, though 
not historical, this passage does show that within some areas of the early church, at least 
in the areas of Asia Minor where the letter would have been read, the practice of celibacy 
was clearly understood as one that aids in the transformation and sanctification of the 
individual in God’s kingdom. 
 The concern for the sanctification of both body and soul is carried forward into 
the texts of the Apostolic Fathers, as well, and so is every indication that some Christians 
considered celibacy as a means of present and immanent transformation of their nature. 
In his appeal for unity in the Church at Corinth, Clement asks that those who dwell in 
continence refrain from boasting since it is a gift granted to them by God.  What is of 
interest for this study is that immediately following this appeal, Clement justifies it by 
reminding those who boast to have humility in light of the dramatic transformation that 
has taken place in them:   
Let him that is pure in the flesh not grow proud of it, and boast, knowing that 
it was another who bestowed on him the gift of continence (enkrateia). Let us 
consider, then, brethren, of what matter we were made, who and what manner 
of beings we came into the world, as it were out of a sepulcher, and from utter 
darkness. He who made us and fashioned us, having prepared His bountiful 
gifts for us before we were born, introduced us into His world. Since, 
therefore, we receive all these things from Him, we ought for everything to 
give Him thanks; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.439 
 
Note how he focuses on the constitution of their nature prior to Christ, and the darkness 
from which they were saved.  Again, some early Christians in Corinth were connecting 
celibacy with the transformation of the individual as part of salvation.  Granted, 
                                                          
438 The connection between the redemption of the body and soul is often made by comparing the redeemed 
in Christ and the Spirit to the “first fruits”, the best of the harvest offered to God. See especially, Rom. 
8:23, 11:16; I Cor. 15:20-23; 2 Thess. 2:2. 
439 I Clement, 38. 
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 Clement’s comments do not contain the imminence of eschatological expectations found 
in the New Testament, but it is safe to assume that the goal was still the transformation of 
the individual in the present. 
 Likewise Ignatius and Polycarp show that celibacy was rooted in the 
transformation of the individual in Christ.  Ignatius’ letter to Polycarp, like Clement, 
warns against celibates boasting in their achievement, lest their boasting undo the 
transformation that celibacy has granted.  Ignatius writes “If he [the celibate one] boast, 
he is lost, and if it be made known to any except the bishop, he is polluted. 
(e0fqartai)”440 The language of pollution (fqeirw)441 is a clear indication of a 
detriment to one’s nature, the opposite of purity in fact, showing celibacy’s ability to 
affect personal purity and spiritual sanctity.  Similarly, Polycarp’s letter to the 
Philippians,442 though ambiguous in its reference to celibates in his church,443 associates 
being cut off from lust (epithumia) as the root of purity and the transformation of the 
individual by the Holy Spirit.  Indeed, he too quotes Paul’s letter to the Galatians and how 
the spirit transforms the individual to naturally curb evil and lust, and how those lusts, 
which remain in the individual, war against the spirit.  Whether his reference to virgins 
and young men who remain pure is an indication of celibacy as an ascetic practice or 
simply the sexual austerity expected of the unmarried is unclear, but his understanding of 
how life in Christ and the Spirit makes human nature pure is difficult to dismiss. 
                                                          
440 Ignatius, Letter to Polycarp, V. 
441 According to Liddel & Scott, the Greek verb fqeirw, connotes a breaking down or disintegration, a 
corruption of some thing’s being or makeup. Likewise, Kittel (TDNT, Vol. IX, p. 97) notes that Aristotle 
used the word as the antithesis of ginomai, or the acts of becoming, and Plato uses the negated form, 
a)fqeirw, as the conceptual marker for his indestructible soul (yuxh). 
442 Polycarp, Letter to the Philippians, V. 
443 See Chapter Two, p. 61ff. 
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 Up to this point in early Christian history, around the first third of the second 
century, the speculation of the ontological relationship between the body and soul, lust, 
sin, and sanctification remained relatively simple.  As we have seen from the New 
Testament and the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, the expectation is simply that 
transformation of the body and soul in Christ is a given, and should result in holiness in 
both body and soul.  The delayed eschatological fulfillment of bodily resurrection meant 
that the body, and the sin that still remained there, made the “lusts” of the body an 
immanent danger, and every Christian was expected to walk carefully in regard to the 
desires of the body.  However, there were, it seems, a small number of early Christians 
who believed that despite the fact that resurrection had not yet occurred, it was still 
possible to discipline the body to align its nature with the new nature granted to the soul 
through Christ and the Spirit.  In that respect, the enkratia, or self-mastery, expected of 
all Christians came to mean complete continence for some of them.  Thus, in the texts of 
the early stages of Christian history, we see enkrateia being used to describe both the 
self-control expected of all Christians, and, occasionally, to describe the specific practice 
of sexual renunciation. As well, there is evidence of disagreements about the 
“superiority” of celibacy over the accepted sexual austerity of the broader population of 
early Christians, and whether it truly could transform nature in the way that the 
proponents of celibacy argued.  Indeed, Paul’s comments in Corinthians demonstrate that 
some felt was celibacy superior while others did not. I Timothy shows a decided 
pessimism about celibacy’s superiority since young celibates were prohibited from being 
included on the list of widows until their “superiority” was proven through maturity and 
service.  Revelation is fairly positive of celibacy’s potency and places the “virgins” 
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 among the 144,000 among God’s elect. Finally, Ignatius warns against boasting of 
superiority on the basis of celibacy, since it is a gift from God, but Hermas includes it 
among the chief of virtues.444 
B. Mid to Late Second Century Texts 
 The historical picture, then, is one where by the early part of the second century 
there is some minor dispute over whether celibacy provides a superior purity or holiness 
to the body, with some engaging in it and the majority not.  However, the picture of 
celibacy given by the apologists of the mid to late second century shows that a shift had 
occurred in the perception of celibacy in the early Christian church.  In essence, celibacy 
had come to be accepted as superior to sexual austerity, and the discussion in the early 
church would move to another level where it was debated whether celibacy was 
necessary for the true Christian who had been transformed by Christ and the Holy Spirit.  
We know that this shift had occurred for two reasons.  First, as we saw from chapter two 
of this thesis, we know that by the middle of the second century there were celibate 
Christians nearly everywhere that Christians existed, many of whom had been celibate all 
their lives. In addition, non-Christians, such as Galen, identified Christians by their 
embrace of celibacy, which would have been unusual even to the sexually austere Greeks 
and Romans, thus making the early Christian celibates quite unique. Second, early 
Christian texts on celibacy from the mid to late second century show the development of 
philosophical, theological and popular literature that was dialoguing intensely over the 
issue of celibacy as a necessity for true Christian transformation. 
 As the early Christians began to debate whether celibacy was a necessary element 
of sanctification, the nature of the debate also changed due to the fact that early 
                                                          
444 See Chapter Two, p. 65ff. 
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 Christianity had lost its connection with Judaism early in the second century.  The most 
important change was that in order to argue for or against the necessity of celibacy, an 
ontology of body and soul more sophisticated than the relatively simple speculations 
inherited from Judaism needed to be developed and incorporated with the early Christian 
teleology of salvation.  What is interesting for this study is that since the early Christians 
did not have a complex ontology of human anthropology, or at least had only a very 
simple one inherited from Judaism, they seemed to have turned to the “default” ontology 
of human anthropology found in the Greco-Roman philosophy.  Consequently, many of 
the positions on body and soul found in Greco-Roman philosophical speculation were 
employed by the early Christians of the second century in their debates over celibacy.  
Not only would this be natural for them, as the weakness of sin found in the body in 
Christian theology is more than compatible and similar with the weakness of the body 
accepted by Greco-Roman schools of philosophy, it would also lend credibility to their 
arguments as they could support their positions with the wisdom accepted by the culture 
as well as scripture.  The result of this new situation in the second century was an 
increased sophistication of early Christian speculation and theology concerning the body 
and soul, and an intense debate over celibacy that contained a unique blend of early 
Christian theological argument and Greco-Roman philosophical perspectives. 
 First, before demonstrating the nature of the more sophisticated speculation on 
celibacy, it is important to remember that though employing the language of Greco-
Roman philosophy to prove their positions, early Christians who held to the superiority of 
celibacy still understood it primarily in the light of salvation and a transformed existence. 
Looking again at the Apocryphal Acts, which date from the mid second to the early third 
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 century, it is clear that while the more educated elements of early Christianity began to 
debate the matter of celibacy using the language and wisdom of Greco-Roman 
philosophy, the broader population of early Christianity retained the simpler view of the 
New Testament and Apostolic fathers.  Looking through the texts of the Apocryphal Acts, 
which scholars generally agree represent popular notions of celibacy,445 a straightforward 
connection between celibacy and early Christian ideas about salvation is clearly 
detectable.  For example, the story of Paul and Thecla included a sermon preached by 
Paul that was basically an adaptation of the Sermon on the Mount, only now praising 
celibacy.446  In it there was a clear reference to individuals who had remained chaste 
instead of marrying, as well as those who “have wives as not having them”, that is remain 
celibate even within marriage.  More importantly, “Paul’s” sermon makes clear 
connections between celibacy and the teleological concepts of early Christian theology. 
His sermon links self-control (enkrateia) with the resurrection, grants the blessing of 
God’s presence to the chaste since they are God’s temple, and claims that the purity of the 
virgin is a work of salvation that will protect the celibate from the judgement of Christ.447 
Moreover, the transformation of Thecla as a heroic individual is all the more potent due 
to her virginity, and her days as a celibate ascetic are marked by extra long life and the 
ability to heal.448  While not elaborating any ontology of body and soul in great detail, 
this story shows that celibacy was popularly seen as connected to the resurrection, 
salvation and the transformation of the individual.  Paul and Thecla of the Acts are 
                                                          
445 See Chapter Two, pp. 71-75. 
446 See Chapter Two, pp. 73-74. 
447 Acts of Paul and Thecla, 2:5-6. 
448 A number of the manuscripts of the Acts of Paul and Thecla contain stories of her performing miracles 
and healings, most ending their accounts with Thecla having spent seventy-two years as a celibate living in 
a cave.   
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 literary characters designed to show the superiority of celibacy, and it is clear that many 
early Christian saw celibacy as a sign of a truly transformed life. 
 Carrying on, the centrality of the issue of living a transformed life in the present is 
also apparent from the more sophisticated speculations of early Christians of the educated 
and clerical classes.  On the one hand, a more sophisticated speculation about how 
celibacy aids in the present transformation of human nature was based in the adaptation 
of Greco-Roman philosophical proofs concerning the body and soul. There was already a 
deep suspicion of the inherent weaknesses of the body and a soul could be led astray 
through sensation and the experience of pleasure, and early Christian apologists could 
easily appeal to that suspicion to support the practice of celibacy.  Athenagoras, for 
example, in describing the sexual practices of Christians to Marcus Aurelius,449 tells the 
emperor that in hopes of gaining the teleological goal of “eternal life,” the early 
Christians despised the “pleasures of the soul,”450 and encouraged married men to relate 
to their wives “with a view to nothing more than procreation,” as the “limit set for the 
indulgence of lust (epithumia).”  As was demonstrated in chapter three, to place firm 
boundaries on pleasure and desire and to engage in sexual activity for the sake of 
procreation was accepted as virtue in every major philosophical school, and Athenagoras 
knew that the Christian position would have be duly impressive since it agreed with the 
wisdom of Greece and Rome.  Moreover, when Athenagoras mentions the celibates 
among the early Christians, he informs us that they have renounced sexual intercourse, 
                                                          
449 Athenagoras, Plea for the Christians, 33-35.  
450 Note the connection of pleasure with the soul. The early Christians have adopted the Greco-Roman 
notion that the source of desire and pleasure is the soul, and not the body. More will be said when the works 
of Clement of Alexandria are examined.  
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 not only to be virtuous, but also “in the hope of being united more closely with God”.  
Indeed, Athenagoras continues:   
But if remaining in virginity and in the state of a eunuch brings [one] nearer 
to God, while the indulgence of carnal thought and desire leads away from 
Him, in those cases in which we shun the thoughts, much more do we reject 
the deeds.451 
 
In that regard, Athenagoras clearly shows that some early Christian celibates expected a 
transformation of their nature that included both the extirpation of lustful thoughts, as 
well as lustful deeds.  It is easy to see, then, the adaptation of Greek philosophical 
language to explain a Christian theological perspective. 
 Justin Martyr, as well, engages his audience using Greek philosophical language 
to defend early Christian celibacy.  The text examined in chapter two of this thesis from 
his On the Resurrection is a good example.452 In describing celibate Christians who had 
refrained from sexual intercourse for their entire lives, Justin brings the discussion firmly 
into the Aristotelian speculation on the sexual appetites of the body.  For Aristotle, the 
sexual appetites (epithumia) were present due to the function of the body for 
reproduction, and in Aristotle’s view the appropriate use of sexual intercourse should be 
based upon fulfilling that function and for no other reason.453  Thus Aristotle would see 
sexual intercourse in a controlled manner as a necessary part of human nature.  Justin, 
however, indicates that some early Christians had considered human nature in light of 
eschatological salvation, and deemed the natural function of the sexual appetites to no 
longer be necessary. Indeed, for Justin, celibacy demonstrated that Aristotle did not 
understand that the natural function of a body part does not make its employment 
                                                          
451 Athenagoras, Plea for the Christians, 33. 
452 See Chapter Two, pp. 66-67. 
453 See Chapter Three, pp. 138-44. 
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 necessary.  Justin defends the early Christians who practice celibacy by arguing that now 
that sexual desire is no longer necessary for those redeemed in Christ, desire has been 
made “lawless” for some, since it has no purpose in the new eschatological era.  Indeed, 
Jesus was the ultimate example in that his coming was intended to destroy “lawless 
desire,”454 and though he submitted himself to other conditions of the body, that is, the 
need for food, drink and clothing, he did not submit to sexual desire because it was no 
longer necessary.  Thus Justin adapts the Aristotelian view of the natural functions of the 
body in order to demonstrate that celibacy reflects the sanctification of the body, which is 
normally to be fully realized in the final resurrection, but now made immanently present 
through sexual renunciation.  In that regard, Justin is very positive in his assessment of 
the possibility of eschatological transformation of the body in the present era. 
 On the other hand, there were also early Christians who developed a more 
sophisticated defence of celibacy on the basis of theological speculation, again firmly 
rooted in the idea that the practice of sexual renunciation reflected a sanctification of 
body in the present.  A good example of this would be Eusebius’ account of the letter by 
Dionysus written to Pinytas, the second century Bishop of Corinth, asking Pinytas to 
refrain from making celibacy compulsory in his parish.455  Dionysius appeals to Pinytas’ 
                                                          
454 “And our Lord Jesus Christ was born of a virgin, for no other reason than that He might destroy the 
begetting by lawless desire, and might show to the ruler that the formation of man was possible to God 
without human intervention. And when He had been born, and had submitted to the other conditions of the 
flesh, — I mean food, drink, and clothing, — this one condition only of discharging the sexual function He 
did not submit to; for, regarding the desires of the flesh, He accepted some as necessary, while others, 
which were unnecessary, He did not submit to. For if the flesh were deprived of food, drink, and clothing, it 
would be destroyed; but being deprived of lawless desire, it suffers no harm.” On the Resurrection, III. 
455 Eusebius writes “Among these is inserted also another epistle addressed to the Cnosians, in  
which he exhorts Pinytus, bishop of the parish, not to lay upon the brethren a grievous and 
compulsory burden in regard to chastity, but to have regard to the weakness of the multitude. 
Pinytus, replying to this epistle, admires and commends Dionysius, but exhorts him in turn to 
impart some time more solid food, and to feed the people under him when he wrote again, with 
more advanced teaching, that they might not be fed continually on these milky doctrines and 
imperceptibly grow old under a training calculated for children. In this epistle also Pinytus’ 
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 pity to have compassion on the weakness of the average person, while Pinytus 
respectfully replies that Dionysius should allow the members of his congregation to grow 
in maturity.  By using Paul’s metaphor that a child can only consume milk but an adult 
can eat meat (I Cor. 3:1-2), and that the child can be ready for meat only after it has 
matured, Pinytas implies that celibacy represents the practice of those who have matured 
as individuals. Consequently, he encourages Dionysius to let his congregation mature 
instead of letting them “grow old under a training calculated for children.”  Interestingly, 
this passage shows that while debating whether celibacy was necessary for the mature 
Christian, it reveals that the crux of the issue seemed to be whether the body could be 
redeemed through “training” to such an extent in everyone, or only in the few.  Dionysius 
seems to be sceptical of the redemption of the body among the broader population of 
early Christians, while Pinytus is more optimistic that all Christians should be capable of 
it. 
 Irenaeus seems to agree with Pinytus, but in a conditional manner based upon the 
most extensively systemized theological speculation in early Christianity to that point in 
Christian history.  John Behr has provided the most recent scholarly summary of 
Irenaeus’ theology and how it relates to asceticism,456 and lacking the space to explore 
Irenaeus’ theology fully, it must suffice to summarize Irenaeus’ views.  Behr summarizes 
Irenaeus’ theology as an “economy” of salvation where the development of the human 
race is an intentional series of acts by God in order to create humans fully in his image 
through a progressive program of maturation.  In essence, God created humans knowing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
orthodoxy in the faith and his care for the welfare of those placed under him, his learning and his 
comprehension of divine things, are revealed as in a most perfect image.” Church History, IV. 23. 
6-10. 
456 See J. Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000) and his 
article “Irenaeus AH 3.23.5 and the Ascetic Ideal” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 37.4 (1993): 305-
13. 
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 that they would sin and fall, but that the process of redemption is what fully produces the 
image of God in freedom to love and serve God.457  In particular, both body and soul are 
sinful, but both are redeemed through Christ and the Holy Spirit.  In that regard, for 
Irenaeus, Christ and the Spirit were both present to humankind at creation, though in a 
limited capacity during the previous sinful era, but only became fully present to them at 
the incarnation, resurrection and Pentecost.458  For Irenaeus, Behr argues, Christ and the 
Spirit are then fully engaged in the present eschatological era in the regeneration of both 
body and soul.  Every individual, from birth to death to final resurrection, is in a process 
of growth, and for Irenaeus, the role of asceticism is a positive one, but conditional upon 
one’s stage in the progress of growth and regeneration.459  For Irenaeus, if asceticism is 
                                                          
457 Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, pp. 68-85. Behr shows that Irenaeus saw human nature as slowly 
being perfected by the Holy Spirit as people became slowly accustomed to bearing the image of God, 
which they were clearly unready for in the Garden. For Irenaeus, through the gift of communion with the 
Spirit, humanity is progressively transformed into the image of God: “But we do now receive a certain 
portion of His Spirit, tending towards perfection, and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little 
accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms “an earnest,” that is, a part of the honor 
which has been promised us by God, where he says in the Epistle to the Ephesians, “In which you also, 
having heard the word of truth, the Gospel of your salvation, believing in which we have been sealed with 
the Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance.” This earnest, therefore, thus dwelling in 
us, renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality. “For you,” he declares, 
“are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you.” This, however does not 
take place by a casting away of the flesh, but by the impartation of the Spirit. For those to whom he was 
writing were not without flesh, but they were those who had received the Spirit of God, “by which we cry, 
Abba, Father.” If therefore, at the present time, having the earnest, we do cry, “Abba, Father,” what shall it 
be when, on rising again, we behold Him face to face; when all the members shall burst out into a 
continuous hymn of triumph, glorifying Him who raised them from the dead, and gave the gift of eternal 
life? For if the earnest, gathering man into itself, does even now cause him to cry, “Abba, Father,” what 
shall the complete grace of the Spirit effect, which shall be given to men by God? It will render us like unto 
Him, and accomplish the will of the Father; for it shall make man after the image and likeness of God.” 
(Against Heresies, 5.8.1) 
458 Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, p. 59. Behr notes that for Irenaeus there is a distinct difference 
between the “animation” provided by the Holy Spirit to humankind in the Garden, and the “vivification”, or 
formation of a truly real life lived in the Spirit. Speaking of the Gnostic Ebionites, Irenaeus writes:  “… 
they remain in that Adam who had been conquered and was expelled from paradise: not considering that, at 
the beginning of our formation in Adam, that breath of life which proceeded from God, having been united 
to what had been fashioned, animated the man, and manifested him as a being endowed with reason; so 
also, in [the times of] the end, the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having become united with the 
ancient substance of Adam’s formation, rendered man living and perfect, receptive of the perfect Father, in 
order that as in the natural [Adam] we all were dead, so in the spiritual we may all be made alive.” (Against 
Heresies, 5.1.3) 
459 Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, pp. 111-15. 
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 engaged before one is ready, or before a full knowledge and union with Christ has 
occurred, asceticism is of no avail to the individual.  Thus, in his Against Heresies, 
Irenaeus speaks of Encratites in the church460 and how they attributed sin to the body and 
God’s creation without the possibility of redemption. Further, Irenaeus explains that the 
Encratites are simply immature and not ready for asceticism, as they do not fully 
understand God yet, nor the role asceticism plays in the maturity of the individual.  As 
such, the Encratites engage their asceticism with their immature minds and bodies and, in 
his opinion, shown a counterfeit repentance that seeks to punish the body instead of 
humbly accepting regeneration.461  The true celibate simply responds to the Spirit, in both 
body and soul, and the harshness of the Encratites’ position simply reflects a nature that 
has not yet been truly transformed. In that regard, Irenaeus is quite positive about the 
possibility of human nature being transformed in Christ and the Spirit, but insistent upon 
patience and wisdom to determine whether one is mature enough to engage in celibacy.462 
 The most important witness to all of this, however, is Clement of Alexandria.  
Writing as a contemporary of Irenaeus and Athenagoras, Clement was well versed in both 
early Christian theology and in the philosophy of the empire.  Therefore, he was in a 
unique position to summarize and explain the variety of positions of celibacy, as well as 
comment on their theological and philosophical motivations.  The key text is book III of 
                                                          
460 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.28.1. 
461 Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, 118-21. In particular, Irenaeus is keen to note that the Encratites 
miss the point of the Genesis story, that the sin of Adam was rooted in the transgression of disobedience, 
not a following after the lusts of the body. As Behr points out, for Irenaeus, “It is the transgression which 
results in the loss of the childlike mind and so the ‘lustful propensity of the flesh’, and it is this which 
confused Adam, mistaking the symptom for the cause, then tries to control or negate [sin & guilt] by 
adopting a state of continence, one which ‘gnaws and frets the body’.” (p. 119) 
462 For Irenaeus, the key difference between “good” asceticism and “bad” asceticism seems to be whether 
the asceticism is “self-imposed” or out of a “natural” response to the Holy Spirit. In that way, the Encratites 
perform a “self-imposed” form asceticism that actually misses out on the blessings and joys of creation, 
while “natural” asceticism is marked by a reasoned response to the Holy Spirit that inspires continence out 
of freedom and obedience. In essence, For Irenaeus, only the mature believer was capable of responding to 
the Spirit to produce a reasonable asceticism. See Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, pp. 120-22. 
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 his Stromaties, which is essentially a treatise addressing the issue of celibacy in the latter 
part of the second century. Clement is yet another witness of both the sexual austerity 
expected of all Christians and the practice of celibacy in the early church.  More 
importantly, his discussion gives insight into the motivations behind celibacy as well as 
some indication of what issue was at the centre of the argument put forward by some 
early Christians that celibacy was a necessary part of the Christian life. 
 Book three of the Stromaties is basically divided in to three parts:  1) a description 
and summary of the various “heresies” regarding celibacy, 2) a refutation of those 
“heresies”, and 3) a description of the proper function and practice of celibacy as 
Clement understands it.  Essentially, Clement divides the “heretics” into two groups:   
Accordingly we may divide all the heresies into two groups in making answer 
to them. Either they teach that one ought to live on the principle that it is a 
matter of indifference whether one does right or wrong, or they set a too 
ascetic tone and proclaim the necessity of continence on the ground of 
opinions which are godless and arise from hatred of what God has created. 
First we may discuss the former group. 463 
 
 What is interesting is that in his lengthy discussions of these groups, it is apparent to 
Clement that the reasoning behind the actions of the “heretics” was rooted in their 
understanding of human nature, and the extent to which Christ and the Holy Spirit, in 
whatever way they understand them (i.e. Gnostic or orthodox), are able to redeem and 
sanctify human nature.  For Clement, then, the two poles of opinion on celibacy are the 
libertine pole, which assumes that human nature in Christ has been redeemed completely 
and therefore no longer needs boundaries placed upon it, and the Encratite pole, which 
assumed that the body, either by remaining in a pre-eschatological state of non-
resurrection, or by being subsumed in the Gnostic conception of evil material existence, 
                                                          
463 Stromaties, III. 40. 
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 must be disciplined as a necessary part of controlling sin until the soul is either freed 
from the body (Gnostic position) or the body is resurrected (orthodox position). 
 Looking at the Libertine position, Clement argues against early Christian thinkers 
such as Basilides, Carpocrates and Epiphanes as examples of those who have come to 
consider that their salvation had overcome the power of sin, and, therefore, they thought 
themselves free to live sexually unrestrained.  For example, Clement points out that 
Basilides and his followers suppose that because of their salvation in Christ “either that 
they have the power to commit sin because of their perfection, or indeed that they will be 
saved by nature even if they sin in this life because they possess an innate election.”464 
Clement notes that the followers of Prodicus, who participated in common sexual 
intercourse as a “mystery of communion,” thought to possess the freedom of Christ in 
their redeemed state and that sin no longer bound them under the Law.465  Clement’s 
judgement is that the libertine argument results in them “living lewder lives than the most 
uncontrolled heathen,” and that they bring a terrible blasphemy upon the name of 
Christ.466  In that respect, we see Clement both concerned for sexual immorality as 
activities that dishonour God, and for the misconception of the Libertine Christians that 
salvation has completely eliminated the effects and consequences of sin for human 
nature.   
 Similarly, according to Clement, the father and son duo of Carpocrates and 
Epiphanes, under the influences of Gnostic thought, convinced a small number of early 
Christians to hold their wives in common, including for sexual intercourse.467 In essence, 
                                                          
464 Stromaties, III. 3. 
465 Stromaties, III. 27-31. 
466 Stromaties, III. 3. 
467 Stromaties, III. 5. 
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 Carpocrates embraced a Gnostic conception of God where the entire universe, including 
human nature, emanated from the one God and therefore possessed a similar nature.  As 
the argument goes, his son Epiphanes suggested that because God’s righteousness was 
fair and equal,468 so human nature (as an emanation of the divine) must be fair and equal 
as well.  In that way, the manifest universality of God’s fairness could never encourage 
monogamy since “all beings beget and give birth alike, having received by God’s 
righteousness an innate equality.”469 It was only human sin that sought to create the 
inequality that produced laws against adultery when, in fact, all men were free to take the 
females of the community “just as the other animals do.”470 Clement’s response is pure 
condemnation, since Ephiphanes has clearly abolished “both law and gospel” by his 
position.471  Rather, Clement argues, the prohibitions against adultery and porneia are 
absolutely clear from scripture, and both Jesus and Paul even go so far as to warn against 
the desire (epithumia) that lingers dangerously in the body.  Clement gives two examples: 
Jesus had claimed that even to look upon a woman with desire was committing adultery, 
and Paul warned the Romans of the covetousness of desire (epithumia) that wars with the 
spirit (Rom. 7).472  In that regard, for Clement to deal with the libertine groups of early 
                                                          
468 Stromaties, III. 6. 
469 Stromaties, III. 7. 
470 Stromaties, III. 8.  
471 Stromaties, III. 8. 
472 Many of the ascetic texts of the early church appeal to the New Testament’s use of the verb “to desire” 
(e0piqumew) to translate “covet” when citing the commandment “Thous shalt not covet.” In reality, Paul 
(Rom. 7) and the synoptic authors had simply quoted the LXX text of the Decalogue. For a good survey of 
the effects of this on New Testament sexuality see W. Loader, The Septuagint, Sexuality and the New 
Testament: Case Studies on the Impact of the LXX in Philo and the New Testament (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004). In the case of ascetic use of scripture, Jesus’ instruction that to look upon a woman with 
lust is to commit adultery is understood to mean, “Thou shalt not lust”, without an object of desire (e.g. 
Clement, Stromaties, III.31; III.71). In addition, for ascetics in the early church, because Paul had used 
e0piqumew to translate “covet,” the command of the Decalogue also becomes “thou shalt not lust” 
without an object, in complete agreement with Jesus. For example, Clement writes “While on this point I 
think I must not commit mention of the fact that the apostle declares that the same God is the God of the 
law, the prophets, and the gospel. In the Epistle to the Romans he quotes the gospel saying "Thou shalt not 
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 Christians, it was simply a matter of showing them that sin obviously still existed within 
their nature and they were by no means free to let it run rampant. 
 Although recognising a number of different groups that had altogether rejected 
marriage and sexual intercourse as sinful,473 Marcion was the epitome of Encratites for 
Clement, and much of Book III of the Stromaties addressed Marcion’s doctrines.  In 
essence, Clement argues that the Marcionites have focused heavily upon on several 
philosophical concepts found in the metaphysical schools of Greek philosophy.  In 
particular, the Platonic and Pythagorean concept of the embodiment of a soul as a divine 
punishment had been over-emphasized by Marcion474 and resulted in Marcion’s denial of 
Creation as good and his emphasis on the need to purify the soul from the body.  Clement 
argues that Plato’s reference of the body as a prison for the soul (Phaedo), and the 
Pythagorean reference to the body as a tomb,475 have been plucked from the broader 
context of the cosmologies of those schools. In Clement’s view, Plato and Pythagoras 
gave no opening for the view that matter is evil, since both saw the goodness of the 
universe as emanating from the goodness of first principles of their systems of thought.476  
In addition, Clement argues that Marcion’s interpretation of scripture, especially of Paul, 
is largely a misinterpretation that encourages Christians to punish the body to control its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
lust" as if it were from the law, knowing that it is the one Father who is preached by the law and the 
prophets. For he says: “ ‘What shall we say? Is the law sin? God forbid. I had not known sin except through 
the law; and I had not known lust unless the law had said, Thou shalt not lust.’ Even if the heretics who are 
opposed to the Creator suppose that in the next sentence Paul was speaking against him when he says, ‘I 
know that in me, that is in my flesh, there dwells no good thing,’ yet let them read what precedes and 
follows this. For before it he says, ‘But sin which dwells in me,’ which explains why it was appropriate for 
him to say, ‘in my flesh dwells no good thing.’” (Stromaties, III. 76) In this way, many of early Christian 
texts commenting on Romans 7:7 or Matt. 5:27-28 argue that Jesus’ and Paul’s use of e0piqumew showed 
that the more accurate intention of the commandment was to extirpate desire (epithumia) altogether.  
473 Clement refers to the Encratism of Marcion, Tatian and Julius Cassianus, the founder of Docetism, and 
others of whom he only speaks of in general.  
474  Stromaties, III. 12-26. 
475 Stromaties, III. 17. 
476 Stromaties, III. 19.  
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 sinful impulses rather than submitting to the Spirit.477 Sexual renunciation, then, is 
Marcion’s way of controlling an unredeemable and sinful human body that could not be 
sanctified until resurrection.  Indeed, Clement notes that Marcion argued of himself : 
“how could he [Marcion] have a body of flesh that is not a corpse?” Further, Clement 
notes that Marcion also believed that “Because he [Marcion] rose from the tomb when 
the Lord killed his passions, that he began to live unto Christ.”478 Thus, Marcion saw sin 
and death reigning in his body, and that his sanctification began with the death of his 
sinful bodily passions.  
 For Clement, Marcion also makes another philosophical error that leads to his 
heretical conclusions.  In over-emphasising the body and matter as evil, Clement argues 
that Marcion misses the important fact that  “desire is not a bodily thing, though it occurs 
because of the body.”479 Clement is more than aware that all the major philosophical 
schools see desire (epithumia) located in the soul, and, as we saw in chapter three, both 
the metaphysical schools and material schools saw the inherent danger of body in being 
the object of the soul’s desire (epithumia), not the source of its weakness.  Indeed, the 
soul, whether metaphysical or corporeal, was always held to be superior, only it could be 
too easily led astray by focusing its contemplation on the body or mistaking physical 
sensations as a true representation of reality.  Clement, therefore, shows that the 
Encratites mistakenly linked sin and evil to the body, when sin and evil dwell in the soul, 
and the soul causes the body to fall into debauchery, or just as easily can act to keep the 
body pure.  In that regard, Clement can accuse the Encratites of abusing their freedom 
                                                          
477 Stromaties, III. 18. Note the similarity with Irenaeus’ view.  
478 Stromaties, III. 25. 
479 Stromaties, III. 34. See also III.59.  
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 and, ironically, being enslaved to the body through obsession with a mistaken 
understanding of the flesh. Clement writes: 
He who indulges his pleasures gratifies his body; but he who is controlled 
liberates from its passions his soul, which is master of the body. And if they 
tell us that we are called to freedom, only let us not use our freedom as an 
opportunity for the flesh, as the apostle says.480 
 
The Encratites, then, did not comprehend that the body was not evil by nature, or 
that it was not unredeemable through its relationship to the soul, which could be 
sanctified in the present by Christ and the Spirit. In that regard, the Encratites had a 
very negative view of the extent to which the body can be redeemed in the present 
eschatological era.    
Having shown that the heretical positions of libertine and Encratite Christians were 
based in a misconception of the nature of the body, and the extent to which salvation in 
Christ and the Spirit has redeemed the body in the present, Clement moves on to an 
exploration of what a true celibate understands about his or her nature.  In essence, 
Clement argues that the soul of the individual has been saved and regenerated by Christ 
and the Holy Spirit, and that while waiting for the full redemption of the body, celibacy is 
the superior path for the regenerated Christian, but not necessary for all, since not all 
have matured enough to be capable of it.  However, Clement is very positive in his 
estimation of the capacity for regeneration of the body in Christ and the Spirit, and 
therefore would expect all Christians to engage in asceticism on some level.  Indeed, if a 
Christian does not embrace a vowed, unmarried celibacy, Clement at the very least 
expected that “a man who marries for the sake of begetting children must practice 
continence so that it is not desire (epithumia) he feels for his wife, whom he ought to 
                                                          
480 Stromatie,s III. 41. 
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 love, and that he may beget children with a chaste and controlled will.”481 In that regard, 
Clement, though describing the weakness of sin in the body in the very terms of Greco- 
Roman philosophy, is absolutely convinced of the possibility that human nature, 
including the passions of the body, can be redeemed and sanctified. 
 First and foremost, like Irenaeus, Clement sees the transformation of the body and 
soul linked to their union with Christ and with the presence of the Holy Spirit.  Quoting 
Paul, Clement writes:  
So then, "if any man be in Christ he is a new creation," no longer inclined to 
sin; "old things are passed away," we have washed off the old life; "behold 
new things have happened," there is chastity instead of fornication, 
continence instead of incontinence; righteousness instead of 
unrighteousness.482   
 
Likewise, Clement also writes:   
In what follows he [Paul] continues, "But if I do that which I do not wish to 
do, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells in me," which being at war 
with the law of God and "of my mind," he says, "makes me captive by the 
law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am, who shall 
deliver me from this body of death." And again (for he does not become in 
the least weary of being helpful) he does not hesitate to add, "For the law of 
the Spirit has set me free from the law of sin and death," since by his Son 
"God condemned sin in the flesh that the righteousness of the law might be 
fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit." In addition to 
this he makes the point still clearer by saying emphatically, "The body is dead 
because of sin," indicating that if it is not the temple, it is still the tomb of the 
soul. For when it is dedicated to God, he adds, "the spirit of him who raised 
Jesus from the dead dwells in you, who shall also make alive your mortal 
bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you."483 
 
And again, interpreting Paul: 
"The mind of the flesh is death because those who live according to the flesh 
mind the things of the flesh, and the mind of the flesh is enmity against God. 
For it is not subject to the law of God. Those who are in the flesh cannot 
please God," not in the sense in which some teach, but in the sense which we 
                                                          
481 Stromaties III, 58. See also, III. 71.  
482 Stromaties, III, 62. 
483 Stromaties, III, 77. 
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 have already explained. Then by contrast to this he says to the Church: "But 
you are not in the flesh but in the spirit, if the Spirit of God dwells in you. If 
any man has not Christ's Spirit, he is none of his. But if Christ be in you, the 
body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness. So 
then, brethren, we are under an obligation, not to the flesh to live after the 
flesh. If you live after the flesh you shall die. But if by the Spirit you mortify 
the deeds of the body, you shall live. For all who are led by the Spirit of God 
are sons of God."484  
   
The union of Christ and the Spirit with the body creates a “new creation,” a 
resurrection,485 where the old passes away and the Spirit reigns in the body and soul in 
complete opposition to what used to be – sin, “the soul’s corruption.”486 Moreover, for 
Clement the union with Christ is not only in his resurrection, but in his death, meaning 
that what was considered the old man, who lived in rebellion and sin, should be 
considered “dead” with Christ:   
 So also the admirable Peter says: "Beloved, I exhort you as strangers and 
pilgrims, to abstain from carnal lusts, which war against the soul, and conduct 
yourselves well among the heathen; for this is the will of God that by doing 
good you should put to silence the activity of foolish men, as free and not 
using your freedom as a covering for evil, but as God's slaves." Likewise also 
Paul in the Epistle to the Romans writes: "We who are dead to sin, how shall 
we any longer live in it? Because our old man is crucified with him, that the 
body of sin might be destroyed," down to the words, "do not present your 
members as instruments of unrighteousness to sin."487 
 
Most importantly, for Clement this transformation creates a contrast between human 
anthropology before Christ and human anthropology after salvation and regeneration.  
Before union with Christ the sinful individual was marked by disobedience to God,488 
and the irrational behaviour of a nature dominated by desire (epithumia).  For example, 
Clement interprets Paul’s statement from Galatians thus:  “ ‘I am crucified with Christ, it 
                                                          
484 Stromaties, III. 78. 
485 Stromaties, III. 87. 
486 Stromaties, III. 63.   
487 Stromaties, III. 75. 
488 Stromaties, III. 94-95. 
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 is no longer I who live’ meaning that I used to live according to my lusts (epithumia), but 
Christ lives in me.”489  Or similarly, he interprets Jesus’ saying that in the age to come 
after resurrection and judgement there will be no marriage (Matt. 22:30) as proof that 
prior to salvation the soul and body were ruled by carnal desire.490 
 After union with Christ and the Spirit, human nature should be transformed into 
one that is obedient to God,491 but also, now portrayed by Clement with the philosophical 
language of the desire (epithumia) that looms in body and soul, a nature that sin no longer 
dominates.  For Clement, this is primarily achieved through redemption of the soul that 
has already begun its transformation through participation in the death and resurrection of 
Christ.  “For in truth,” Clement writes, “he [the Lord] did destroy the works of desire 
(epithumia), love of money, contentiousness, vanity, mad lust for women, pederasty, 
gluttony, licentiousness and similar vices.  Their birth is the soul’s corruption, since we 
are “dead in sins.”492  With the soul regenerated, the body must continue to submit to the 
soul to be “both pure and reasonable,”493 and one should live as though sin and desire no 
longer remain since Christ has destroyed them through his death. 
 So far, Clement’s argument is similar to the general position of early Christianity 
on sexual restraint.  The individual must live in a sexually austere manner, which reveals 
both an obedient nature and a life that is pure and an honour to God.  Life in Christ and 
the Holy Spirit should transform both body and soul, and for Clement, he is very positive 
                                                          
489 Stromaties, III. 106. 
490 Stromaties, III. 87. 
491 Stromaties, III. 95. 
492 Stromaties, III. 63. 
493 Stromaties, III. 79. Note that the use of “pure and rational” covers both the moral expectations passed 
down from early Christianity’s Jewish heritage (i.e purity), and the moral expectations of the philosophy of 
the Empire (i.e. rational virtue).  
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 about the extent that the desires of the body, though still deeply shaped by sin, can be 
sanctified in the present age.  Therefore, he can say: 
The human ideal of continence (enkrateia), I mean that which is set forth by 
Greek philosophers, teaches that one should fight desire and not be 
subservient to it so as to bring it to practical effect. But our ideal is not to 
experience desire at all. Our aim is not that while a man feels desire he 
should get the better of it, but that he should be continent even respecting 
desire itself.494   
 
For Clement, it seems, the transformation of the body and soul in Christ can be of such 
thoroughness, that even what the Greeks and Romans would have considered the inherent 
natural functions of desire (epithumia) in human anthropology could not only be 
controlled, but eliminated altogether. However, in arguing against the heretical positions 
of some early Christian groups, Clement is keen to preserve the notion that while the 
practice of celibacy can indeed aid in the transformation of human nature, it must also be 
practiced in maturity and in freedom. 
 First, Clement argues that celibacy cannot be enforced as a necessity because the 
process of regeneration for the body and soul is an ongoing set of works by Christ and the 
Spirit.  For Clement, the first movement of regeneration for the body and soul is to 
engage in the use of the soul’s powers in an appropriate manner, which can then grow 
into full asceticism only after further maturation where desire has been extirpated 
completely.  For example, Clement writes:   
He, then, who uses the soul's natural powers as is right, desires those things 
which are appropriate, and hates what is harmful, as the commandments 
prescribe: "Thou shalt bless him who blesses thee and curse him who curses 
thee." But when he has risen above these, passion and desire, and in very 
deed has begun to love the creation of the God and Creator of all things, then 
he will live a Gnostic life, as he has become like the Saviour and has attained 
to a state of continence no longer maintained with difficulty. He has united 
knowledge, faith, and love. Thenceforth he is one in his judgment and truly 
                                                          
494 Stromaties, III. 57. 
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 spiritual, wholly incapable of thoughts arising from passion and desire, one 
who is to be made perfect after the image of the Lord by the artist himself, a 
perfect man, already worthy to be called a brother to the Lord as well as his 
friend and son. Thus the "two" and the "three" come together into one and the 
same thing -- a Gnostic man.495  
 
The transformation into the “true Gnostic” is for one to be transformed into the likeness 
of Christ, where the image of God has been made perfect and the soul is no longer 
capable of passion and desire, yet united to God in love of the creator.496  Thus, unlike 
the Encratites of Gnostic character, celibacy was to proceed from a love of God and n
contempt of creation, and could only be achieved as one grew in faith, knowledge and 
love of God.
ot 
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 Second, Clement is adamant that Christians must have the freedom to mature at 
the pace chosen by them by God, though obviously recognizing the superiority of 
celibacy.  For example, Clement writes:   
 If it is lawful to live any sort of life one likes, obviously one may live in 
continence; or if any kind of life has no dangers for the elect, obviously one 
of virtue and self-control is far less dangerous. If the "lord of the Sabbath" 
has been given the right to pass uncorrected if he lives an immoral life, a 
fortiori there will be no correction for him who behaves decently. "All things 
are lawful, but all things are not expedient," says the apostle. If all things are 
lawful, obviously this includes self-control. Therefore if one who uses his 
power to live a virtuous life receives praise, then much more worthy of 
reverence and honour is he who has given us this free and sovereign power 
and has allowed us to live as we choose, not allowing us to become enslaved 
and subjected to necessity by our acts of choice and rejection. But both can 
495 Stromaties, III. 69. 
496 Love is without passion for Clement, for love is a reflection of the divine, which is also without passion. 
Perfected love, then, is rooted in the enjoyment of, and longing for, the fulfillment of union with God. In 
such a state, the desires of body and soul simply do not exist as human nature has been transformed into the 
likeness of God’s (i.e without passions). Stromaties, VI. 71-77. For a brief but solid discussion of Clement’s 
“apathetic” love, see A. Louth, “Apathetic Love in Clement of Alexandria” in E.A. Livingstone, ed., Papers 
of the 1983 Oxford Patristic Conference (Oxford, 1983), reprinted in International Conference on Patristic 
Studies, Vol. 18.3 (1989): 413-419.  
497 Stromaties, III. 51: “Therefore there is nothing meritorious about abstinence from marriage unless it 
arises from love to God.” 
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 have no anxiety, he who chooses incontinence [i.e. marriage] and he who 
chooses abstinence, yet the honour is not equal.498 
 
And again:   
In general all the epistles of the apostle teach self-control and continence and 
contain numerous instructions about marriage, begetting children, and 
domestic life. But they nowhere rule out self-controlled marriage. Rather they 
preserve the harmony of the law and the gospel and approve both the man 
who with thanks to God enters upon marriage with sobriety and the man who 
in accordance with the Lord's will lives as a celibate, even as each individual 
is caned,499 making his choice without blemish and in perfection.500 
 
Moreover, Clement is angered that an individual might choose celibacy on the basis of an 
unfounded rejection of marriage as a sin, or reject celibacy because he does not want to 
live alone.501  For Clement, if done with self-control (enkratia), both marriage and 
celibacy are choices to be made by the individual in response to the will of the Holy 
Spirit and according to the grace given to them by God.502  Some may choose celibacy, 
some may choose marriage; both are good, neither to be enforced, and Clement 
concludes:   
Celibacy may lawfully be chosen according to the sound rule, with godly 
reasons, provided that the person gives thanks for the grace God has 
granted, and does not hate the creation or reckon married people to be of no 
account. For the world is created: celibacy is also created. Let both give 
                                                          
498 Stromaties, III. 40-41. 
499 This rather arcane translation of J.Oulton and H. Chadwick (see The Library of Christian Classics: 
Volume II, Alexandrian Christianity: Selected Translations of Clement and Origin (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1954) employs the word “caned”, which refers to an older English usage of weaving or 
furnishing something from cane fibres, such as the seat of a chair. A more contemporary translation might 
substituted “woven” or “formed.”  
500 Stromaties, III. 86. 
501 Stromaties, III. 67: “Therefore a man ought not to think that marriage on rational principles is a sin, 
supposing that he does not look on the bringing up of children as being bitter (on the contrary to many 
childlessness is most grievous); but if a man regards the rearing of children as bitter because it distracts him 
from the things of God on account of the time it takes up, he may yet desire to marry because he does not 
take easily to a bachelor's life. What he wants to do is not harmful if it is done with self-control; and each 
one of us is master of his own will in deciding whether to beget children.” 
502 Stromaties III. 57:  “This chastity cannot be attained in any other way except by God's grace. That was 
why he said ‘Ask and it shall be given you.’ This grace was received even by Moses, though clothed in his 
needy body, so that for forty days he felt neither thirst nor hunger.” 
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 thanks for their appointed state, if they know to what state they are 
appointed.503 
 
C. Third Century Texts 
 Up to this point in the chapter, the early Christian texts on celibacy have been 
surveyed to about the end of the second century in the hopes of finding the origins and 
motivations behind celibacy prior to the explosion of monasticism in the early fourth 
century.  Interestingly, it is the texts of the third century that provide the least evidence to 
help continue the exploration of the origins of celibacy in the early Church.  First, from 
the turn of the third century until the turn of the fourth century there is a small number of 
texts dealing with celibacy, and what does exist does not go into the kind of detail that 
would be helpful for our study.  For example, the Didascalia Apostolorum and Apostolic 
Constitutions simply provide rules for the interaction of celibates with members of their 
churches and in relation to the clergy, especially for women celibates, and the language 
used to describe them simply refers to them in terms of their purity.504 Interestingly, other 
texts that may provide help in understanding the motivations of celibacy into the third 
century primarily show a concern for identifying “true” virgins among pretenders, and for 
proper modes of interaction with each other and within the church.  For example, the two 
pseudonymous Letters to Virgins from the mid to late third century primarily show a 
concern for how celibates should conduct themselves within the church and out in the 
non-Christian world,505 and a concern that the “true” virgin is one who serves the church 
and does not live in idleness or compete for honours.506  Not surprisingly, what the letters 
do tell of their motivations describes the laying aside of desire that is at war with the 
                                                          
503 Stromaties, III. 105. 
504 See Chapter Two, pp. 86-88.  
505 See Chapter Two, p. 91, n. 225. 
506 Letter I.11, I. 7. 
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 Holy Spirit,507 and the transformation of their nature through the imitation of Christ and 
the sanctification of the Spirit508 in order to produce self-denial and good works.509  Even 
the Syrian Demonstrations of Aphrahat and Letter to Publius are primarily concerned 
with proper conduct of virgins,510 and the “true” identity of virgins being revealed in 
good works and reputation.511 The canons of the early church councils, too, only showed 
a similar concern for proper conduct among the churches and in regard to the clergy, and 
say nothing of early Christian motives for celibacy.    
 However, we do know a little of early Christian motivations for celibacy by the 
third century from a few texts. Tertullian, for example, in his works On Chastity and On 
the Veiling of Virgins, discusses the matter of celibacy in regard to local problems or 
personal questions,512 though he says very little about the motivations behind it.  Indeed, 
in his On Chastity, aside from acknowledging the three “species” of celibates in the 
church, he says nothing about the motivations of celibacy, but spends the duration of the 
                                                          
507 Letter I.8. 
508 Letter I.7: “Those, therefore, who imitate Christ, imitate Him earnestly. For those who have “put on 
Christ” in truth, express His likeness in their thoughts, and in their whole life, and in all their behaviour: in 
word, and in deeds, and in patience, and in fortitude, and in knowledge, and in chastity, and in long-
suffering, and in a pure heart, and in faith, and in hope, and in full and perfect love towards God. No virgin, 
therefore, unless they be in everything as Christ, and as those “who are Christ’s,” can be saved. For every 
virgin who is in God is holy in her body and in her spirit, and is constant in the service of her Lord, not 
turning away from it any whither, but waiting upon Him always in purity and holiness in the Spirit of God, 
being “solicitous how she may please her Lord,” by living purely and without stain, and solicitous to be 
pleasing before Him in every thing. She who is such does not withdraw from our Lord, but in spirit is ever 
with her Lord: as it is written, “Be ye holy, as I am holy, saith the Lord.” 
509 Letter I.1, I.3, I.9. 
510 S.H. Griffith, “ Asceticism in the Church of Syria: The Hermeneutics of Early Syrian Monasticism” in 
Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush, & R. Valantasis, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 235-36. 
For example, Aphrahat is particularly concerned with the cohabitation of male and female celibates.  
511 Griffith, Asceticism in the Church of Syria, p. 236. Griffiths quotes Ephraem’s Letter to Publius, where a 
vision of the next life showed who the true virgin was at judgement: “I saw there pure virgins whose 
virginity had been rejected because it had not been adorned with the good oil of excellent works….I also 
saw there those who did not have the title of virginity, but who were crowned with victorious deeds, their 
conduct having filled the place of virginity…. Let no man any longer trust the chaste reputation alone of 
virginity when it is deprived of the works which constitute the oil of the lamps.” See translation of text by 
S. Brock in “Ephrem’s Letter to Publius,” Le Museon 89 (1976): 286-87. 
512 See Chapter Two, pp. 82-85. 
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 text arguing against second marriage as an option for the widower who has written him. 
What he does say simply substantiates what is already apparent about the motivations for 
celibacy up until then: 
 The will of God is our sanctification, for He wishes His "image " – that is, 
us - to become likewise His "likeness;" that we may be "holy" just as Himself 
is "holy." That good - sanctification, I mean - I distribute into several species, 
that in some one of those species we may be found. The first species is, 
virginity from one's birth: the second, virginity from one's birth, that is, from 
the font; which (second virginity) either in the marriage state keeps (its 
subject) pure by mutual compact, or else perseveres in widowhood from 
choice: a third grade remains, monogamy, when, after the interception of a 
marriage once contracted, there is thereafter a renunciation of sexual 
connection. The first virginity is (the virginity) of happiness, (and consists in) 
total ignorance of that from which you will afterwards wish to be freed: the 
second, of virtue, (and consists in) contemning that the power of which you 
know full well: the remaining species, (that) of marrying no more after the 
disjunction of matrimony by death, besides being the glory of virtue, is (the 
glory) of moderation likewise; for moderation is the not regretting a thing 
which has been taken away, and taken away by the Lord God, without whose 
will neither does a leaf glide down from a tree, nor a sparrow of one farthing's 
worth fall to the earth. 513 
 
Similarly, when Tertullian argues against male celibates who seek to have an outward 
sign of their virginity in the same way that the female celibates did with the veil, he says:  
To what purpose, then, do they [male celibates] thrust their glory out of sight 
abroad, but expose it in the church? I demand a reason. Is it to please the 
brethren, or God Himself? If God Himself, He is as capable of beholding 
whatever is done in secret, as He is just to remunerate what is done for His 
sole honour. In fine, He enjoins us not to trumpet forth any one of those 
things which will merit reward in His sight, nor get compensation for them 
from men. But if we are prohibited from letting "our left hand know" when 
we bestow the gift of a single halfpenny, or any eleemosynary514 bounty 
whatever, how deep should be the darkness in which we ought to enshroud 
ourselves when we are offering God so great an oblation of our very body 
and our very spirit--when we are consecrating to Him our very nature! It 
follows, therefore, that what cannot appear to be done for God's sake 
(because God wills not that it be done in such a way) is done for the sake of 
men,--a thing, of course, primarily unlawful, as betraying a lust of glory.515 
                                                          
513 Tertullian, On Chastity, 1. 
514 An old Latin term meaning “of relating to, or supported by charity.” 
515 Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, XIII. 
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The male celibates, then, are seeking glory instead of receiving what honour God would 
give them for the offering of their bodies in a transformed nature. In that way, Tertullian 
simply acknowledges the accepted motivations of celibacy passed down from the second 
century: the sanctification of the individual and the transformation of human nature into 
the image of God.  
 Similarly, as Sydney Griffiths has shown, the îhîdāyā516 celibates of Syria showed 
concerns for purity and the transformation of their nature to that of the Christ.517 In 
particular, the îhîdāyā saw Christ as the heavenly Ihîdāyā, the only begotten Son of God 
who is singularly devoted to the Father and held in the bosom of God.518 Their goal, then, 
was to be imitators of Christ so that their nature would be transformed into one similar to 
Christ’s, thus bringing them into relationship with the Father where they, too, were held 
intimately in the heart of God. Practically, this seems to have meant that at their baptism 
they sought to “put on” Christ, as well as the very divinity found in the nature of God’s 
son. In that way, we see in a hymn written by Ephraem these themes merging in poetic 
form: 
 You to be baptized, who found this kingdom 
  In the very bosom of Baptism,  
 Step down, put on the Ihîdāyā 
  Who is Lord of the kingdom. 
 Blessed are you who have been crowned.519  
                                                          
516 The term îhîdāyā, roughly translated “single”, does not refer to the solitary nature of the monastic, but to 
“singular” devotion to God. See Chapter Two, p. 89. 
517 S.H. Griffith, “ Asceticism in the Church of Syria: The Hermeneutics of Early Syrian Monasticism” in 
Asceticism, V.L. Wimbush & R. Valantasis, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 220-245. 
518 Griffiths, Asceticism in the Church of Syria, pp. 225-27.  
519 This is Griffiths translation of the text found in E. Beck, Des heiligen Ephraem Des Syrers Hymnen de 
Paradiso und Contra Julianum, CSCO, vol. 174 (Louvain, 1957), p. 191. Whether it is from Beck’s 
German or the original Syriac is unclear. Griffiths also seems to think that this was one of many hymns 
composed specifically for those embracing celibacy at their baptism, though he does acknowledge that 
other scholars have argued that these hymns may have been addressed to all baptized persons regardless of 
whether they were ascetics. However, Griffiths argues that if that were the case, the ascetic îhîdāyā were 
still likely regarded as the higher ranked of the community of îhîdāyā because of their unique dedication 
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Moreover, to become like Christ was to take upon oneself the nature of Christ in his 
sacrifice and resurrection, and to stand as a type or example of Christ.520 In that way, the 
îhîdāyā were expected to show transformation into the image of Christ, and visibly 
express that image through service, devotion and good works in their community.521 
 While space has limited our survey of early to mid third century texts, which are 
cursory at best, it is clear that the perceived motivations behind celibacy, when 
discernable, were the same as those of their first and second century counterparts.  The 
celibates were concerned for continued purity and the transformation of their nature, only 
now the texts reveal a concern for engaging asceticism in a genuine manner, and this is 
not surprising since in chapter two we saw several instances of celibates inappropriately 
receiving honour due to others or unnecessarily taking advantage of the church’s charity 
for personal gain.  Otherwise, what is most interesting is the lack of discussion over the 
matter of celibacy compared to the second century texts, and the texts that do speak of 
celibacy are concerned primarily with correcting the behaviour of celibates.  What this 
shows is not a lack of interest in celibacy, but that by the beginning of third century 
celibacy had come to be accepted as a genuine means of sanctification in the church.  
Now that there was no dispute that it was an appropriate and superior path to follow, 
though not necessary for salvation, what remains of many of the third century texts is 
simply the early church’s attempts to place proper boundaries on the practice as it became 
commonplace in the church. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and role in the church, and therefore granted the right to carry the term îhîdāyā as a title. See Griffiths, 
Asceticism in the Church of Syria, pp. 226-27. 
520 Griffiths, Asceticism in the Church of Syria, pp. 231-34. 
521 Griffiths, Asceticism in the Church of Syria, pp. 235-38. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 A summary of the data, then, would look as follows:  the cosmological and 
anthropological views of the early church, inherited from Judaism, would have naturally 
placed boundaries on early Christian activity due to the need to avoid porneia, which 
included sexual activity associated with idolatry and sexual behaviour that dishonoured 
God.  Those concerns are apparent in the New Testament, and the New Testament 
Christians adopted many of the legal prohibitions from the Old Testament.  In addition, 
the developing theology of the early church also placed an emphasis upon the 
transformation of sinful human narture through a union with Christ and under the 
sovereignty of the Holy Spirit.  In early Christian theology, the eschatological 
expectations of salvation occurring in the present age opened up the possibility that the 
body could be transformed in the present to conform to the future resurrected “spiritual 
body.”  The result was a few isolated incidences of early Christians practicing celibacy (I 
Cor 7, I Tim 4-5) and a stream of thought making its way among the primitive church 
associating celibacy with the state of those redeemed at the future judgement (Rev 14).  
By the turn of the first century, it is clear that while sexual austerity was expected of all 
Christians in order to avoid porneia, a small number of early Christians still argued that 
human nature could be transformed in the present, and argued that it was a superior path, 
causing concern for church leaders such as Clement of Rome, Ignatius and Polycarp who 
felt the celibates had no right to boast.  By this point in history, the break with Judaism, 
assuming it was early, had left a speculative opening in the early church, which was by 
now largely non-Jewish.  The fact that early Christian sexual morals were very 
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 compatible with Greco-Roman philosophical ideals encouraged the apologists to appeal 
to the morality of Christians in their defences of the faith, even mentioning those lifelong 
celibates as example of their superior morality in regard to the empire.  So, too, the 
Apocryphal Acts showed that for some early Christians celibacy had gained a status of 
superior spiritual pursuit by the mid to late second century.  Indeed, celibacy had gained 
so much popularity that a minority of ascetic celibates, under various influences of both 
orthodox and Gnostic thought, suggested that sexual renunciation might be necessary to 
live out a fully transformed life. 
 At this point in early Christian history, by mid to late second century, there were 
four opinions across a spectrum of speculative thought concerning the present 
sanctification and transformation of the body.  For some, the body had been transformed 
by Christ and the Spirit, and been granted the power of resurrection, and, therefore, 
sexual behaviour was inconsequential, with libertine expressions of sexuality as the 
result.  At the other end of the spectrum there were those who were entirely pessimistic of 
any transformation of the body in its pre-resurrected state, even considering the body as 
sinful in its own right under Gnostic influences.  For these, celibacy was a necessary part 
of the process of salvation, both for orthodox Christians who still felt sin’s power in the 
body or for Gnostics Christianswho saw the body as part of the evil of material reality.  In 
the middle of this spectrum there were those who were cautiously optimistic about the 
body’s transformation, such as the author of I Timothy, the bishop Dionysius, Irenaeus 
and Tertullian, who felt celibacy could be helpful but only for those who had matured, but 
that celibacy could certainly never eliminate the dangers of sin and desire in human 
nature.  Finally, a happily optimistic group of celibates in the early church felt that, 
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 though never being able to completely extirpate desire and sin from the body and soul, 
celibacy could go a long way to achieving the present sanctification of the body.  Thus, 
Clement of Alexandria could say that early Christians attempted to eliminate desire 
altogether, and although acknowledging the goodness of creation, marriage and sex for 
procreation, he also suggested that within marriage couples should remain celibate after 
producing children. 
 In addition, the early church had largely adopted the language of ancient 
philosophy in its discussions over the extent to which celibacy transformed, or reflected 
the transformation of, human nature.  However, this does not mean that the motives of 
celibates in the early church were solely historically dependent upon an adoption of 
Greco-Roman sexual ideals.  Rather, the sexual ethics of the Greek and Roman 
philosophical traditions and the sexual morals of early Christians were very compatible, 
but derived from two very different sets of cosmological and teleological speculation.  
The telos of Greco-Roman speculation was to achieve happiness (eudaimonia) through 
alignment of human behaviour with human nature as it was defined by ontological and 
cosmological speculation. The telos of early Christianity was salvation of body and soul 
from sin and death, and this too was achieved through both an alignment of human 
behaviour, but now alignment with an attitude that reflected faith, humility and obedience 
to their Creator. Moreover, Greco-Roman speculation saw no potential for the 
transformation of human nature, only the potential to live out human nature to its fullest 
and truest expression. But early Christians, now considering the death and resurrection of 
Christ, saw potential for the transformation of human nature as it was united with the Son 
of God and sanctified by the Holy Spirit. In that regard, the theological speculations of 
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 early Christians allowed for a situation where the sexual austerity found in the empire 
could be both achieved by the majority and surpassed by a minority whose union with 
Christ and the Spirit had caused their very natures to be transformed. 
It is, then, the development of celibacy as an early Christian practice that reflects 
one area of early Christian thought on which the speculations of the Greco-Roman world 
had a great effect. With its limited ontology of the human anthropology received from its 
Jewish heritage, early Christianity often accepted and transformed Greco-Roman 
philosophical speculation to answer questions about the body and soul, and it was those 
speculations on human anthropology that allowed for a variety of positions concerning 
the extent of sanctification in the present.  The irony, in fact, is that depending upon what 
sort of speculation an individual accepted concerning the present sanctification of body 
and soul, an early Christian could, in theory, engage in libertine or Encratite positions, or 
adopt the more or less optimistic middle way that the early church largely accepted, and 
could defend those practices with the same scriptures or philosophical perspectives.522  
Thus, both orthodox and Gnostic Christians could adopt an overly harsh or overly liberal 
position on sexuality, and in the second century one could likely find orthodox Encratites, 
Gnostics Encratites, orthodox libertines and Gnostics libertines, and very likely, every 
position in between. 
 By the turn of the third century, then, it seems that the early church had largely 
agreed that sexual renunciation was superior to marriage, though not necessary or 
appropriate for all believers.  Indeed, the goal of transformation was now recognized to 
be an arduous process for those who truly embarked upon that path, and celibates began 
                                                          
522 For an excellent survey on how the various positions of sexual renunciation were defended with 
scripture, and how the scriptures were used and abused by adherents of celibacy, see E. Clark’s Reading 
Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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 to serve their congregations (e.g. widows, apotaktikoi, îhîdāyā) in the third century as a 
reward for their obvious sanctification.  However, the key issue was always the 
possibility of immanent present sanctification, and argument over the matter would 
continue into the following centuries. Only the libertine position was far more 
conservative and the issues seemed to be around living arrangements and conduct among 
celibates, and the Encratite position, though re-appearing occasionally523 was condemned 
by the canons of the early church.  Consequently, one of the larger concerns of the early 
church in the late third, fourth and fifth century, was to place proper boundaries on the 
practice of celibacy and correct the abuses and negative consequences that ascetic 
practice was having on the early church. 
 In particular, after the peace of Constantine monasticism included a new political 
element, and rather than describing the growth of asceticism as a largely “new” 
development in early Christian history, as some scholars have, it is far more accurate to 
describe the explosion of monasticism in the fourth century as a shift in already accepted 
ascetic practices in the early church.  Of the three classic markers of monasticism- 
enkrateia, askesis and anachoresis – the first two had existed in the early church since the 
first century.  The question that remains is why and how did withdrawal, or anachoresis, 
become entangled with early Christian asceticism? And why did a clear ascetic minority 
in the early church experience such growth in numbers during the fourth century, with the 
ideals of celibacy gaining such rhetorical urgency in the church’s doctrines and canons?  
Those questions, however, are for another study. 
                                                          
523 For example, an Armenian bishop, Eustathius, was condemned by the Council of Gangra in the mid 
fourth century for excessive encratism. See Sozomen, Church History, III.14, Socrates, Church History, 
II.43. 
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  It is clear, however, that while a simple correlation of sexual morality between 
pagans and Christians could lead to the conclusions that early Christianity stood in 
continuity and dependence with the Greco-Roman culture, a closer look has revealed a 
sui generis set of propositions within early Christianity that led to the ascendancy of 
celibacy as an ideal practice in the early church.  Moreover, it is the theological concerns 
for the salvation, transformation and sanctification of body and soul in early Christian 
theology that were at the heart of the origins and motives for early Christian celibacy.  
Certainly, the practice of celibacy had natural sociological consequences for the 
distribution of social power, but it is largely inaccurate to see a conflict over social power 
as the cause of ascetic practice in the early church. Rather, early Christian celibates were 
in the business of saving their bodies and souls through the discipline (askesis) of 
negative mortification of the sinful passions of the body, and positive recreation of their 
nature in Christ and the Spirit. 
 Richard Valantasis’ 1995 article “Constructions of Power in Asceticism”524 begins 
with a quotation of a passage from the Apophthegmata Patrum, the great collection of 
sayings from the early fathers of the desert: 
Abba Lot received Abba Joseph and said to him:  “Abba, according to my ability I 
perform my order of prayer a little, my fast a little, the prayer, the meditation and 
the silence, and according to my ability the cleansing of my thoughts.  What more 
remains, then, that I must perform?”  When the old man arose, he stretched out his 
hands to heaven, and his fingers became as then lamps of fire, and he said to him 
“If you wish, become entirely as fire!”525 
 
For Valantasis, the passage is full of constructions of power; power being desired, power 
being possessed power being transferred, and in asceticism he sees only performances 
                                                          
524 R. Valantasis, “Constructions of Power in Asceticism”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
63 (1995): 775-821. 
525 Saying 7, Apophthegmata Agian Pateron (Athens: Aster Publishing House, 1970), p. 53. 
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 done to shift the social environment to create new subjectivities, different social relations 
and an alternative symbolic universe.  However, if read in the light of asceticism defined 
as an act that brings a teleological goal into immanent existence through discipline, this 
text seems more likely to be the culmination of three centuries of ascetic imagination 
where the desert was full of early Christians whose very nature had been transformed into 
something nearly divine. Asceticism in early Christianity, and in other times and 
traditions, was not the construction of cultural discourse and conflict over social relations 
and the distribution of power, but the natural result of the belief that the teleological goals 
of that religious tradition could be achieved in the present.  Asceticism, then, is the hard 
practice that accompanies the theological and cosmological speculations of a tradition, 
and reflects the attitudes of the few that try to make the most difficult and significant 
transformations of the individual a reality.  It is only appropriate then, that it captures the 
imagination of the participants as they seek to transform their very natures:  “If you wish, 
become entirely as fire!” 
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